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Executive summary
In this safety assessment the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has evalu-
ated the safety of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in connection with application for the 
operating license renewal. This safety assessment provides a summary of the reviews, 
inspections and continuous oversight carried out by STUK.
The issues addressed in the assessment and the related evaluation criteria are set forth in 
the nuclear energy and radiation safety legislation and the regulations issued thereunder. 
The provisions of the Nuclear Energy Act concerning the safe use of nuclear energy, safety 
and emergency preparedness arrangements, and waste management are specified in more 
detail in the Government Decisions and Regulatory Guides issued by STUK. 
Based on the assessment, STUK consideres that the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant meets 
the set safety requirements with some reservations related to the redundancy and separa-
tion of components needed for performing safety functions. These reservations are originat-
ing from the design basis laid down during the 1970s. However, substantial modernisations 
have been carried out at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant since its commissioning to im-
prove safety. During the current operating licence period, risk factors have been systemati-
cally identified and eliminated using operating experience, research and development and 
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Examples of such plant modifications are given in the 
assessment. Licensee has many ongoing projects for enhancing safety. This is in line with 
the principle of continuous improvement of safety provided in Section 27 of the Resolution 
395/1991. In addition, section 28 of the Resolution 395/1991 allows considering expediency 
in evaluating technical solutions at nuclear power plant in operation.
In addition to the implementation of the plant modernisation programme, STUK raised 
issues of special significance in ensuring safe operation of the plant during the next operat-
ing license period. These were related to the management of brittle fracture risk in the re-
actor pressure vessel, adequacy of ageing management programmes for electrical and I&C 
systems and components, adequacy of the organisation and monitoring of safety culture 
and effective utilisation of operating experience feedback.
In conclusion, the prerequisites for safe operation of Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant and the 
related buildings and storage facilities required for nuclear fuel and waste management 
have been met. The application submitted by licensee for extending the operating licence to 
exceed the 30-year service life by 20 years is essentially based on the estimates made in the 
lifetime management programme. STUK required licensee to carry out two periodic safety 
reviews during the licence period. The first safety review shall be submitted to STUK for 
approval by the end of 2015, and the second safety review by the end of 2023.
Safety assessment of the Loviisa nuclear power plant. Statement regarding the licence application by 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy concerning the operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant. STUK-B 81. 
Helsinki 2007. 78 pp.
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fortum Power and Heat oy (fPH) has submitted 
an application to the Government in which the 
company applies for a licence referred to in section 
20 of the Nuclear Energy Act:
1. to operate the power plant units Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2 of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, 
each with nominal thermal power of 1500 MW, 
for the purpose of producing electrical energy 
until 31 December 2027 for Loviisa 1, and 31 
December 2030 for Loviisa 2; and
2. to use the buildings and storage facilities, as 
well as their necessary extensions, relating to 
Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 and required for nuclear 
fuel and nuclear waste management until 31 
December 2030.
In preparation for the issuance of the licence, the 
finnish ministry of Trade and Industry (mTI) has 
sent letter 6/330/2006, dated 6 November 2006 (No. 
A213/73), to the finnish Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) requesting a statement 
regarding the application filed by fPH.
fPH has filed with mTI an operating licence 
application, as well as the documents to be in-
cluded in the operating licence application, as re-
quired according section 33 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree. In addition, a number of other documents, 
to be submitted directly to STUK, are required for 
the periodic safety review included in the renewal 
of operating licence. The requirements concerning 
them are presented in Guide yvL 1.1.
The periodic safety review is mainly based on 
the following documents referred to in section 36 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree:
1. the final safety analysis report;
2. a probabilistic safety analysis;
3. a quality assurance programme for the opera-
tion of the nuclear facility;
1 Introduction
4. the Technical Specifications, which shall at least 
define limits for the process quantities that af-
fect the safety of the facility in various operating 
states, provide regulations on operating restric-
tions that result from component-failures and 
set forth requirements for the testing of compo-
nents important to safety;
5. a summary programme for periodic inspections;
6. a description of the arrangements for physical 
protection and emergencies;
7. a description of how to arrange the safeguards 
that are necessary to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons;
8. administrative rules for the nuclear facility; 
and
9. a programme for radiation monitoring in the 
environment of the nuclear facility.
According to section 36 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree: “When the application for an operating li-
cence is made for a nuclear facility that has al-
ready been in operation, the documents mentioned 
in subsection 1 need be submitted to STUK only to 
the extent that they have not been submitted before. 
In addition, the applicant must submit to STUK 
any other information considered necessary by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority.”
The documents referred to in section 36 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree shall be continuously up-
dated, and the updated versions shall be regularly 
submitted to STUK. According to Guide yvL 1.1, 
when applying for renewal of the operating li-
cence, the documents may be submitted to STUK 
only insofar as they have been amended since the 
previous updates. The licensee shall also submit 
a periodic safety review of its own concerning the 
safety status of the nuclear facility, potential ar-
eas of development and maintenance of the safety. 
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According to Guide yvL 1.1, this assessment shall 
include:
•	 a	 report	 on	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 requirements	 laid	
down in Government Decisions 395–397/1991 
and in the relevant YVL Guides
•	 a	summary	of	the	renewed	safety	analyses	and	
conclusions drawn from their results
•	 experience	 of	 the	 facility	 ageing	 and	 ageing	
management
•	 a	description	of	the	licensee’s	safety	culture	and	
safety management
•	 a	 report	 on	 the	 actions	 required	 in	 Section	 27	
of Government Decision 395/1991 [operating 
experience and safety research] and on the con-
sequent plant improvements
•	 a	 report	 on	 compliance	 with	 any	 terms	 of	 the	
operating licence
•	 a	 summary	 of	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 requirements	
laid down in Section 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
has published the safety guide NS-G-2.10, “Periodic 
Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants”, 2003, con-
cerning periodic safety reviews. The guide lists the 
following 14 safety factors that are assessed in the 
safety review:
•	 plant	design
•	 physical	condition	of	the	nuclear	power	plant
•	 qualification	of	equipment	and	structures
•	 ageing	management
•	 deterministic	safety	analyses
•	 probabilistic	safety	analyses
•	 protection	 against	 external	 and	 internal	 haz-
ards
•	 plant	operating	experience	in	terms	of	safety
•	 operating	experience	obtained	from	other	plants	
and safety research findings
•	 organisation	and	administration
•	 plant	procedures
•	 factors	contributing	to	the	work	performance	of	
people
•	 emergency	planning
•	 radiological	impact	on	the	environment.
According to Guide yvL 1.1, In making its own 
periodic safety review, the licensee shall verify that 
the	safety	factors	proposed	in	the	IAEA’s	guide	[17]	
[NS-G-2.10, ”Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear 
Power Plants”, 2003] have been taken into account 
to a sufficient degree in the safety review and other 
licence application documents.
The said documents and reports have been filed 
with STUK in several batches and updated or oth-
erwise supplemented in the course of the applica-
tion process in response to the remarks presented 
by STUK.
This Safety Assessment presents the basis for 
STUK’s statement. This Safety Assessment pro-
vides a summary of the reviews concerning the 
issues and documents relating to the operating 
licence application, inspection of the safety review 
presented by the licence applicant and the results 
of the continuous oversight carried out by STUK.
1.1 Safety-related regulations
Sections 5 to 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) 
contain the following safety provisions:
Section 5, The use of nuclear energy, taking into 
account its various effects, shall be in line with the 
overall good of society;
Section 6, The use of nuclear energy must be 
safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or damage 
to the environment or property;
Section 6a, Nuclear waste generated in connec-
tion with or as a result of use of nuclear energy in 
Finland shall be handled, stored and permanently 
disposed of in Finland […]; and
Section 7, Sufficient physical protection and 
emergency planning as well as other arrangements 
for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting 
nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be a 
prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.
This Safety Assessment covers all the aspects of 
the operation of the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units that fall within STUK’s mandate. The 
issues to be addressed in the Safety Assessment 
and the related evaluation criteria are set forth in 
the nuclear energy and radiation safety legislation 
and the regulations issued thereunder. The provi-
sions of the Nuclear Energy Act concerning the safe 
use of nuclear energy, safety and emergency pre-
paredness arrangements, and waste management 
are specified in more detail in the Government 
Decisions applicable to each field of activity and 
issued under Section 81 of the Nuclear Energy Act. 
The resolutions are:
•	 General	Regulations	 for	 the	Safety	 of	Nuclear	
Power Plants (395/1991)
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•	 Physical	 Protection	 of	 Nuclear	 Power	 Plants	
(396/1991)
•	 Emergency	Response	Arrangements	at	Nuclear	
Power Plants (397/1991)
•	 Safety	of	a	Disposal	Facility	for	Reactor	Waste	
(398/91), and
•	 Safety	 of	 Disposal	 of	 Spent	 Nuclear	 Fuel	
(478/1999).
The yvL Guides published by STUK set out even 
more detailed safety requirements. STUK continu-
ally evaluates the currency of the nuclear safety 
regulations in relation to current international de-
velopments, particularly within the framework of 
the International Atomic Energy Association IAEA 
and the western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association wENRA. The currency of the yvL 
Guides is checked regularly at about five-year in-
tervals.
The principle regulations governing the field of 
nuclear energy – that is, the Nuclear Energy Act, 
the Nuclear Energy Decree and the Government 
Decisions on the general regulations for the safety, 
physical protection and emergency preparedness 
of nuclear power plants, and for the safety of a 
disposal facility for reactor waste and disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel – have, with the exception of the 
latter of the above, been issued between the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Section 80, paragraph 1 
of the new Constitution of finland, which entered 
into force at the beginning of march 2000, requires 
that principles governing the rights and obliga-
tions of private individuals and the other matters 
that, under the Constitution, are of a legislative 
nature shall be governed by Acts.
on the basis of the above, the ministry of Trade 
and Industry initiated a project for revising the nu-
clear energy legislation in cooperation with STUK. 
The objective and task of the project is to amend 
the nuclear energy legislation so that it fulfils the 
requirements laid down in the Constitution. In par-
ticular, the regulation level of certain regulations 
relating to nuclear safety and the authorisation 
provisions of the Nuclear Energy Act are under 
consideration. The regulations relating to the ex-
port and import of nuclear products and goods and 
the decommissioning of nuclear facilities will be 
reviewed and supplemented when required during 
the course of the project. The legislation will also 
be technically updated in other relevant respects. 
A Government proposal to amend the Nuclear 
Energy Act, as well as the Government decrees on 
the amendment of the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
on general regulations for the safety of a nuclear 
power plant, physical protection concerning the 
use of nuclear energy, emergency preparedness ar-
rangements at nuclear power plants and the safety 
of the disposal of nuclear waste will be prepared in 
connection with the project.
According to preliminary estimates, the changes 
concerning nuclear energy legislation are planned 
to enter into force at the beginning of 2008. The as-
sessment concerning the renewal of the operating 
licence for the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units shall be carried out based on the currently 
effective legislation. However, the impact of the 
planned changes on the assessment has been con-
sidered in the summary of the safety assessment 
(Section 14) by assuming that the changes were 
already in effect.
1.2 Structure of the safety assessment
In this Safety Assessment, matters relating to nu-
clear safety are discussed in the same order as 
they are presented in the Government Decision 
395/1991. In addition, the discussion also covers 
matters that are proposed to be transferred from 
the yvL guides onto the decree level in connection 
with the amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act 
and Government Decrees. These additions relate 
to the qualification and service life management 
of equipment and structures, handling and storage 
of nuclear waste and nuclear fuel, and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear power plant. In addition, mat-
ters relating to Government Decisions 396/1991, 
397/1991, 398/1991 and 478/1999 are also dis-
cussed, as well as the compliance with the terms 
of the current operating licence of the plant. This 
Safety Assessment also discusses those precondi-
tions laid down in section 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act that have not been separately included in the 
current Government Decisions but the assessment 
of which nevertheless falls within the mandate of 
STUK. Relating to the above, section 20, paragraph 
1, point 4 concerns, among other things, the appli-
cant’s financial prerequisites to engage in opera-
tions; although this point primarily falls within the 
mandate of other authorities, STUK nevertheless 
presents its observations concerning the cover for 
nuclear liability, preparations for nuclear waste 
10
STUK-B 81
management costs and the operations fPH in the 
current conditions of the open electricity market. 
In accordance with section 20, paragraph 1, point 
4, this Safety Assessment also discusses the fulfil-
ment of finland’s international contractual obli-
gations concerning nuclear material safeguards, 
nuclear safety and nuclear waste management.
The relevant text from the Government Decision 
is quoted at the beginning of each section in ital-
ics. Direct quotations from other regulations are 
likewise presented in italics. If necessary, a brief 
description of the practical applications of the re-
quirements in the Government Decisions and the 
more detailed criteria presented in the yvL Guides 
is provided. Each section includes an evaluation 
of how the related requirements are implemented 
at the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. 
Special attention will be paid to the question of 
whether “the nuclear facility meets the safety re-
quirements set, that the physical protection and 
emergency planning are sufficient, that the neces-
sary control to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons has been arranged appropriately, and that 
the licensee of the nuclear facility has, as provided, 
arranged indemnification regarding liability in 
case of nuclear damage” (Nuclear Energy Act, sec-
tion 20, paragraph 2, point 1). A summary of the 
results of the review is presented at the end of the 
Safety Assessment.
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2 Premises and definitions 
(Government Decision 395/1991)
2.1 Section 1: Applicability
In this decision general regulations relating to the 
safety of nuclear power plants equipped with a light 
water reactor are given.
In terms of their basic design, the Loviisa 1 and 
2 nuclear power plant units are vvER-440 light 
water reactors.
2.2 Section 2: Definitions
In this decision:
1. dose (more precisely, effective dose) shall 
refer to the weighted sum of the equivalent doses 
of tissues and organs subjected to radiation, 
where the equivalent dose denotes the product of 
the mean energy absorbed per unit mass in the 
tissue or organ and of the radiation weighting 
factor;
1. dose commitment shall refer to the time in-
tegral of the dose rate reaching to a separately 
defined period of time;
2. criticality accident shall refer to such an ac-
cident during which an uncontrolled chain reac-
tion of fissions caused by neutrons arises;
3. quality assurance shall refer to all planned 
and systematic actions necessary to provide 
adequate confidence that a component, plant or 
activity will satisfy given requirements;
4. anticipated operational transient shall re-
fer to a deviation milder than an accident from 
normal operational conditions which can be ex-
pected to occur once or several times during any 
period of a hundred operating years;
5. accident shall refer to a deviation from normal 
operating conditions which is not an anticipated 
operational transient. Accidents are grouped 
into two classes:
6. postulated accident means an event which 
serves as a design basis for the engineered safety 
systems of a nuclear power plant. The nuclear 
power plant shall withstand a postulated ac-
cident without severe fuel damages and without 
radioactive releases that would require extensive 
measures for restricting the exposure of the gen-
eral public; and
7. severe accident means an event during which 
a considerable part of the fuel in the reactor is 
damaged;
8. probabilistic safety analysis shall refer to 
estimates and calculations based on experience 
and probabilistic methods which address the 
reliability of operation of nuclear power plant 
systems, potential accident sequences, reactor 
damage, accident propagation and releases of 
radioactive materials;
9. safety functions shall refer to functions impor-
tant from the safety point of view the meaning 
of which is to prevent the emergence or advance-
ment of transient and accident conditions or to 
mitigate the consequences of accidents; the most 
important safety functions are reactor shut-
down, residual heat removal from the reactor to 
the ultimate heat sink and the functioning of the 
containment building; and
10. nuclear power plant shall refer to a nuclear 
installation equipped with a nuclear reactor 
which is intended for electricity generation, or, if 
several such or other nuclear installations have 
been placed on the same site, the entity of instal-
lations formed by them.
This Safety Assessment makes use of the defi-
nitions specified in the Government Decision 
395/1991.
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3 General Principles 
(Government Decision 395/1991)
3.1 Section 3: General objective
The general objective is to ensure nuclear power 
plant safety so that nuclear power plant operation 
does not cause radiation hazards which could en-
danger the safety of workers or of the population in 
the vicinity or could otherwise harm the environ-
ment or property.
This objective is defined in section 6 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act. more detailed requirements 
for measures required to ensure safety are also 
included in sections 6a, 7 and 20 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (see section 14, Summary), Government 
Decisions 395/1991, 396/1991, 397/1991, 398/1991 
and 478/1999, yvL Guides issued by the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority, and radiation safety 
legislation. The above-mentioned regulations form 
the basis of this Safety Assessment.
This Safety Assessment gives an evaluation of 
the attainment of the general objective laid down 
in section 3.
3.2 Section 4: Safety culture
When designing, constructing and operating a nu-
clear power plant, an advanced safety culture shall 
be maintained which is based on the safety-oriented 
attitude of the topmost management of the organi-
sations in question and on the motivation of the 
personnel towards responsible work. This presup-
poses well-organised working conditions and an 
open working atmosphere, as well as the encourage-
ment of alertness and initiative in order to detect 
and eliminate factors which endanger safety.
The significance of a safety culture as an im-
portant factor affecting safety has been widely 
acknowledged since the 1990s. The development 
of a safety culture is a continuous learning process 
carried out in slightly different ways in different 
utilities due their different approaches. The safety 
culture prevailing in organisations does not re-
main unchanged but is constantly changing due to 
internal and external reasons. Changes are intro-
duced to procedures and attitudes by, among other 
things, personnel turnover, changing economic con-
ditions and developments in technology. Because 
the safety culture is constantly changing, it is es-
sential that fPH and the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant retain the capacity for assessing, developing 
and maintaining their safety culture.
In line with an advanced safety culture, the 
management of fPH and the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant have documented their commitment 
to nuclear and radiation safety in the documents 
serving as operating guidelines. Annual planning 
is strategy-based, the consequence of which is that 
safety objectives are being used as criteria for long 
and short-term planning of operations and resourc-
ing.
In line with an advanced safety culture, the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has systematic proce-
dures in place through which the personnel are mo-
tivated towards responsible work (e.g. inroduction, 
training, communications, plant procedures and 
monitoring of supervisors). However, in its oSART 
(operational Safety Review Team) review in 2007 
the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA ob-
served deficiencies in the visibility of safety man-
agement and compliance with procedures. STUK 
will monitor the implementation of the corrective 
measures taken and development plans prepared 
on the basis of these observations.
The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has proce-
dures in place for selecting, instructing and super-
vising contractors and subcontractors. The power 
plant aims at developing long-term co-operation 
with its suppliers. The objective is to raise the 
subcontractors’ knowledge of the plant and its 
procedures to ensure it is sufficient. The coopera-
tion between Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, part of 
STUK-B 81
13
the fortum Generation business unit, and fortum 
Nuclear Services Ltd has been significantly im-
proved during the present operating licence period, 
and these efforts should be further continued in 
the future.
with regard to successful preconditions for a 
safety culture, development needs have been ob-
served in the working conditions at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant concerning, for example, 
housekeeping as well as workspaces and locker 
facilities. These deficiencies have been adequately 
addressed by means of a development programme 
relating to occupational safety and plans relating 
to workspaces. Different types of reporting prac-
tices promote initiative and alertness to raise nu-
clear and radiation safety issues. The organisation 
attempts to identify possible nuclear and radiation 
safety risks.
fPH has at its disposal a variety of tools 
(e.g. QA activities, atmosphere surveys, appraisal 
discussions and external reviews) for obtaining 
information about the current state of the safety 
culture. However, extensive follow-up targeting the 
safety culture of the entire operating organisation 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has not been 
implemented, nor is such follow-up planned for 
implementation in the reports submitted in con-
nection with the operating licence renewal.
The conclusion to the above is that attempts 
are being made to maintain an advanced safety 
culture at fPH and the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant in line with the basic intention of section 4 
of the Government Decision. However, systematic 
work for promoting safety culture with the help 
of experts in organisational research has not been 
conducted at fPH. In future, fPH must pay more 
attention in the monitoring and further improve-
ment of the state of the safety culture. STUK will 
monitor the subsequent developments of the safety 
culture in connection with its regulatory work.
3.3 Section 5: Quality assurance
Advanced quality assurance programmes shall be 
employed in all activities which affect safety and 
relate to the design, construction and operation of a 
nuclear power plant.
The Quality Assurance Programme of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant refers to the entity 
described in the quality assurance manual for op-
erations and in the procedures required for imple-
menting the programme. The quality assurance re-
quirements and procedures to be adhered to when 
procuring nuclear fuel and planning its use are de-
fined in the nuclear fuel quality assurance manual. 
All sections of the quality assurance manual for op-
erations have been revised and approved by STUK 
during 2002–2006, and the sections of the nuclear 
fuel quality assurance manual during 2002–2004 
respectively. The procedures for implementing the 
quality assurance measures have been submitted 
to STUK for information.
The organisations of the licensee participating 
in nuclear operations, the Generation business 
unit as a whole, and the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant and fortum Nuclear Services Ltd (fNS) 
within it, have a shared quality policy for nuclear 
operations, while each of the above have separate 
management systems that interrelate in an appro-
priate manner. The Generation business unit has 
an environmental certificate in accordance with 
SfS-EN ISo-14001:2004, which also comprises 
the operations of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. 
fNS has a quality management system certificate 
in accordance with SfS-EN ISo-9001:2000.
During the present operating licence period the 
quality management system of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant has been developed in several ways 
according to the experience gained and the gen-
eral development trend of quality management. 
Examples include:
•	 reflecting the impact of changes on the organi-
sation and work duties at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant in the administrative and operat-
ing procedure system and emphasising the role 
of management in the procedures
•	 extensive update to emergency procedures and 
development of procedures for severe accidents
•	 development of new occupational health and 
safety system and its integration with the certi-
fied environmental system
•	 development of information systems and utilis-
ing them in document management
•	 development of laboratory quality system
•	 establishing a separate inspection organisation 
at Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in 2001
•	 development of investment and refurbishment 
project procedures as well as modification and 
design procedures.
A project for developing a process-oriented op-
erating model was initiated at the Loviisa Nuclear 
14
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Power Plant in 2005. The description of the quality 
management system in the form of process dia-
grams was completed during 2006. The objective is 
that the development of the quality management 
system and the improvement of operations over 
the next few years are to be carried out on the ba-
sis of the process diagrams.
STUK has conducted regular inspections on the 
implementation of the quality system at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant. During the current operating 
licence period, no such deficiencies relating to the 
fundamentals or structures of quality management 
that would have essential significance to safety or 
operations affecting quality have been observed. 
fPH has appropriately processed and rectified the 
single deficiencies observed in the implementation 
of quality management.
The quality management system and its ef-
ficiency have also been assessed by organisations 
other than STUK. IAEA conducted the oSART 
(operational Safety Review Team) inspections tar-
geted at the operating activities at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant in 1990 and 2007. other 
assessments of quality management include, for 
instance, a number of self-assessments on the basis 
of various quality standards, the Peer Review in-
spections by wANo (world Association of Nuclear 
operators), certification inspections concerning the 
management of environmental matters, a number 
of focused inspections carried out by different or-
ganisations, the plant’s own annual inspections, 
and the independent reviews of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant ordered by the licensee.
The conclusion to the above is that fPH has 
exposed its operations to external assessment ac-
cording to the distinctive features of an advanced 
quality system, and that such inspection and as-
sessment activities have been comprehensive dur-
ing the operating licence period. The quality man-
agement system of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant meets the set requirements and is up to 
date. The undergoing project for describing operat-
ing processes creates improved preconditions for 
monitoring, assessing and developing operations 
affecting safety.
The organisation and its operational precondi-
tions, as well as the implementation of the quality 
system, is also discussed in several other sections 
of this Safety assessment.
In summary, it can be stated that activities 
relating to the quality management system of 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant have been ar-
ranged in manner referred to in section 5 of the 
Government Decision.
3.4 Section 6: Demonstration 
of compliance with the 
safety regulations
If compliance with the safety regulations cannot 
be directly ascertained, fulfilment shall be demon-
strated by the necessary experimental and calcula-
tional methods.
Nuclear power plant safety and the design of its 
safety systems shall be substantiated by accident 
analyses and probabilistic safety analyses. Analyses 
shall be maintained and revised if necessary, tak-
ing into account operating experience, the results 
of experimental research and the advancement of 
calculating methods.
The calculating methods employed for demon-
strating that the safety regulations are met shall 
be reliable and well qualified for dealing with the 
events in question. They shall be applied so that the 
calculated results are, at a confident estimate, less 
favourable than the results which are considered 
best estimates. Furthermore, analyses which picture 
the likely course of transients and accidents shall 
be conducted for the purpose of probabilistic safety 
analyses and for the development of emergency op-
erating procedures.
3.4.1 Accident analyses
Analyses are intended to prove the ability of the 
plant unit to safely overcome various transients 
and accidents. According to Guide yvL 2.2, the 
analyses shall focus on events that, by their nature 
and severity, cover various types of incidents and 
accidents as well as possible. The course of tran-
sients and accidents shall be analysed as a func-
tion of time, starting from the initiating event and 
ending in a safe and stable state.
fPH has reviewed all analyses of transient and 
accident conditions presented in section 14 of the 
final Safety Analysis Report for Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant and updated them to the extent re-
quired by modifications carried out at the plant or 
amendments to the requirements set by the au-
thorities. After the granting of the valid operating 
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licence, Guides yvL 2.2 and yvL 6.2, for example, 
have been revised. These guides define the clas-
sification of initiating events, provide instructions 
on how to perform the analyses, and present the 
acceptance criteria for the analyses. As to plant 
modifications, the introduction of new emergency 
procedures, for example, has resulted in needs for 
renewing the accident analyses.
The calculation methods used for calculating 
the plant’s normal operating condition, transients 
and postulated accidents are primarily those devel-
oped in finland. The methods have been qualified 
primarily by performing comparative calculations 
against the results measured using different meth-
ods and test equipment. The extent of the quali-
fication is on a good level from an international 
perspective. Due to uncertainty relating to the 
accuracy of calculating methods, it is essential that 
sufficiently wide safety margins be applied when 
assessing the fulfilment of the analysis acceptance 
criteria.
The analyses described in the safety analysis 
report, as well as the related topical reports, also 
present and justify the initial values used and the 
assumptions made affecting the end results of the 
analyses, as well as the sensitivity analyses car-
ried out. STUK has reviewed the presented analy-
ses and the methods used therein. In addition, 
STUK has commissioned independent comparative 
analyses. Sensitivity and comparative analyses are 
required for assessing and reducing the uncertain-
ties relating to calculating methods and calculat-
ing assumptions in general.
The analyses presented in the safety analysis 
report discuss anticipated operational transients 
and postulated accidents used as the design basis 
of the safety systems as well as the so-called severe 
accidents. Different types of transients and acci-
dents have been further divided into classes. Each 
class contains a variety of accident sequences, 
and separate analyses have been presented for 
each. All safety-critical analyses include sensitivity 
analyses, often of considerable scope.
Anticipated operational transients are distur-
bances that can be expected to occur at least once 
during the service life of the plant. on the basis of 
the review of the analyses, the following cases of 
operational transients have been reanalysed:
•	 stopping of one and three reactor coolant 
pumps,
•	 opening of secondary circuit safety relief valve, 
and
•	 stopping of main feedwater pump.
The results of the renewed analyses meet the ac-
ceptance criteria set for operational transients in 
all respects.
According to Guide yvL 2.2, postulated acci-
dents are divided into two classes according to the 
estimated frequency of the initiating event:
•	 level 1 postulated accidents; frequency 10–3…
10–2/year, and
•	 level 2 postulated accidents; frequency less than 
10–3/year.
fPH has classified the postulated accidents on the 
basis of the above and reanalysed the following 
cases resulting from level 1 postulated accidents:
•	 feedwater pipe break and
•	 steam generator heat transfer tube rupture 
(without the loss of off-site power).
The following cases of level 2 postulated acci-
dents have been reanalysed:
•	 steam generator heat transfer tube rupture 
(with the loss of off-site power),
•	 large break primary-to-secondary leak
•	 small and large break loss of coolant accident, 
and
•	 uncontrolled	actuation	of	control	rods	from	zero	
power with failure of automatic scram.
fPH has also supplemented the overpressure pro-
tection analyses and renewed the analysis of boron 
dilution with regard to small break loss of coolant 
accident.
The results of the renewed analyses meet the ac-
ceptance criteria set for postulated accidents in all 
respects. The accident analyses assessing the opera-
bility of safety systems are discussed in more detail 
in section 5.3 in terms of reactor core and fuel, and 
in sections 4.4 and 4.5 in terms of radiation safety.
Transient and accident analyses, and the meth-
ods of analysis used therein shall be maintained 
and developed throughout the service life of the 
nuclear power plant. on the basis of the results 
of the analyses, safety-enhancing measures shall 
be taken as required. Nearly all of the analyses of 
transient and accident conditions will be updated in 
connection with the automation renewal that is to 
be implemented at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
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over the next few years. In connection with the con-
ceptual design plans for the functional changes to be 
implemented during the course of the renewal, fPH 
has already carried out and submitted to STUK a 
number of analyses to justify these changes. over 
the next few years, fPH will also prepare analyses 
of the so-called extensions of postulated accidents. 
The primary purpose of these analyses is to ensure 
that there are no such conditions immediately out-
side of the actual design basis the plant is incapable 
of managing safely.
The conclusion to the above is that the tran-
sient and accident analyses concerning the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant have been prepared in a 
manner referred to in section 6 of the Government 
Decision.
3.4.2 Probabilistic risk analyses (PRA)
In this connection, probabilistic risk analyses 
(PRA) refer to the probabilistic safety analyses as 
prescribed in section 36 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree 161/1988 and in section 6 of the Government 
Decision 395/1991.
PRA is used for systematically analysing the 
occurrence of transients and the operation of the 
safety functions required by them, while taking 
into account the possibilities for faults and er-
rors, as well as their probabilities, in each system. 
Transients may originate from equipment failures, 
fires, floods, harsh weather conditions, earthquakes 
or human errors. Event sequences describing acci-
dent propagation resulting in reactor core damage 
are analysed in the PRA, and the probability for 
their occurrence is estimated. The PRA can be used 
for identifying such dependencies between systems 
that may otherwise remain unnoticed.
The timing and probabilities of accident sequenc-
es resulting in reactor core damage are defined on 
level 1 of the PRA; the quantity, time and probabil-
ity of the release of radioactive material into the 
environment is estimated on level 2 of the PRA.
In the PRA, an initiating event is a single event 
that causes a transient and requires starting the 
plant safety functions. The initiating event can be 
an internal or external event. Internal initiating 
events are transients arising from component fail-
ures, loss of off-site power and human errors made 
by plant personnel. The ‘flood’ initiating events are 
floods occurring inside the plant due to ruptures 
in piping or pressure vessels causing a transient 
and loss of components important to safety. The 
‘fire’ initiating events are fires occurring inside the 
plant site causing a transient.
External initiating events are transients caused 
by weather phenomena and earthquakes as well as 
disturbances in the environment caused by human 
activity. The weather phenomena considered in 
risk analyses include strong wind, lightning, excep-
tionally high or low outdoor temperature, snowfall, 
high seawater temperature, high seawater level, 
and phenomena causing a clogging risk in the 
seawater	 systems,	 such	as	 frazil	 ice	 (sudden	sub-
cooling of seawater) and excessive growth of algae. 
In addition, the impacts of offshore oil accidents 
are also analysed.
Level 1 PRA – Internal initiating events
In terms of core damage frequency, the most im-
portant internal initiating events during power op-
eration are leaks from the primary circuit outside 
containment and the loss of control room I&C fa-
cilities cooling. The core damage frequency caused 
by internal initiating events during power opera-
tion has decreased by approximately 50 % from the 
estimate of 1997, even though new significant risk 
factors have been identified during the develop-
ment of the PRA model. The risk has been reduced 
by a number of plant modifications and changes 
to plant procedures. The most significant of these 
changes concern the reductions of risks arising 
from leaks outside the containment and leaks in 
the seals of reactor coolant pumps.
During an annual maintenance outage, the 
most important internal initiating in terms of 
core damage frequency are dropping heavy loads 
in the reactor hall and losses of reactivity control. 
The analysis has been supplemented during the 
current operating licence period, while new risk 
factors relating to annual maintenance outages 
have been identified. A number of plant modifica-
tions have been made on the basis of the updated 
analyses, the most important of which being the 
changes relating to heavy load lifting routes and 
instructions, as well as the changes relating to the 
prevention of boron dilution implemented to en-
sure reactor sub-criticality.
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Level 1 PRA - Flood risks (internal flooding)
The flood risk analysis of Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant has been developed and supplemented by 
modelling, among other things, the feed water tank 
level and the plant modifications implemented dur-
ing the current operating licence period. According 
to the analysis, the most significant floods are 
caused by a leak in the emergency cooling system 
inside the reactor building, leaks in the fire fight-
ing water system inside the control room building, 
and leaks in the feed water system above the con-
trol room.
The risk arising from floods has been reduced 
during the current operating licence period. The 
risk arising from leaks occurring in the feedwater 
system above the control room was reduced by 
changing the feed water piping material to more 
erosion-corrosion resistant, by installing jet shields 
and restraints for the possible occurrence of pipe 
breaks, and by improving the leaktightness and 
drainage of the level. Risks arising from leaks in 
the seawater systems and in the fire fighting water 
system were reduced by a number of plant proce-
dure changes and plant modifications. The most 
important of these plant modifications included 
protecting the service water system pressure meas-
urements against the impacts of flood, enhancing 
the drainage of and adding flood alarms to the 
cable room below the control room, and changing 
the sprinkler systems below the control room to 
manually actuated.
The planned automation renewal will enhance 
the reliability of the cooling of reactor coolant 
pump seals, which will also reduce the risk arising 
from floods in the control room. The flood risk from 
the emergency cooling system and the seawater 
system will not essentially change as a result of 
the automation renewal.
Level 1 PRA – Fire risks
The fire risk analysis of Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant has been developed and supplemented by 
modelling, among other things, the control room 
building and the plant modifications implemented 
during the current operating licence period. The 
analysis does not yet cover the modelling of re-
activity accidents, pressure vessel brittle fracture 
and shutdown states.
The majority of the risk caused by fires arises 
from leaks in the reactor coolant pump seals. The 
large risk share of reactor coolant pump seal leaks 
is due to the fact that the operation of the pumps 
involves a large number of cables and a seal leak 
can be the result of fires in several rooms. The 
plant modifications carried out in order to ensure 
the cooling of seal water have not significantly re-
duced the risk of seal leak arising from fires.
The risk arising from fires has been reduced 
during the current operating licence period. The 
improvement of the model and the several plant 
modifications carried out have both contributed 
to the reduction of the risk. Plant modifications 
for ensuring residual heat removal have been car-
ried out during the operating licence period and, 
as a result, the operation of systems located in 
the turbine hall is no longer necessary. The risk 
significance of fires in the turbine hall has thus 
been reduced. fire detector systems have been re-
newed, and fire extinguishing systems have been 
improved.
Level 1 PRA – Weather phenomena
fPH has updated the weather risk analysis for 
power operation of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant during the current operating licence period 
and prepared a weather risk analysis for shutdown 
states. The weather risk analysis has been supple-
mented by a separate detailed oil risk analysis.
The core damage frequency estimate arising 
from weather phenomena has decreased signifi-
cantly during the current operating licence period. 
Among other things, this is due to the plant modi-
fications carried out for preventing the complete 
clogging of the seawater system. The modifications 
will be continued in 2007, after which seawater 
intake will be possible from the outlet side as well. 
Backup of the cooling of reactor coolant pump seal 
water independent of the seawater system has 
been implemented at the plant during the current 
operating licence period, which reduces the risk 
of seal leak caused by clogging of the seawater 
intake.
After the plant modifications, the most impor-
tant external phenomena are clogging of the sea-
water system during outage caused by an offshore 
oil accident and high seawater level (+2.5 m above 
average water level) during power operation. other 
risk-relevant external phenomena include strong 
wind, lightning and clogging of the seawater sys-
tem	caused	by	algae	and	frazil	ice.
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Level 1 PRA - Earthquakes
Apart from slow land uplift, the finnish bedrock is 
stable. The occurrence of dangerous earthquakes in 
finland is considered extremely unlikely, but very 
weak earthquakes are observed relatively often.
Loads caused by earthquakes have not been 
separately accounted for in the design of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. Instead, other load 
cases were considered to cover them to a sufficient 
extent. It has since turned out that earthquakes 
may present a significant risk factor for nuclear 
power plants in areas of low seismic activity if the 
horizontal	 forces	caused	by	earthquakes	have	not	
been considered at all in the design of components 
and their supports, for example. However, no items 
particularly sensitive to earthquakes have been 
detected in the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
The earthquake resistance of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant was assessed in a seismic risk 
analysis completed in 1992. The main elements 
of the analysis are the estimation of the annual 
frequency of earthquakes of varying magnitude 
on the basis of seismologic measurement data and 
historical observations, building vibration analy-
ses and definition of peak accelerations on differ-
ent floor levels, and estimation of the probability 
of structural damage in earthquakes of different 
magnitude.
The seismic resistance of the structures, sys-
tems and components of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant was generally considered good. The feed wa-
ter tank supports and certain direct current power 
systems were considered the seismically most sen-
sitive items. on the basis of the analysis, the core 
damage frequency resulting from earthquakes is 
relatively small.
The number of accumulated accurate measure-
ment observations has increased and methods 
for estimating the frequency of rare earthquakes 
have been developed globally during the past 15 
years. various investigations carried out in differ-
ent conjunctions have produced slightly different 
earthquake frequencies for the Loviisa area. The 
calculation methods for building vibration analysis 
have also advanced. Although the above-mentioned 
factors are not likely to have essential significance 
for the conclusions concerning the earthquake 
risks of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, there is 
a justified reason to update the analysis early on 
during the next operating licence period.
Level 2 PRA
Level 2 PRA for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
has been significantly improved and supplemented 
with further detail during the current operating 
licence period. The model for migration of radioac-
tive material has been renewed. Level 2 PRA has 
been supplemented by flood and weather events 
during power operation and preliminary estimates 
on fire and seismic events during power operation. 
In addition, the risk resulting from internal initiat-
ing events during an outage has also been prelimi-
narily assessed.
Initiating events during outage comprise the 
majority of the frequency of a major release. The 
PRA is not yet comprehensive in this regard. major 
release in this connection refers to a release ex-
ceeding the limit for a release arising from a severe 
accident as defined in section 12 of Government 
Decision 395/1991. According to a preliminary es-
timate, the most important outage events in terms 
of the risk of a major release are dropping heavy 
loads when lifting heavy loads, reactivity increase, 
and floating of oil into the plant. During power op-
eration, the most significant causes of release risk 
are internal initiating events.
fPH has presented plans for plant modifica-
tions to be carried out on the basis of the current 
level 2 PRA results in order to reduce the frequen-
cy of a major release. These include, e.g., improv-
ing the reliability of break isolation in the control 
rod cooling piping, reducing the reactivity risk by 
means	of	on-line	boron	analyzers	and	development	
of instructions, identifying the opportunities for re-
ducing the risks arising from heavy load lifting by 
means of crane modifications, as well as numerous 
instruction development efforts. other significant 
renewal projects are also currently underway at 
the plant (for example, the automation renewal 
project LARA), the completion of which will further 
reduce the frequency of a major release. The major-
ity of the modifications will be implemented during 
2007–2012.
fPH has also presented a plan for supplement-
ing the level 2 PRA analyses for the missing parts. 
The long-term objective is to improve plant safety 
based on the results of the analyses. The outage 
analysis will be carried out during 2007–2009, and 
STUK has required that the development of instruc-
tions for outage situations based on the results of 
the analysis is completed by the end of 2014.
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Summary
PRA has been used for systematically identifying 
and eliminating risk factors during the preceding 
and the current operating licence period.
The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant meets the 
target value for core damage frequency set for old 
plants by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), but fails to meet the numerical design ob-
jectives set for new power plants concerning core 
damage and major release frequency in Guide yvL 
2.8 issued by STUK. STUK has set attaining a 
safety level as high as reasonably achievable as a 
target for nuclear power plants in operation.
In the 1998 safety assessment STUK requested 
that the most significant risks be reduced. Safety 
has been improved by means of several plant modi-
fications during the current operating licence pe-
riod. Examples include ensuring the cooling of re-
actor coolant pump seals as well as improvements 
to the plant residual heat removal and emergency 
cooling systems.
The PRA has indicated that it will be necessary 
to continue the safety improvement measures dur-
ing the future operating licence period in, e.g., the 
following areas:
•	 Improvements aiming at preventing reactor 
coolant pump seal leaks shall be continued with 
regard to fire and flood conditions.
•	 Precautions against oil accidents in the Gulf 
of finland shall be further improved by, e.g., 
developing the emergency preparedness for oil-
combating in the neighbouring area and the 
instructions relating to outage situations.
•	 In order to decrease the possibility of a reactiv-
ity accident, the accidental migration of unbo-
rated coolant into the primary circuit shall be 
more reliably prevented.
•	 The risks arising for heavy load lifting shall be 
further reduced by improving the structural 
reliability of the crane and developing the pro-
cedures relating to lifting.
Improvements to the containment systems for man-
aging severe accidents were implemented during 
the current operating licence period of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant. However, the estimated risk 
of major release has not been significantly reduced 
because new accident sequences have been identi-
fied that are not included in the present severe ac-
cident management strategy. Relating to the above, 
it will therefore be necessary to carry out the fol-
lowing improvements during the future operating 
licence period:
•	 The risk arising from leaks from the primary 
circuit outside the containment shall be re-
duced. An example of these kinds of contain-
ment bypass sequences is a non-isolated leak 
in the cooling piping of the reactor control rod 
drive mechanism.
•	 The impact of external events (storm, lightning, 
earthquakes) and fires on the frequency of a 
major release shall be analysed in more detail.
fPH has presented a long-term plan for reducing 
the accident and release risk, and for supplement-
ing the existing PRA. STUK will monitor and over-
see the implementation of the programme.
on the basis of the above, it can be stated that 
fPH has justified the plant safety and safety 
engineering solutions in accordance with the re-
quirements concerning probabilistic safety analy-
ses presented in section 6 of Government Decision 
395/1991.
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4 Regulations concerning radiation exposure 
and releases of radioactive materials 
(Government Decision 395/1991)
4.1 Section 7: Limitation of 
radiation exposure
Radiation exposure arising from the operation of 
a nuclear power plant shall be kept as low as rea-
sonably achievable. A nuclear power plant and its 
operation shall also be designed so that the limits 
presented in this decision are not exceeded.
Consequently, exposure to radiation must 
be controlled in accordance with the As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle.
The International Commission on Radiation 
Protection (ICRP) is currently revising its radia-
tion protection policy document. The reforms will 
not, however, require any substantial changes to 
the existing national radiation protection regula-
tions. for example, the dose limits prescribed in 
the Radiation Decree (1512/1991) will remain un-
changed.
The radiation safety of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant workers and the population in the 
plant vicinity is discussed in more detain in sec-
tions 4.2–4.6 below.
4.2 Section 8: Radiation safety of 
nuclear power plant workers
A	nuclear	power	plant’s	design	and	operation	shall	
be implemented so that radiation exposure to work-
ers can be limited as separately enacted.
The regulations concerning the radiation expo-
sure of employees are the Radiation Act 592/1991, 
the Radiation Decree 1512/1991, and the ST and 
yvL Guides issued by STUK. Section 3 of the 
Radiation Decree stipulates that the effective dose 
caused to a worker by radiation work shall not ex-
ceed an average of 20 millisieverts (mSv) per year 
reckoned over a period of five years, nor 50 mSv in 
any single year.
Chemical decontamination of the entire pri-
mary circuit was carried out in the Loviisa 2 nu-
clear power plant unit in 1994. This significantly 
decreased the radiation dose rates in the steam 
generator room of the plant unit. Dose rates were 
successfully stabilised to an equal level of Loviisa 1 
nuclear power plant unit, and have remained rela-
tively stable at both plant units since this treat-
ment. The contribution of various radionuclides 
is examined at the plant units on a regular basis. 
Cobalt-60 and antimony-124 have been the most 
significant nuclides contributing to the dose rate 
during the past few years.
In addition to radiation dose rates, the amount 
of maintenance work carried out during annual 
maintenances, including the amount of refurbish-
ment work due to ageing and plant modifications 
to improve plant safety, has essential impact on 
the radiation doses of workers. The target value 
presented in Guide yvL 7.9 for reducing the collec-
tive occupational dose of nuclear power plant work-
ers is 2.5 manSv per one Gw net electrical power 
calculated for one reactor unit as an average of two 
consecutive years. for the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant, this translates to an average of 1.22 manSv 
per year for one reactor unit at the current power 
lever. This reporting limit, stipulated in Guide 
yvL 7.9, was exceeded at the Loviisa 1 nuclear 
power plant unit in 2003-2004. fPH has submit-
ted to STUK an extensive report that discusses 
the factors contributing to the dose development 
and assesses the methods for reducing the doses. 
The limited space of the steam generator room af-
fects the radiation protection results at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant.
The monitoring of occupational exposure at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant and the reporting 
of measurement data to the Dose Register main-
tained by STUK has been developed during the op-
eration of the plant in accordance with Guides yvL 
7.9 and yvL 7.10. The annually conducted qual-
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ity control tests targeted at the dosimetric service 
have indicated that the measurement accuracy has 
remained in accordance with the requirements set 
forth in international standards. fPH has submit-
ted to STUK the documents concerning the main-
tenance and quality of dosimetry systems. fPH 
thus accounts for the amendment to the Radiation 
Decree ratified in 2006, according to which the ap-
proval of the dosimetric service has changed into a 
fixed-term approval.
No annual radiation doses exceeding 20 mSv 
have accumulated in any employee at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant since 1996. The highest indi-
vidual radiation dose in 2006 was 13.6 mSv. The 
average radiation dose of exposed workers in 2006 
was 2.4 mSv.
During the past five years (2002–2006) the 
highest radiation dose received by a finnish nu-
clear power plant worker, 70.4 mSv, was accumu-
lated while working both at Swedish nuclear power 
plants and at the two nuclear power plants in 
finland. The highest radiation dose accumulated 
during 2002–2006 while working exclusively at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant was 55.0 mSv.
The monitoring of dose rates, occupational 
dosimetry and monitoring of internal doses of 
workers have been improved at both nuclear power 
plant units in Loviisa. The stationary radiation 
measuring systems of the plant have been renewed 
during 2002–2003.
STUK has required that additional measures 
be taken in annual maintenances to improve radia-
tion protection concerning, for example, the work 
carried out in the steam generator room of the 
plant. STUK has also paid attention to the opera-
tion and resource needs of the radiation protection 
organisation and the training of external contrac-
tors participating in annual maintenance. STUK 
will inspect the procedures relating to the above in 
connection with the annual maintenances in 2007.
The conclusion to the above is that the radiation 
protection and occupational dosimetry of workers 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant have been im-
plemented in a manner referred to in section 8 of 
the Government Decision.
4.3 Section 9: Limit for normal operation
The limit for the dose commitment of the individual 
of the population, arising from normal operation of 
a nuclear power plant in any period of one year, is 
0.1 mSv. Based on this limit, release limits for ra-
dioactive materials during the normal operation of 
a nuclear power plant are to be defined.
The prescription concerning individual protec-
tion contained in section 9 of the resolution must 
be implemented together with the ALARA require-
ment concerning the limitation of radiation expo-
sure (section 4.1). Detailed requirements concern-
ing the calculation methods used for assessing the 
radiation exposure of the population are specified 
in the Guides yvL 7.2 and yvL 7.3.
Release limits for radioactive materials for the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant are defined in the 
Technical Specifications concerning the operation of 
the plant units. Limits have been separately defined 
for atmospheric noble gas and iodine releases, and, 
on the other hand, for water releases into the sea. 
A separate nuclide-specific release limit has been 
defined for radioactive tritium in water releases. 
The purpose of the release limits is to retain the 
individual annual radiation exposure in the sur-
rounding population of the plant units clearly below 
the threshold value of 0.1 mSv set forth in section 
9 of the Government Decision. The licensee shall 
constantly monitor the releases and radioactive sub-
stances present in the environment, reporting any 
abnormal conditions to STUK without delay.
when calculating the radiation dose of an in-
dividual of the population caused by releases of 
radioactive materials, the analysis is based on the 
average radiation exposure of the most exposed 
group. This group represents a hypothetical group 
of individuals in the population who, based on their 
residence and life style, are estimated to receive the 
highest radiation exposure arising from releases ac-
cording to calculations.
fPH has renewed its calculations methods con-
cerning the radiation exposure of surrounding pop-
ulations arising from the normal operation of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant during the current 
operating licence period. The renewed methods are 
in accordance with the requirements specified in the 
Guides yvL 7.2 and 7.3.
The highest theoretical dose commitment re-
ceived by an individual of the population most 
exposed to radiation in the vicinity of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant, calculated from the releases 
of 2006, was, as reported by fPH, 0.00012 mSv (in 
finland, the average annual individual dose result-
ing from natural radiation is above 1 mSv). The 
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comparative calculation performed by STUK result-
ed in a value lower than that reported by fPH. The 
calculated radiation dose has remained within this 
order of magnitude during the past few years since 
the implementation of the measures for restricting 
caesium releases into the sea at the Loviisa plant. 
The radioactive releases from the Loviisa 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units have also been clearly 
below the release limits set forth in the Technical 
Specifications.
STUK has requested a report from the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant on the implementation of the 
updated yvL 7.1 and yvL 7.6 guides concerning 
the availability of solutions for further reducing the 
radioactive releases.
The control of radioactive releases from the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant and the monitoring of 
radioactive substances and radiation in the environ-
ment are discussed below in section 6.4.
The conclusion to the above is that the operation 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has not resulted 
in such radioactive releases that the limit of 0.1 mSv 
set forth in section 9 of the Government Decision 
would have been exceeded. It can be expected that 
the calculated dose to an individual in the most ex-
posed group of the population arising from annual 
normal radioactive releases of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant will remain small.
4.4 Section 10: Limit for an anticipated 
operational transient
The limit for the dose of the individual of the popu-
lation, arising, as the result of an anticipated op-
erational transient, from external radiation in the 
period of one year and the simultaneous radioactive 
materials intake, is 0.1 mSv.
Detailed requirements concerning the analyses 
of anticipated operating transients are specified 
in the Guide yvL 2.2. If an operational transient 
could cause a release of radioactive substances, 
the radiation doses caused by the releases shall be 
identified. Detailed requirements concerning the 
calculation methods used for assessing the radia-
tion exposure of the population are specified in the 
Guides yvL 7.2 and yvL 7.3.
The descriptions of the analyses concerning an-
ticipated operating transients are presented in the 
safety analysis report for Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units. These analyses are discussed 
in section 3.4.1 of the Safety Assessment with re-
gard to plant behaviour. operating transients are 
not expected to result in a release of radioactive 
materials because the fuel is not damaged or plant 
systems are capable of retaining the releases. The 
radiation doses to an individual in the population 
arising from anticipated operational transients are 
therefore not assessed by means of calculations.
No such operating transients have occurred 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in which in-
creases in radioactive releases compared with the 
normal conditions had occurred.
The conclusion to the above is that the antici-
pated operating transients of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant do not result in a release as a conse-
quence of which the radiation doses of an individu-
al in the population would exceed the limit value of 
0.1 mSv set forth in section 10 of the Government 
Decision.
4.5 Section 11: Limit for a 
postulated accident
The limit for the dose of the individual of the popu-
lation, arising, as the result of a postulated acci-
dent, from external radiation in the period of one 
year and the simultaneous radioactive materials 
intake, is 5 mSv.
The Guides yvL 2.2, yvL 7.2 and yvL 7.3 
contain detailed requirements for calculating the 
accident analyses concerning plant behaviour and 
the releases and radiation doses relating to them, 
and for the acceptability of the results.
Accident analyses and their calculation meth-
ods are under continuous development throughout 
the operating life of the nuclear power plant. The 
descriptions of the accident analyses of the plant 
units are presented in the safety analysis report 
for the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
(discussed in more detail in section 3.4.1). The 
methods of analysis for radiation exposure em-
ployed by fPH have been developed over several 
years and are in accordance with the requirements 
specified in the Guides yvL 7.2 and 7.3. The meth-
ods contain unlikely assumptions that, in reality, 
result	in	overestimating	the	size	of	radiation	doses	
calculated as a consequential effect.
Safety-enhancing measures are taken as re-
quired on the basis of the analyses. In terms of ra-
diation safety, special attention has been paid to an 
accident in which a large leak of coolant from the 
primary circuit cooling the reactor into the second-
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ary circuit could occur rapidly due to internal dam-
age to the steam generator. fPH has implemented 
a number of important modifications at the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units (section 5.6), the 
purpose of which are to, e.g., prevent damage to the 
fuel and the resulting major releases of radioactive 
material if such leaks were to occur. The heads of 
the steam generator primary collectors have been 
replaced during the current operating licence pe-
riod, with the new heads being furnished with leak 
restrictors and rings restricting the elevation of 
the heads. New graphite seals have been installed 
in the heads to replace the original nickel ring 
seals. The leak restrictor restricts the leak of cool-
ant into the secondary circuit in the event of dam-
age to the head, thus also restricting the release of 
radioactive materials into the environment. The 
emergency operating procedures relating to ac-
cident management were revised and put into use 
in 2006.
In the analysis performed in 1997, the maximum 
value for the dose to an individual in the population 
arising from a large primary-to-secondary leak was 
12 mSv, which remains below the 100 mSv limit set 
forth in section 28 for a postulated accident con-
cerning a nuclear power plant commissioned prior 
to entry into force of the Government Decision, but 
exceeds the 5 mSv dose limit set forth in section 11. 
According to the results of the accident analyses, 
revised to a large extent during the current oper-
ating period from among the postulated accidents 
analysed, a primary-to-secondary leak may still 
result in the highest radiation dose to an indi-
vidual in the population, but the maximum value 
for the dose is 3.9 mSv. The reduction of the maxi-
mum value is based on the reduction of permis-
sible leak of fuel during operation in the Technical 
Specifications, and reanalysis of mass flows during 
an accident while taking into account the changes 
to the plant’s technical systems and procedures as 
well as on a more realistic modelling of the release 
and dispersion of radioactive materials inside the 
plant and in the environment. A spent nuclear fuel 
handling accident in the containment may cause 
an individual dose of the same order of magnitude 
(the maximum value for the calculated dose being 
0.82 mSv). The doses arising from other postulated 
accidents were, according to the analyses, smaller 
by several orders of magnitude.
The conclusion to the above is that the postu-
lated accidents at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
do not result in a release of radioactive material 
as a consequence of which the radiation doses to 
an individual in the population would exceed the 
limit value of 5 mSv set forth in section 11 of the 
Government Decision.
4.6 Section 12: Limit for a severe accident
The limit for the release of radioactive materials 
arising from a severe accident is a release which 
causes neither acute harmful health effects to the 
population in the vicinity of the nuclear power 
plant nor any long-term restrictions on the use of 
extensive areas of land and water. For satisfying the 
requirement applied to long-term effects, the limit 
for an atmospheric release of cesium-137 is 100 
TBq. The combined fall-out consisting of nuclides 
other than cesium-isotopes shall not cause, in the 
long term, starting three months from the accident, 
a hazard greater than would arise from a cesium 
release corresponding to the above-mentioned limit. 
The possibility that, as the result of a severe acci-
dent, the above mentioned requirement is not met, 
shall be extremely small.
The original design basis of the Loviisa 1 and 
2 nuclear power plant units did not include provi-
sions for the loads or radiation condition prevailing 
during a severe accident. fPH has carried exten-
sive research to identify the plant modifications 
required for making provisions for severe accidents 
at the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. 
The modifications have been practically completed 
during the current operating licence period. The 
management of severe accidents at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant is discussed in more detail in 
section 5.5 in this assessment.
The probability of a severe accident and the 
related releases of radioactive materials have been 
investigated in the PRA level 2 analyses (section 
3.4.2). The radiation doses to the surrounding pop-
ulation have been assessed in the same connection. 
on the basis of the analyses, the probability for 
not meeting the requirement concerning the limit 
value set forth in section 12 of the Government 
Decision is extremely small, as prescribed in that 
section. The development plan for reducing the 
probability of a major release is discussed in sec-
tion 3.4.2.
The reason why the radiation exposure of indi-
vidual workers relating to a severe accident is ex-
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ceptionally high in an early stage of an emergency 
condition occurring on the plant site of the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant could be due to the fact that 
the radiation shielding thickness of the reactor 
containment roof is not sufficient in this condition. 
Part of the upwards-directed radiation penetrating 
the roof would thus reflect back from the air onto 
the plant site as external radiation. modification of 
the reactor containment roof structures afterwards 
is not possible in practice, considering the adverse 
safety effects that would result from the modifica-
tion. The reports prepared by fPH demonstrate 
that the radiation exposure caused by a severe 
accident does not exceed the radiation protection 
design requirements, provided that attention is 
continuously paid on these conditions in, for ex-
ample, emergency response planning and imple-
mentation as well as in the related exercises. The 
emergency procedures have been updated during 
the current operating licence period to take into ac-
count the radiation safety of workers during an ac-
cident. fPH has developed an information system 
for radiation experts (SaTu) that can be used for 
assessing the radiation dose rates caused by differ-
ent types of accidents, both inside the plant and on 
the plant site.
The conclusion to the above is that the provi-
sions set forth in section 12 of the Government 
Decision have been fulfilled at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant as well as reasonably possible when 
taking into account the provisions set forth in sec-
tions 27 and 28.
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5 Design criteria for nuclear safety 
(Government Decision 395/1991)
5.1 Section 13: Levels of protection
In the design, construction and operation, proven or 
otherwise carefully examined high-quality technol-
ogy shall be employed to prevent operational tran-
sients and accidents (preventive measures).
A nuclear power plant shall encompass systems 
by means of which operational transients and ac-
cidents can be quickly and reliably detected and 
the aggravation of any event can be prevented. 
Accidents leading to extensive releases of radioac-
tive materials shall be highly unlikely (control of 
transients and accidents).
Effective technical and administrative measures 
shall be taken for the mitigation of the consequenc-
es of an accident. Counter-measures for bringing an 
accident under control and for preventing radiation 
hazards shall be planned in advance (mitigation 
of consequences).
In addition to the structure of the plant, the 
quality of operation activities has crucial signifi-
cance in the prevention of transients and accidents. 
Quality assurance concerning operating instruc-
tions, other plant procedures and operating activi-
ties is being continuously developed at fPH. The 
importance of complying with the instructions and 
the quality assurance programme is highlighted in 
the training of personnel.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
have operated reliably, and the number of safety-
significant transients occurred has remained small. 
The transients that have occurred have been dis-
cussed in the quarterly reports published by STUK 
and in the statements of position concerning the 
renewal of operating licences for the plant units.
STUK’s inspection programme concerning the 
control of nuclear power plant operation includes 
inspections of the procedures and methods adhered 
to in the operating activities. Quality assurance 
and operating activities are discussed in more de-
tail in sections 3.3 and 6.
Guide yvL 1.0 requires that a nuclear power 
plant be provided with a protection system. The 
Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units have 
in place protection systems that include a reactor 
protection system and a plant protection system. 
The function of the protection system is to actuate 
the required safety functions if any of the safety-
important parameters substantially deviates from 
its normal value. The function of the reactor pro-
tection system is to initiate reactor shutdown. The 
most important of the functions actuated by the 
plant protection system are reactor emergency 
cooling, residual heat removal and containment 
isolation functions. The Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units have the required safety systems 
in place for executing these functions (section 5.6).
The reactor protection systems of the Loviisa 1 
and 2 nuclear power plant units have been imple-
mented by means of relay technology, and the plant 
protection systems by means of conventional elec-
tronics. The employed technology is proven but be-
coming outdated. The design and implementation 
of the reactor protection system is based on solu-
tions on which the plant supplier had gained expe-
rience from the previously constructed vvER-440 
type plants. The operating reliability of the system 
has been improved on the basis of operating expe-
rience by replacing certain components with more 
reliable ones and by adding new components that 
ensure operability in the event of common cause 
failures affecting redundant components. The test-
ing and user experience of the plant protection sys-
tem indicate that the solutions employed have thus 
far been effective. The protection systems meet the 
fail-safety requirement set forth in Guide yvL 1.0 
– that is, each subsystem shifts into a state requir-
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ing protection in the event of a failure of any of its 
components.
The I&C systems of the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units will be renewed in four stages 
during the future operating licence period. In the 
second stage of the renewal the old reactor and plant 
protection systems will be integrated into a single 
new reactor protection system. An automatic and 
a manual backup protection system will be imple-
mented for fault conditions in the reactor protection 
system. The automatic system covers the actuation 
of safety functions urgently required in cases of acci-
dents, while the manual system covers the remain-
ing functions. These two securing systems will make 
it possible to bring the plant into hot shutdown even 
in event of complete loss of the actual reactor protec-
tion system. The latter renewal stages involve the 
renewal of, e.g., main control rooms and operational 
I&C systems. Backup systems for bringing the plant 
from hot shutdown to cold shutdown will also be 
implemented in this connection.
The plant is equipped with appropriate safety 
systems for the purpose of mitigating the con-
sequences of accidents postulated in the design 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The plant 
operators also have at their disposal instructions 
prepared for abnormal occurrences and accidents, 
reviewed by STUK. The emergency plan is a docu-
ment approved by STUK in which the definition 
of duties and responsibilities required for acci-
dent conditions are presented, among other things. 
Emergency response arrangements are discussed 
in more detail in section 9.
major releases of radioactive substances into 
the environment may occur mainly in severe acci-
dents. The provisions made for severe accidents are 
discussed in more detail in section 5.5.
The conclusion to the above is that the levels 
of protection at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
meet the requirements set forth in section 13 of the 
Government Decision. Deficiencies with regard to 
ensuring containment integrity and ensuring safe-
ty functions are discussed in sections 5.5 and 5.6.
5.2 Section 14: Technical barriers 
for preventing the dispersion 
of radioactive materials
Dispersion of radioactive materials from the fuel 
of the nuclear reactor to the environment shall be 
prevented by means of successive barriers which are 
the fuel and its cladding, the cooling circuit (the 
primary circuit) of the nuclear reactor and the 
containment building.
Detailed regulations concerning the operability 
of technical barriers are laid down in section 15, 16 
and 17 of the Government Decision.
The first barrier to the dispersal of radioactive 
materials is the fuel and its cladding. The fuel used 
at the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units is 
uranium dioxide enriched in the U-235 isotope to 
a maximum level of 4%. During normal operating 
conditions, when the temperature of the uranium 
dioxide does not rise exceptionally high, the major-
ity of fission products remain within the fuel pellet 
(inside the matrix).
Uranium dioxide pellets have been packed in 
cladding tubes with an outside diameter of approx-
imately 9 mm, which, in turn, have been assembled 
into fuel assemblies consisting of 126 rods. The 
ends of the cladding tubes have been sealed gas-
tight. The properties of the cladding tube material 
make it very suitable for the conditions prevailing 
in the reactor. The material also meets the excep-
tional durability requirements imposed by high 
temperatures.
The next barrier after the fuel (the uranium 
dioxide matrix and the surrounding gas-tight clad-
ding) for preventing the dispersion of radioactive 
materials is the pressure-bearing boundary of the 
primary circuit. The main components of the pri-
mary circuit (the reactor pressure vessel, steam 
generators,	pressurizer,	pipings)	have	been	manu-
factured of stainless steel or carbon steel coated 
with stainless steel.
The starting point of the design of the reactor 
primary circuit was that the releases into the en-
vironment would remain within the set limits even 
if the integrity of the cladding of approximately 
one per cent of the approximately 40,000 fuel rods 
contained in the core were lost in normal operating 
conditions. Nowadays the primary circuit activity 
limit set forth in the Technical Specifications of 
plant units is lower, equalling approximately 33 
leaking fuel rods. The water treatment system of 
the reactor primary circuit is furnished with fil-
ter equipment that enables orderly collection and 
removal of fission products released into the cool-
ing water, as well as corrosion products activated 
by neutron radiation that are migrating in the 
circuit.
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The current requirements relating to the basic 
dimensioning of the primary circuit and the fuel 
are essentially similar to those that were in force 
in the building stage of the plants.
The primary circuit is entirely contained within 
a gas-tight containment building manufactured of 
steel plates. The steel containment is surrounded 
by a cylindrical secondary building made of con-
crete and equipped with a light roof structure 
supported by steel lattices. The space between the 
inner and outer containment is held at negative 
pressure and equipped with filtered ventilation 
systems in order to reduce potential radioactive 
releases in the event of accidents.
The containment was not originally dimen-
sioned against severe accidents. Plant modifica-
tions implemented in order to make provisions 
for severe accidents are discussed in more detail 
in section 5.5, while section 6.2.5 provides further 
details on containment ageing management.
The conclusion to the above is that the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant is equipped with techni-
cal barriers for preventing the dispersion of ra-
dioactive materials referred to in section 14 of the 
Government Decision.
5.3 Section 15: Ensuring fuel integrity
The probability of significant degradation of fuel 
cooling or of a fuel failure due to other reasons shall 
be low during normal operational conditions and 
anticipated operational transients.
During postulated accidents, the rate of fuel fail-
ures shall remain low and fuel coolability shall not 
be endangered.
The possibility of a criticality accident shall be ex-
tremely low.
Detailed requirements relating to section 15 
of the Government Decision are set forth in the 
guides yvL 1.0, yvL 2.2 and yvL 6.2.
The fuel cladding in the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant	is	made	of	zirconium–niobium	alloy.	The	fuel	
manufacturer has gained considerable experience 
of its use as fuel rod cladding material since the 
1960s. The results of the manufacturer’s operating 
experience and laboratory research have been suc-
cessfully confirmed by the research on spent fuel 
carried out at the plant site. The oxide layer on the 
surface of the cladding caused by corrosion remains 
very thin, and the ductility of the material remains 
sufficient throughout the service life of the fuel.
The fuel manufacturer has provided measure-
ment results concerning the quantities of fission 
gases released from the fuel pellet inside the rod. 
These have been analysed by computational meth-
ods, and supplementary measurement results have 
also been obtained from the fuel irradiated at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. on the basis of these 
results and analyses, the release fraction of fission 
gases can be regarded as being sufficiently low at 
the current operating mode of the reactor.
The integrity of fuel during power change con-
ditions relating to the normal operation of the 
reactor is ensured by restrictions concerning power 
change rates, which are mainly based on investiga-
tions carried out on research reactors in Russia as 
well as operating experience obtained elsewhere.
on the basis of the current operating experi-
ence from the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, the 
probability of fuel damage can be regarded as 
being sufficiently small in normal operating condi-
tions of the plant. The structure of fuel assemblies 
and rods has been gradually developed on the basis 
of the operating experience obtained. In the cur-
rent structure of the top section of fuel assemblies, 
provisions have been made for the elongation of 
fuel rods during operation beyond the original 
dimensioning, the manufacturing method of fuel 
pellets has been changed, the internal pressure of 
fuel rods has been increased, and the material used 
in	the	spacer	grids	has	been	changed	to	zirconium-
niobium alloy. All of these changes have had a ben-
eficial impact on fuel integrity in normal operating 
conditions, anticipated operating transients and 
postulated accidents.
The probability of significant degradation of 
fuel cooling during normal operation – that is, heat 
transfer crisis – is extremely small at the Loviisa 1 
and 2 nuclear power plant units. This is primarily 
due to the beneficial ratios between the total and 
linear power of the fuel and between primary and 
secondary coolant flows, the coolant quantities and 
the related time constants. This is indicated by 
the fairly large margin of departure from nucleate 
boiling during the stationary state. for the above 
reasons, the probability of a heat transfer crises 
during anticipated operating transients is also 
very unlikely.
As for postulated accidents, fuel damages may 
be expected mainly in loss of primary coolant, ejec-
tion of control rods and anticipated transient with-
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out scram (ATwS) accidents. The analysis results 
for a large break loss of coolant accident indicate 
that the temperatures of the fuel cladding will re-
main so low that the probability for the occurrence 
of fuel damages is unlikely. According to the analy-
ses, the number of fuel damages possibly occurring 
as a result of control rod ejection or an ATwS ac-
cident remains small. The coolability of fuel is not 
endangered in postulated accidents.
one major objective is to prevent transients 
resulting in inadvertent criticality and/or reactiv-
ity increase of the reactor. The probability and sig-
nificance of malfunctions resulting in the dilution 
of the boron solution used as reactivity poison for 
the primary circuit or internal dilution occurring 
in connection of certain types of accidents has been 
investigated. on the basis of the investigations, 
plant modifications to prevent inadvertent boron 
dilution have been made at the Loviisa 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units. These measures will 
be further continued during the next operating 
licence period (section 3.4.2). The prevention of 
inadvertent criticality has also been taken into ac-
count in the fuel storage and handling systems of 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
A number of improvements to the operation of 
the emergency core cooling systems of the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units have been made 
during the current operating licence period. The 
operating parameters of the pressurised emer-
gency make-up water tanks of the low-pressure 
emergency cooling system have been changed and 
the pumps have been renewed. These modifications 
have improved the cooling of fuel in the event of a 
large break loss of coolant accident. In addition, 
two of the four high-pressure emergency cooling 
system pumps have been replaced at the Loviisa 2 
nuclear power plant unit. Similar replacement will 
be carried out at the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant 
unit in 2008.
The conclusion to the above is that fuel integ-
rity has been ensured at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant in a manner referred to in section 15 of the 
Government Decision.
5.4 Section 16: Ensuring the integrity 
of the primary circuit
The primary circuit of a nuclear reactor shall be 
designed so that the stresses imposed upon it re-
main, with sufficient confidence, below the values 
defined for structural materials for preventing a 
fast growth crack during normal operational condi-
tions, anticipated operational transients and postu-
lated accidents. The possibility of a primary circuit 
break due to other reasons shall be low, too.
Requirements concerning the strength analy-
ses of a nuclear power plant primary circuit, as 
well as in-service strength assurance are speci-
fied in Guide yvL 3.5, which was implemented 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant on 3 october 
2006. According to the above-mentioned guide, 
Safety Class 1 pressure equipment shall be dimen-
sioned according to the ASmE (American Society of 
mechanical Engineers) Boiler and Pressure vessel 
Code, Section III, or by otherwise fulfilling a simi-
lar safety level. A brittle fracture analysis shall be 
carried out for the most stress-imposed parts of 
pressure vessels made of ferrite steel.
The design of primary components of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant is mainly based on standards 
that were in force in the Soviet Union at that 
time. The design principles are similar to those 
in the ASmE Boiler and Pressure vessel Code, 
but the requirements are deficient with regard to 
brittle fracture. The design of the primary circuit 
is based on setting a sufficient safety factor for 
various types of failure mechanisms, such as gen-
eral deformation (plastic instability), continuously 
increasing deformation during load variations, fa-
tigue, brittle fracture and instability (compression 
stress). The defined design loads comprise normal 
operation, deviations from normal conditions and 
postulated accidents. Provisions have been made 
for a guillotine break of the reactor coolant pipe by 
constructing emergency restraints and jet shields. 
Earthquake loads were not included in the design 
basis.
The reactor pressure vessel is manufactured of 
low-alloy Crmov steel and cladded on the inside 
with austenitic stainless steel. After three years of 
operating the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit, 
it was discovered, on the basis of the investigation 
of the material samples placed inside the reactor 
pressure vessel, that the material characteristics 
of the ring weld at the level of the reactor core 
were deteriorating faster than anticipated. The 
observation was made prior to the commission-
ing of the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant units. 
Neutron radiation from the reactor core increases 
the transition temperature, in the vicinity of which 
STUK-B 81
29
the ductility of the material deteriorates rapidly 
when the temperature decreases. Safety is not en-
dangered in normal operating temperature, but in 
certain transient and accident conditions cold cool-
ant is fed into the primary circuit and the risk of 
fast brittle fracture increases if the embrittled area 
contains a crack. To reduce the risk of brittle frac-
ture, the dose rate of neutrons has been reduced by 
replacing the 36 fuel elements on the edges of the 
reactor core with elements made of steel. A number 
of other modifications have also been made at the 
plant units to reduce loads and their probability. 
Primary circuit safety relief valves operating at 
low-pressure have been added to the plant units 
to prevent cold pressurisation during an outage. 
The best available non-destructive testing methods 
have also been used for detecting potential faults. 
The endurance of the reactor pressure vessel in the 
above conditions has been investigated by means 
of thermohydraulic and fracture-mechanical calcu-
lations. The reactor pressure vessels of both plant 
units have fulfilled the acceptance criteria set for 
them in the deterministic and probabilistic safety 
analyses performed by fPH.
Heat treatment was applied to the embrittled 
weld in the reactor pressure vessel of the Loviisa 
1 nuclear power plant unit during the 1996 refu-
elling outage, which recovered the ductility char-
acteristics of the weld nearly back to the original 
level. material samples were placed inside the 
reactor pressure vessel for determining the re-em-
brittlement rate. The rate of the re-embrittlement 
was estimated conservatively and thorough non-
destructive examinations were performed on the 
reactor pressure vessel. In 2003 the estimate of 
the re-embrittlement rate was further specified by 
means of a calculation formula containing phos-
phor concentration, which was derived according 
to research principles from the results of material 
samples selected to represent the critical weld as 
accurately as possible that were irradiated inside 
the reactor pressure vessel. on the basis of the re-
sults of these analyses, the reactor pressure vessel 
has been approved for operation until the refuelling 
outage of 2012. Continued operation requires that 
more detailed analyses are performed in which the 
conservativeness included in the analyses is re-
duced or, alternatively, another heat treatment is 
performed on the reactor pressure vessel. STUK 
is not aware of any obstacles of a principal nature 
to the continued operation of the reactor pressure 
vessel of the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit.
The embrittlement rate of the reactor pressure 
vessel of the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant unit is 
lower than that of Loviisa 1 due to smaller concen-
trations of impurities in the weld material. on the 
basis of the safety analyses performed, the reac-
tor pressure vessel of the Loviisa 2 nuclear power 
plant unit has been approved for operation until 
the refuelling outage of 2010. Continued operation 
requires that more detailed analyses are performed 
in which the conservativeness included in the anal-
yses is reduced or, alternatively, heat treatment is 
performed on the reactor pressure vessel. STUK 
is not aware of any obstacles of a principal nature 
for the continued operation of the reactor pressure 
vessel of the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant unit.
other pressure-bearing components of the pri-
mary circuit of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
units have been manufactured of austenitic stain-
less steel or carbon steel cladded with austenitic 
stainless coating. The safety factor for general 
deformation is at least 1.5. Thus the magnitude of 
a fault resulting in fast fracture is so large that it 
can be detected with high probability as a minor 
leak or discovered in in-service inspections. Due 
to choices of materials, general corrosion reducing 
wall thickness cannot occur in the primary circuit.
The over-pressure protection of the primary 
circuit has been implemented as redundant pres-
surizer	safety	relief	valves	with	staggered	opening	
pressures. The safety relief valves are designed to 
operate by steam, water and a steam-water mix-
ture. Pressure increase at low temperatures has 
been prevented by means of an outage safety relief 
valve that is actuated when the temperature of the 
primary circuit falls to the level requiring brittle 
fracture protection.
The conclusion to the above is that the integrity 
of the primary circuit of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant has been demonstrated to meet the require-
ments set forth in section 16 of the Government 
Decision, provided, however, that the situation will 
be re-assessed for the reactor pressure vessels of 
the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units in 
2012 and 2010. STUK is not currently aware of any 
obstacles of a principal nature for the continued 
operation of the reactor pressure vessels of the 
Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units after 
2012 and 2010. fPH will estimate the need for 
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further heat treatments on the pressure vessels in 
connection with the preparation of a subsequent 
application concerning the use of pressure vessels.
5.5 Section 17: Ensuring containment 
building integrity
The containment shall be designed so that it will 
withstand reliably pressure and temperature loads, 
jet forces and impacts of missiles arising from an-
ticipated operational transients and postulated ac-
cidents.
Furthermore, the containment shall be designed 
so that the pressure and temperature created inside 
the containment as a consequence of a severe acci-
dent will not result in its uncontrollable failure.
The possibility of the creation of such a mixture 
of gases as could burn or explode in a way which 
endangers containment integrity shall be small in 
all accidents.
The hazard of a containment building failure 
due to a core melt shall also be taken into account 
in other respects in designing the containment 
building concept.
The function of the containment is to limit the 
release of radioactive materials during normal op-
eration and accidents. The Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units are equipped with a double con-
tainment. The inner, steel containment is gas-tight 
and surrounded by the outer containment made of 
reinforced concrete. The purpose of the outer con-
tainment is to protect the inner containment from 
external impacts. The double containment struc-
ture makes it possible to maintain negative pres-
sure in the annular space between the buildings.
The operability and leaktightness of the con-
tainment access openings, penetrations and proc-
ess line isolation valves is verified by periodic tests 
carried out at regular intervals. The leaktightness 
of the steel containment is inspected by means of 
leak tests carried out at four-year intervals. A peri-
odic testing programme has been defined for test-
ing the auxiliary systems that are essential for the 
overall functionality of the containment. The con-
tainment has been assigned to the highest class in 
terms of service life in the service life management 
programme of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
The inner containment, its penetrations and 
directly related auxiliary systems have been di-
mensioned to withstand pressure and temperature 
loads, jet forces and impacts from missiles arising 
from postulated accidents in a manner referred to 
in section 17 of the Government Decision and in 
the Guide yvL 1.0. The containment is equipped 
with ice condensers that condense the steam dis-
charged in accident conditions, thereby limiting 
the pressure increase inside the containment. The 
containment is also equipped with an internal spay 
system and systems for the treatment of combus-
tible gases. The crane wall inside the containment 
protects the steel containment against jet forces 
and missiles occurring during accidents.
The space between the steel liner and the outer 
containment is held at negative pressure by means 
of a safety ventilation system equipped with filters. 
The negative pressure causes an air flow from the 
outdoor air into the annulus. The fission products 
that may leak from the inner containment in ac-
cident conditions can be retained in the filters to a 
large extent, which decreases the releases into the 
environment arising from containment leaks. The 
outer containment is made of reinforced concrete.
Loads arising from severe accidents were not 
included in the original dimensioning basis of the 
containment systems of the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units. Section 17 of the Government 
Decision and yvL 1.0 require that the contain-
ments of new nuclear power plants have the ca-
pability for severe accident management. In this 
regard, the requirements set forth in sections 27 
and 28 are applied to plants that are currently in 
operation. on the basis of extensive research and 
development activities, fPH prepared a strategy 
for severe accident management drawing from the 
distinctive features of the plant, and the plant 
modifications required by the strategy have been 
completed during the current operating licence 
period. The primary elements of the strategy are 
pressure reduction in the primary circuit, retention 
of core melt inside the reactor vessel by cooling the 
pressure vessel from the outside, removal of resid-
ual heat from the containment by means of a spray 
system outside the containment, and prevention of 
fast pressurisation of the containment (prevention 
of hydrogen fires and explosions).
The retention of core melt inside the pressure 
vessel by cooling the pressure vessel from the 
outside is a central function in the severe accident 
management strategy of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant. The purpose of the primary circuit pressure 
reduction is to reduce the load imposed on the 
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pressure vessel in a severe accident, which, in turn, 
is to ensure the retention of core melt inside the 
pressure vessel and the required cooling outside 
the pressure vessel. Two redundant high-capacity 
pressure reduction lines were installed at both 
plant units in 1996. Significant modifications have 
been performed at both plant units to implement 
the strategy: the neutron and heat shield below the 
pressure vessel was changed to one supported by a 
hydraulic cylinder in 2002, which makes it possible 
to lower it down during an accident. This ensures 
the access of water to the outer surface of the pres-
sure vessel, thus also ensuring the cooling of core 
melt. Additional flow channels were installed in 
the reactor, and filters were installed to remove 
potential impurities contained in the water.
The overpressurisation of the steel containment 
in a severe accident is prevented by means of a 
spray system outside the containment. The plant 
unit-specific spray system comprises a water stor-
age, two redundant pumps, a heat exchanger and 
the actual spray circuit. The seawater system cool-
ing the spray system and the system securing the 
emergency power of the spray system are shared 
systems within the plant. Spray systems were in-
stalled at both plant units in 1992.
Large quantities of combustible gas mixtures 
may only be generated at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant in a severe accident in which a sub-
stantial part of the reactor core is damaged. TThe 
fuel cladding material reacts with water steam, 
producing hydrogen in the overheated core. A 
large-scale hydrogen fire or explosion in the con-
tainment of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant could 
endanger the integrity of the containment. The hy-
drogen management at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant is based on the controlled dilution of hydro-
gen concentrations and the removal of water.
The dilution of high hydrogen concentrations to 
a non-flammable level is carried out by mixing the 
hydrogen into the containment atmosphere. The 
doors of the containment ice condenser are forced 
open to ensure successful mixing. opening the 
doors causes a natural circulation flow from the 
lower into the upper plenum, which mixes the gas-
es effectively and evens out the hydrogen content. 
Plant modifications to enable the forced opening of 
ice condenser doors were carried out at both plant 
units in 2001.
Hydrogen is removed from the containment us-
ing a recombiner and ignition plugs designed for 
the purpose. The recombiners remove the hydrogen 
by means of a catalytic reaction by oxidising it into 
water. 154 recombiners have been installed at both 
plant units, the majority of which are located in 
the steam generator room and in the upper plenum 
of the containment. The recombiners are passive 
equipment that does not require electrical power or 
operator action to actuate. The ignition plugs burn 
the hydrogen in accident conditions where hydro-
gen generation occurs very rapidly. 40 ignition 
plugs have been located in the steam generator 
room as close to the possible sources of hydrogen 
leak as possible. The recombiners and ignition 
plugs, as well as the instrumentation, automation 
and power supply needed for their operation, were 
installed at the Loviisa nuclear power plant units 
in 2003. The processing is still in progress with 
regard to the testing criteria for new ignition plugs 
and recombiners.
During a severe accident, all control and moni-
toring can be performed from within the so-called 
SAm (Severe Accident management) control room, 
which, at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, is 
shared between both plant units. The fact that con-
trol activities may need to be performed for a long 
time from within the SAm control room has been 
considered in the design. The SAm control room 
was completed in 2000.
fPH has completed all plant modifications re-
quired by the severe accident management strat-
egy developed for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
during the current operating licence period, with 
the exception of the processing of the testing cri-
teria for ignition plugs and recombiners, which is 
still in progress. These measures will ensure the 
integrity of the containment in most cases where a 
leak from the primary circuit into the containment 
occurs. fPH has performed new PRAs during the 
current operating licence period, which indicate 
that containment bypass leaks are of greater sig-
nificance than previously assessed. The current se-
vere accident management strategy is not effective 
in the management of such accident conditions. 
STUK’s position in this matter is that the preven-
tion of containment bypass conditions and more 
reliable prevention of their consequences is one of 
the most important development targets for the 
next operating licence period.
with regard to severe accidents, the Loviisa 1 
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and 2 nuclear power plant units may be considered 
to fulfil the requirements set forth in section 17 of 
the Government Decision and in the Guide yvL 
1.0, while taking into account the provisions of 
section 28 of the resolution concerning operating 
plants. The development plan concerning contain-
ment bypass conditions is discussed in more detail 
in section 3.4.2.
5.6 Section 18: Ensuring safety functions
In ensuring safety functions, inherent safety fea-
tures attainable by design shall be made use of in 
the first place. In particular, the combined effect of 
a	nuclear	reactor’s	physical	feedbacks	shall	be	such	
that it mitigates the increase of reactor power.
If inherent safety features cannot be made use of 
in ensuring a safety function, priority shall be given 
to systems and components which do not require an 
off-site power supply or which, in consequence of a 
loss of power supply, will settle in a state preferable 
from the safety point of view.
Systems which perform the most important safe-
ty functions shall be able to carry out their func-
tions even though an individual component in any 
system would fail to operate and additionally any 
component affecting the safety function would be 
out of operation simultaneously due to repairs or 
maintenance.
A nuclear power plant shall have on-site and 
off-site electrical power supply systems. The execu-
tion of the most important safety functions shall be 
possible by using either of the two electrical power 
supply systems.
Safety systems which back up each other as well 
as parallel parts of safety systems shall be sepa-
rated from each other so that their failure due to an 
external common cause failure is unlikely.
In ensuring the most important safety functions, 
systems based on diverse principles of operation 
shall be used to the extent possible.
Detailed requirements relating to section 18 
of the Government Decision are specified in the 
Guides yvL 1.0, yvL 2.1 and yvL 2.7. Provisions 
concerning the application of this section to operat-
ing nuclear power plants are set forth in section 
28.
The most important safety functions of a nucle-
ar power plant are: 1) reactor shutdown, 2) residual 
heat removal from the reactor to the ultimate heat 
sink, and 3) the functioning of the containment 
building. These functions shall be operable in nor-
mal operational conditions, anticipated operational 
transients and postulated accidents.
Inherent reactor-physical feedbacks are made 
use of in the design of the reactors in Loviisa 1 and 
2 nuclear power plant units and in their loading 
plans so that each physical feedback separately, 
and thus their combined effect collectively, miti-
gates the increase of reactor power in transient 
and accident conditions. This is demonstrated both 
analytically and experimentally in the start-up of 
the plant following refuelling outages.
Both control rods and boron systems are avail-
able for the purpose of shutting down the reactor 
at the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. 
Control rods may be used by either driving them 
by means of electric motors or by dropping them 
into the reactor by means of gravity in connection 
with a reactor scram. If the control rods lose their 
electric diving force, they will fall into the reactor 
shutting it down. The fuel loading of the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units is designed to 
enable reactor scram during normal operation, an-
ticipated operational transients and postulated ac-
cidents by means of control rods even in the event 
of a malfunction of the most effective control rod. 
In addition to the control rods, the reactors can be 
shut down using the boron systems equipped with 
emergency diesel power supply.
modifications concerning the systems and op-
erating mode of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
have been performed to provide for the inadvertent 
dilution of boron concentration of the water used 
for long-term power control of the reactor. These 
measures have reduced the risk of inadvertent bo-
ron dilution, but attention must be paid to further 
reduction of the risk (section 3.4.2).
The removal of residual heat from the primary 
circuit into the secondary circuit is carried out by 
means of natural circulation of the primary cool-
ant. The heat transferred into the secondary cir-
cuit can be further transferred into the sea or the 
atmosphere using a number of different systems. 
These systems require active equipment that re-
ceive their driving power from power supply sourc-
es equipped with emergency diesels. The shared 
standby emergency feedwater system constructed 
for the power plant units is equipped with desig-
nated diesel-operated pumps that are independent 
of the electrical systems of the plant. The supply 
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of water into the steam generators carried out by 
means of the standby emergency feedwater system 
and the removal of residual heat carried out by 
means of secondary circuit blowdown are operable 
in the event of a loss of power supply.
Residual heat removal has been further secured 
during the current operating licence period by con-
structing a standby residual heat removal system, 
which makes it possible to cool the plant units 
down into cold shutdown if the actual residual heat 
system is lost, for example in the event of fire in 
the turbine hall. Amendments have also been made 
to secure the ultimate heat sink. These include the 
construction of an alternate cooling water intake 
from the seawater outlet channel. As a result, the 
reliability of the plant safety systems has been im-
proved in conditions where, for example, ice, oil or 
algae endanger the normal cooling water intake.
fPH has presented plans for further securing 
the residual heat removal. The modifications will 
improve the reliability of residual heat removal 
carried out using the feedwater and steam supply 
to the steam generator in, e.g., various steam and 
feed water pipe break conditions. The plans have 
been submitted to STUK and the modifications will 
be implemented in connection with the automation 
renewal of the plants.
If residual heat removal through the second-
ary circuit is not possible, the residual heat can 
be removed directly from the primary circuit. This 
is carried out by feeding water through the high-
pressure emergency cooling pumps into the prima-
ry circuit, where the warmed-up water is released 
into	 the	 containment	 by	 opening	 the	 pressurizer	
high-capacity relief valves. Residual heat removal 
from the containment is carried out by means of 
recycling through floor drains using the emergency 
heat transfer chain.
After the possible occurrence of a primary cir-
cuit break, water to the primary circuit is first 
obtained from pressure water tanks that discharge 
without any external driving force. Subsequently, 
the residual heat removal is carried by means of 
the emergency cooling systems. The residual heat 
is removed through the component intermediate 
cooling system into the seawater circuit.
The filter structures of the containment floor 
drains have been so designed that they do not be-
come clogged if the thermal insulation used on the 
outer surface of the primary circuit is damaged and 
breaks off in the occurrence of a pipe break. The 
clogging of the floor drains would mean complete 
loss of the emergency cooling function. According 
to the current best available knowledge, the filter 
structures of the floor drains have been designed 
to collect the greatest possible amount of loose in-
sulant without causing disturbance to the cooling 
function due to the loose insulant or other simulta-
neously released impurities. In addition, the floor 
drain filters are also equipped with instrumenta-
tion and a cleaning system. This makes it possible 
to monitor the possible emergence of clogging and 
to clean the filter structures if required, which, in 
turn, makes long-term operation secure.
In order to mitigate the consequences of leaks 
occurring from the primary side into the secondary 
circuit, the structure of steam generator collector 
heads has been modified so that the largest possible 
leak	 size	 has	 been	 reduced	 to	 approximately	 20%	
of the original. To ensure the cooling of the reactor 
during a primary-to-secondary leak, a shared emer-
gency make-up water tank has been constructed for 
the plant units. The primary circuit pressure control 
in primary-to-secondary leaks has been changed 
to	 be	 performed	using	 the	 pressurizer	 relief	 valve	
instead of the previously used spraying from the 
high-pressure emergency cooling system.
Keeping containment pressure and tempera-
ture within the design values does not require the 
operation of active components in the early stage 
of any of the design basis accidents. In conditions 
where a large amount of steam leaks into the con-
tainment, the operation of the spray system inside 
the containment is required after the ice contained 
in the ice condenser has melted. In a condition 
of this type, the heat released from the reactor is 
transferred into the seawater circuit through the 
reactor emergency cooling system and the com-
ponent intermediate cooling system that cools it. 
The operation of these systems is based on active 
components that require electrical energy as their 
driving force. Spraying outside the steel contain-
ment can also be used for containment residual 
heat removal. The spraying pumps receive their 
power supply from the on-site diesel generators 
that are independent from other electrical systems 
of the plant. The leaktightness of the containment 
process penetrations is ensured by isolation valves, 
of which there are normally two, one outside the 
containment and one on the inside.
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In the original design basis of the systems im-
portant to the safety of the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units it was not considered that, in 
addition to the inoperability of any single compo-
nent, another component could be simultaneously 
unavailable due to repair or maintenance. Instead, 
in accordance with the requirements that were in 
force at that time, it was set as an objective that all 
systems important to safety were to be able to per-
form their function even in the event of a malfunc-
tion of any single component of the system. for this 
reason alone, several modifications to the plant 
safety systems, as well as replacements of single 
components to improve the operational reliability 
of systems and the general reliability of the plant, 
have been necessary since the commissioning of 
the plant. A number of fully redundant standby 
systems have also been constructed, the most 
important of which being the standby emergency 
feedwater system.
The off-site electrical power supply at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant comprises two 400 kv 
connections and one 110 kv connection to the 
finnish national grid. In addition to the nor-
mal emergency power systems, the plant is also 
equipped with four diesel generators for each plant 
unit, as well as battery systems, for backup sup-
ply of electrical power. The plant’s safety systems 
have been divided into two subsystems, separated 
from each other, both of which receive power sup-
ply from the external network or from two diesel 
generators. In systems where there are four redun-
dant active components, such as the low and high-
pressure emergency cooling pumps, the power sup-
ply to each of the components is arranged through 
busbars connected to a different diesel generator. 
In addition, a power supply connection of 6 kv has 
been constructed between the units.
A connection from the Ahvenkoski hydropower 
plant has also been constructed at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant. This connection may simul-
taneously replace one of the emergency diesel 
generators at both Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 nuclear 
power plant units.
Gas turbines located on the plant site may also 
be used for power supply through the 110 kv con-
nection.
A number of modifications to the electrical 
components have been carried out at the Loviisa 1 
and 2 nuclear power plant units in order to secure 
safety functions. A power supply connection from 
the SAm diesel generators of the spray system 
outside the containment was constructed for the 
battery pack rectifiers of the DC systems of both 
plant units. The purpose of these modifications is 
to ensure the operability of safety systems in ac-
cident conditions, while taking into account, e.g., 
the requirements indicated by the revised safety 
analyses.
The detailed regulations laid down in the 
Technical Specifications of Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant direct the operation of the plant units to-
wards continuous maintenance of the acceptable 
safety level and the securing of the necessary 
safety functions required by it. The requirements 
in the Technical Specifications for the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant are quite extensive in terms 
of their number, as well as strict and very detailed 
in terms of their content, thereby expressing the 
need to compensate by strict administrative means 
the deficiencies in systems technology arising from 
the design basis.
Because the components required by the safety 
functions of the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units are not adequately separated in all 
respects, the same external reason could damage 
mutually securing redundant components. for this 
reason, a number of modifications, mostly those re-
lating to fire compartmentalisation requirements, 
have been required since the commissioning of the 
plant. The separation and protection of systems 
has been improved on the basis of the results of a 
probabilistic risk analysis assessing the magnitude 
of risks arising from fires and floods.
According to STUK’s view, continuous improve-
ments have been made in ensuring safety functions 
since the commissioning of the plant by means of 
research and plant modifications performed on the 
basis of the results of this research, the most im-
portant of which are the new standby emergency 
feedwater and standby residual heat removal sys-
tems, as well as the improvements made to the 
seawater systems.
The conclusion to the above is that the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant can be considered to fulfil 
the requirements concerning the measures to en-
sure safety functions set forth in section 18 of the 
Government Decision, while taking into account 
the provisions of section 28 of the resolution con-
cerning operating plants.
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5.7 Section 19: Avoiding human errors
Special attention shall be paid to the avoidance, 
detection and repair of human errors. The possibil-
ity of human errors shall be taken into account both 
in the design of the nuclear power plant and in the 
planning of its operation so that the plant with-
stands well errors and deviations from planned 
operational actions.
It is not possible to completely avoid human 
errors. However, the possibilities for errors can be 
reduced by proper design, instructions, procedures, 
training and effective quality management (see 
section 3.3, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3).
fPH has conducted an extensive study of hu-
man activities, the purpose of which is to detect the 
possibilities and consequences of human errors. A 
variety of tasks routinely carried out at the plant 
during power operation and annual maintenance 
have been assessed for the purpose of analysing 
the errors affecting the sequence of events of a 
potential transient or accident. Different plant 
conditions and the related operation and mainte-
nance errors have been systematically assessed in 
the analysis. It is important that the plant operat-
ing experience is systematically studied in order 
to avoid human errors. The operating experience 
feedback activities at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant are discussed in more detail in section 6.5.2. 
fPH has developed the utilisation of operating 
experience and performs root cause analyses of sig-
nificant events. for annual maintenance, a compre-
hensive survey has been performed in which the 
hazards	resulting	in	inoperability	or	an	initiating	
event are identified.
The method of analysis for human activities 
and their reliability was originally developed on 
the basis of methods internationally used in the 
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of power opera-
tion, while taking into account the specific features 
of and the operating experience from the plant. A 
plant simulator has been employed in the develop-
ment of analysis methods. fPH has made additions 
to and further specifications in the analysis method 
for the reliability of human activities at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant for the analysis of shutdown 
states. Shutdown states are characterised by a 
large amount of repair and maintenance work, 
numerous alarms and disabled voice alarms, large 
number of external workers, increased possibilities 
for errors in coordination and communication, low 
number of plant simulator exercises concerning ex-
ceptional situations, lack of emergency procedures 
for transients occurring during an outage, low and 
changing degree of plant automation, as well as 
low decay power that enables longer completion 
times than those allowed during power operation.
fPH has utilised the results obtained from the 
PRA and operating experience when planning pro-
cedure and plant modifications as well as in train-
ing. fPH has identified the single errors that are 
most important in terms of their risk significance, 
as well as the operating states in which these er-
rors are most likely to occur. In connection with 
each new PRA entity or update, fPH has assessed 
and prioritised the risk elimination procedures and 
recommendations. on the basis of the recommen-
dations,	 dozens	 of	 plant	 and	 procedure	modifica-
tions have been made, as a result of which it has 
been possible to reduce the risk of human errors by, 
for example, replacing operator actions with auto-
mation, increasing the operator’s completion time 
by means of plant modifications, and improving the 
opportunities for detection and repair of errors.
The renewal of emergency procedures is cur-
rently underway at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant (the renewal project is discussed in more 
detail in section 6.1). The method for assessing op-
eration actions during transients, as well the reli-
ability assessments performed, shall be updated to 
reflect the new procedures. fPH also aims at devel-
oping emergency procedures for outages. The as-
sessment of heavy load lifting, reactivity accidents 
and recovery functions during outages constitutes 
an important development target. In addition to 
the above, the impact of the automation renewal on 
human operations shall be assessed.
According to STUK’s view, fPH has in place 
systematic measures for detecting the possibility 
for human errors. fPH has assessed the signifi-
cance of errors in terms of core damage risk and 
implemented risk reduction measures.
In summary, it can be stated that the avoidance, 
detection and repair of human errors at the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units has been imple-
mented in a manner referred to in section 19 of the 
Government Decision.
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5.8 Section 20: Protection against 
external events and fires
The most important nuclear power plant safety 
functions shall remain operable in spite of any 
natural phenomena estimated possible on site or 
other events external to the plant. In addition, the 
combined effects of accident conditions induced by 
internal causes and simultaneous natural phenom-
ena shall be taken into account to the extent esti-
mated possible.
Structures, systems and components important to 
safety shall be designed and located, as well as 
protected by means of structural fire barriers and 
adequate fire fighting systems so that the likelihood 
of fires and explosions is small and their effect on 
plant safety insignificant.
Detailed requirements relating to section 20 
of the Government Decision are specified in the 
Guides yvL 1.0, yvL 2.6, yvL 4.1, yvL 4.2 and 
yvL 4.3, among others.
External events
Loads and conditions arising from natural phe-
nomena have been considered in the design of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with 
finnish building regulations. The most important 
natural phenomena, as well as their combinations, 
have also been considered in the functional design 
of systems. The safety margins used in the original 
design are not as wide as those currently applied 
when designing new nuclear power plants. fPH 
has studied the risks arising from external events 
in probabilistic risk analyses. The events analysed 
include, among others, harsh weather conditions, 
high seawater temperature and level, and phenom-
ena causing a clogging risk in the seawater sys-
tems,	 such	as	 frazil	 ice,	 algae	 and	 oil	 accident	 in	
the Gulf of finland. According to the analyses, the 
most important external events are the introduc-
tion of oil into the seawater system during an an-
nual maintenance outage and high seawater level 
during power operation.
The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is relatively 
well prepared for the complete clogging of seawa-
ter	 systems	 caused	 by	 oil,	 seaweed	 and	 frazil	 ice	
(sudden sub-cooling of seawater). The plant has a 
standby emergency feedwater system independent 
of the seawater cooling that can be used for cooling 
the reactor in the event of complete clogging of the 
seawater systems. However, this system cannot be 
used in those shutdown states in which the pri-
mary circuit is not pressurised.
on the basis of probabilistic risk analyses, no 
significant risks have been detected resulting from 
combinations of accidents arising from internal 
causes and natural phenomena.
The aircraft crashes considered in the plant 
design are milder than those required for new nu-
clear power plants.
According to the plant’s seismic risk analysis, 
the risks arising from earthquakes are relatively 
minor. The safety factors used in the original 
dimensioning of the plant structures and compo-
nents are considered to sufficiently cover the loads 
caused by earthquakes.
A survey of electromagnetic conditions (EmC) 
has been performed during the current operating 
licence period. As a result of the EmC survey, case-
specific solutions will be implemented pertaining 
to conditions deviating from those of normal indus-
trial environment. Lightning protection has been 
improved after damage caused by lightning. The 
electromagnetic interferences caused by nature 
and human action have been considered in the de-
sign of new I&C buildings in accordance with the 
current requirements.
The plant and procedure modifications imple-
mented during the current operating licence period 
reduce the risk imposed on the plant by natural 
phenomena and other external events. Probabilistic 
risk analyses are discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 3.4.2. According to STUK’s view, the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant can be considered to fulfil 
the requirements concerning protection against 
external events to a sufficient extent. However, 
during the next operating licence period, atten-
tion shall be paid to oil-combating arrangements 
in the event of an offshore oil accident because 
the oil transport volume is estimated to increase 
in the Gulf of finland. fPH has reported that, in 
co-operation with regional rescue authorities, it is 
planning to arrange practical exercises concerning 
the efficiency of oil-combating in order to test the 
reliability of operations and to assess the opportu-
nities for improvement.
Fires
The possibility of fires, as well as the accident risks 
resulting from them, was not sufficiently consid-
ered in the original design of the buildings and sys-
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tems of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. In many 
respects, the fire compartmentalisation is not such 
that the plant safety functions could be maintained 
in all possible fire conditions. The turbine building 
has a major significance in terms of safety due to 
the residual heat removal systems centrally lo-
cated inside it. Because of the deficiencies in the 
original design, it has been important to develop 
fire detection and fire extinguishing systems, as 
well as operative fire protection in parallel with 
structural fire protection.
A new residual heat removal system has been 
constructed at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
during the current operating licence period, among 
other things for the possible loss of all residual heat 
removal systems located inside the turbine hall as 
a result of a fire in the turbine hall. The fire fight-
ing water system and fire extinguishing systems 
have been renewed throughout the plant site. The 
fire extinguishing systems located in the turbine 
hall have been renewed, and the diesel generators 
have been protected by new sprinkler systems. The 
fire detection system has been renewed and made 
address-based, as a result of which fires can be 
detected, located and automatically extinguished 
faster than previously. A new fire station has been 
commissioned, and operative fire protection equip-
ment has been renewed.
According to STUK’s view, the fire safety of 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has improved 
during the current operating licence period. Due 
to deficiencies in the compartmentalisation of 
safety systems and insufficient structural fire 
resistance, which are due to the basic design of 
the plant, the fire safety is not capable of fulfill-
ing all of the requirements laid down in the Guide 
yvL 4.3. The licensee shall further develop fire 
safety in order to reduce the risks arising from 
the above-mentioned deficiencies. Some improve-
ments to that effect are in fact being implemented 
in connection with the LARA automation renewal 
currently underway.
Summary
The conclusion to the above is that the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant is presently sufficiently pro-
tected against external events and fires in a man-
ner referred to in section 20 of the Government 
Decision. However, the level of plant protection, 
as well as oil-combating in offshore areas, shall be 
further developed in order to amend the deficien-
cies indicated in the PRA, among others.
5.9 Section 21: Safety classification
The functions important to the safety of the sys-
tems, structures and components of a nuclear power 
plant shall be defined and the systems, structures 
and components classified according to their safety 
significance.
The systems, structures and components important 
to safety shall be designed, manufactured, installed 
and operated so that their quality level and the 
inspections and tests required to verify their qual-
ity	level	are	adequate	considering	any	item’s	safety	
significance.
Detailed requirements relating to section 21 
of the Government Decision are set forth in the 
Guide yvL 2.1, which was revised during the op-
erating licence period (valid as of 1 January 2001). 
In connection with the renewal, Safety Class 4 was 
introduced and definition of systems assigned to 
that category was required in the implementation 
decision.
The purpose of the safety classification is to 
ensure that the quality level complied with in the 
design, manufacture, installation and operation of 
systems, structures and components important to 
safety, as well as required inspections and tests, 
are in correct proportion to the safety significance 
of the item. The safety class provides a starting 
point for specifying the requirements to be set 
for the design, manufacture, installation, inspec-
tion, testing, operation and quality assurance of 
a system, structure or component. STUK uses 
the safety classification when defining its inspec-
tion activities. The direct dependence between the 
safety classification and the inspection activities is 
presented in detail in various yvL guides.
The systems, structures and components of 
the plant units have been classified into four safe-
ty classes in the classification document: Safety 
Classes 1, 2, 3 and 4, as well as Class EyT (non-
nuclear). The items with the highest safety signifi-
cance belong to Safety Class 1.
The safety classification of process-related, I&C 
and electrical components is presented in the 
safety classification document of the Loviisa 1 and 
2 nuclear power plant units, which consists of clas-
sification diagrams and classification lists. This 
document as a whole has been approved by STUK 
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in June 2007. System-level safety classification is 
presented in the final Safety Analysis Report of 
the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units (Lo-
fSAR).
As to system modifications, fPH presents the 
required changes and additions to the safety clas-
sification of systems in connection with the pre-in-
spection documentation submitted to STUK for ap-
proval. The revised parts of the safety classification 
documents are submitted to STUK once a year.
In addition to the requirements arising from 
the actual safety classification, additional require-
ments may be imposed on components concern-
ing environmental conditions in accidents or cer-
tain electrotechnical requirements. on the basis 
of these requirements, the classification of some 
components has been changed and the components 
have been replaced by those with better endurance 
in accident conditions. The results of probabilis-
tic risk assessments may also impose a need to 
present additional requirements for certain sys-
tems or components.
The conclusion to the above is that the safety 
classification of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
fulfils the regulations set forth in section 21 of the 
Government Decision.
5.10 Section 22: Monitoring and 
control of a nuclear power plant
A	nuclear	power	plant’s	control	rooms	shall	contain	
equipment which provide information about the 
plant’s	 operational	 state	 and	any	deviations	 from	
normal operation as well as systems which moni-
tor	 the	 state	 of	 the	 plant’s	 safety	 systems	 during	
operation and their functioning during operational 
transients and accidents.
A nuclear power plant shall contain automatic 
systems that maintain the plant in a safe state dur-
ing transients and accidents long enough to provide 
the operators a sufficient time to consider and im-
plement the correct actions.
There shall be an emergency control post at a 
nuclear power plant which is independent of the 
control room and the necessary local control sys-
tems by the means of which the nuclear reactor can 
be shut down and cooled and residual heat from 
the nuclear reactor and spent fuel stored at the 
plant can be removed.
Guide yvL 5.5 provides a set of more detailed 
guidelines concerning monitoring and control.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
have separate independent control rooms. The 
alarms from the spent fuel storages are also printed 
into the main control room of the Loviisa 2 nuclear 
power plant unit. The implementation of the main 
control rooms is based on proven control room tech-
nology. In addition to the main control room, reactor 
shutdown, as well as the control and monitoring 
measures necessary for safety, can also be conducted 
from the so-called safety panel located in the main 
control room of the other plant unit.
In addition to the main control room, both auxil-
iary buildings have auxiliary control rooms for the 
monitoring of the operation of important auxiliary 
processes. further, the plant has plant unit-specific 
ventilation control rooms as well as diesel genera-
tor-specific local control stations. Alarms from all 
auxiliary control rooms are collected and sent to the 
main control rooms.
monitoring and control systems for severe ac-
cidents, independent from the other I&C, have been 
implemented during the current operating licence 
period. The monitoring and control stations of these 
systems are located crosswise in the vicinity of 
the control rooms of both plant units, in the annu-
lar spaces, and in a monitoring station shared by 
both plant units. The standby emergency feedwater 
pump building and the containment spray system 
serving both plant units have separate monitoring 
stations each.
In the main control room, the process informa-
tion is presented by gauges, indicator lights, plotters 
and display devices of the process computer system. 
Alarms arrive in the main control room from two 
systems implemented by different technology: from 
the conventional alarm system and from the proc-
ess computer system. The signal light fields of the 
alarm systems are in the control consoles. Process 
computer alarms are indicated by its display de-
vices. In addition, event and status information, as 
well as any information about warning and alarm 
limits being exceeded, are also printed out on the 
alarm printers. The process computer provides op-
erators with process information in an illustrative 
form. The process computer carrying out process 
monitoring, as well as the related technical systems, 
has been renewed in the course of general develop-
ment of technology.
The control performed from within the control 
room targeting different plant systems is imple-
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mented through different levels of I&C. The highest 
level is that of plant control and the lowest that of 
individual controls. Currently, the principal user 
interface devices for the controls include the push 
button control units placed in the consoles and pan-
els of the main control room, key switches, and a set 
of other selector switches and controls representing 
conventional technology.
The protection systems of the Loviisa 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units are so designed that the 
actuation of safety systems in transient or accident 
conditions does not require rapid action from the op-
erator. The operators’ time for consideration before 
control and other actions, appropriate emergency 
operating procedures and operator training effec-
tively reduce the possibility of human errors. The 
process computer is equipped with the so-called 
HoKE support screens that are used together with 
the emergency operating procedures presented in 
the form of flow charts.
The management of the plant equipment and 
material data, planning and control of maintenance, 
management of periodic tests, and operating jour-
nals have previously been implemented as separate 
information systems or journals. During the operat-
ing period they have been collected under a single 
information system deployed in 2006, the user inter-
face of which is located in the main control room.
The changes relating to the automation renewal 
project LARA have been commenced during 2006 
as preparations for the first control room changes. 
The purpose of the project is to gradually renew the 
protection I&C, operational I&C and control rooms 
of the plant over several years, as well as to imple-
ment a separate emergency control post. The I&C 
ageing management is discussed in more detail in 
section 6.2.5.
The automation renewal has been divided into 
four stages:
•	 In stage 1, both safety-classified and non-classi-
fied items will be renewed; the first stage serves 
as a kind of pilot stage. The items to be renewed 
include, among others, fast and slow reactor 
shutdown and interlocking of control rods, se-
quence control and position indication of control 
rods, and the non-classified I&C of the auxiliary 
building. Stage 1 is planned to be implemented 
during 2007–2008 at the Loviisa 1 nuclear 
power plant unit, and in 2008 at the Loviisa 2 
nuclear power plant unit.
•	 In stage 2, reactor protection – that is, the 
reactor scram function – and the plant protec-
tion functions will be renewed. old reactor and 
plant protection systems will be integrated into 
a single new reactor protection system and for 
fault conditions in that system, an automatic 
and a manual backup protection system will be 
implemented. Stage 2 is planned to be imple-
mented in 2008 for the Loviisa 1 nuclear power 
plant unit, and in 2010 for the Loviisa 2 nuclear 
power plant unit.
•	 In stage 3, the I&C for the primary circuit and 
its auxiliary systems will be renewed. Stage 3 
is planned to be implemented in 2010 for the 
Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit, and in 2012 
for the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant unit.
•	 In stage 4, the I&C for the secondary circuit and 
its auxiliary systems will be renewed. Stage 4 
is planned to be implemented in 2012 for the 
Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit, and in 2014 
for the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant unit.
The new I&C systems are primarily based on pro-
grammable technology, which makes it possible to 
obtain more accurate information on the status of 
the monitored and controlled processes and I&C 
systems. The I&C functions will primarily remain 
unchanged. However, some changes to the plant 
functions will be made in connection with the au-
tomation renewal. These are due to the needs for 
modifications that have emerged and analysed 
during operational history. for example, the fans 
in safety-important rooms will in future be actu-
ated from the reactor protection system, the start-
up conditions of the containment spray system will 
be revised, and the probability for the occurrence 
of a coolant leak through the reactor coolant pump 
seals in transient conditions will be reduced. most 
of the control functions will become screen-based.
The I&C cabinets of the new system will be lo-
cated in new buildings that meet the requirements 
laid down in the yvL guides, providing clear physi-
cal separation for the mutually redundant systems. 
The buildings are in the finishing stage in the sum-
mer of 2007.
A simulator unit is being used in the training of 
control room personnel, the functions, user interface 
and appearance of which are very similar to those of 
the main control rooms of the plant units. The con-
trol room changes relating to the LARA project will 
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first be implemented with a simulator to provide the 
control room personnel with an opportunity to prac-
tice operating the changed control room before the 
change is implemented in the actual control room. 
for the purposes of the LARA project, a separate 
development simulator has been implemented in 
the facilities of fNS responsible for the design, and 
used as a control room design tool. In significant 
automation changes, the new user interfaces are 
implemented and tested for the first time in the 
supplier’s testing site.
The approval of the automation renewal by 
STUK is progressing in stages. STUK has approved 
the conceptual design plan as the starting point for 
the automation renewal, as well as the conceptual 
design plans concerning functional changes. most 
of the detailed pre-inspection documents concerning 
stage 1 of the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant have 
already been approved by STUK, as have the qual-
ity management and qualification plans concerning 
the automation platforms intended to be used. The 
stage 1 automation is currently in a trial run at the 
manufacturer. The most important plans in terms of 
safety concerning stage 2 will be processed by STUK 
during 2007.
The conclusion to the above is that the monitor-
ing and control of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
has been implemented in a manner referred to in 
section 22 of the Government Decision.
5.11 Equipment qualification
According to the IAEA guide NS-G-2.10 “Periodic 
Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants”, a nuclear 
power plant shall have systematic procedures for 
qualifying equipment and structures important 
to safety and for maintaining the documentation 
demonstrating qualification. The qualification is 
to ensure that equipment and structures are ca-
pable of performing their functions in design basis 
operating conditions and accidents with sufficient 
margin while taking into account the loads and en-
vironmental conditions arising during them. most 
essential in connection with periodic safety reviews 
is to review those factors that may have impaired 
the qualification since the previous safety review 
or may do so during the subsequent review period.
Mechanical components
The most important mechanical components of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant are the Safety Class 
1 pressure equipment, the qualification of which is 
sufficiently implemented by fulfilling the require-
ments of the applicable standards and yvL guides 
pertaining to design, manufacture, inspection and 
testing. The fatigue analyses of these components 
have been updated in connection with the operat-
ing licence application to correspond with the 50-
year service life. Requirements concerning accident 
loads have remained unchanged, and the power 
increase carried out in connection with the previ-
ous operating licence has not increased the loads 
imposed on the primary circuit. The suitability of 
other mechanical components such as pumps and 
valves to the designed environmental conditions 
is also ensured in connection with their design, 
procurement and installation by defining for them 
accident and normal operating conditions under 
which they must maintain their operability and 
under which the ageing and wear of components 
can be managed by means of maintenance. These 
requirements are presented in the pre-inspection 
documents and material specifications. The con-
struction inspections include pressure, load and 
leak tests, in addition to which other tests, type 
tests and operating experience data for applica-
ble components may also be required. Component-
specific supplementary qualification tests have 
been performed on the emergency cooling system 
floor drain filters, emergency cooling and emer-
gency make-up water system pumps and impulse 
pipe flow limiters, among others. The qualification 
of valve actuators inside the containment in terms 
of environmental conditions and the suitability of 
torque ranges was also reassessed during the first 
years of operation.
Electrical and I&C systems and components
According to the guides yvL 5.2 and yvL 5.5 con-
cerning electrical and I&C systems and compo-
nents, the systems and equipment at a nuclear 
facility shall be qualified for their intended use. 
Qualification verifies the conformity of the systems 
and their components with the requirements. The 
licensee shall draw up a special qualification plan 
to demonstrate the suitability of Safety Class 2 
and 3 electrical power and I&C systems and com-
ponents for their intended use. A system’s safety 
significance and the reliability requirements placed 
on it shall be considered in the drawing up of the 
qualification plan. The qualification plan shall be 
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updated if the requirement specification of the sys-
tem is changed such that this affects the qualifica-
tion, or if essential new information has been ob-
tained about the system and this information may 
be considered to affect the qualification plan.
The environmental conditions and stresses of a 
nuclear facility’s safety-classified electrical power 
and I&C systems and components as well as cables 
in all planned operational conditions and during 
storage and transport shall be defined. The sys-
tems, components and cables shall be of such de-
sign that their operating capability is maintained 
within set requirements for their entire design 
service life. The qualification of safety-classified 
components and cables under design environmen-
tal conditions and stresses shall be demonstrated 
by means of tests and analyses that are in accord-
ance with standards. The tests shall correspond to 
the combined effects of the most unfavourable op-
erational and environmental conditions possible.
Deficiencies in the accident qualification of the 
electrical and I&C systems of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant were observed during the design and 
construction phase. for this reason, a systematic 
qualification assessment of the electrical and I&C 
components outside containment (qualification to 
conditions) was performed at the beginning of the 
1980s, with the safety significance of each compo-
nent and the operational and environmental condi-
tions prevailing during accidents serving as the 
starting point. In connection with the assessment, 
the components were classified as follows: compo-
nents to be qualified, components to be replaced 
by qualified components, and components with no 
qualification requirements. The required qualifica-
tion measures and replacements of components 
and cables were performed as a result of the as-
sessment. on the basis of the analysis of accident 
conditions, certain structural changes, mostly re-
lating to cables, were also performed.
The power increase of the Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant units has only had limited significance for 
the qualification of electrical and I&C components. 
Therefore, the power increases have not resulted 
in new significant qualification requirements. with 
regard to electrical systems, the power increases 
have mainly resulted in modifications concerning 
secondary side components (generators and main 
transformers) and structures (generator busbars). 
The inspection of the reactor emergency heat 
transfer chain relating to the increase of thermal 
power, mostly performed during 1997, resulted in 
modifications, the purpose of which were to ensure 
the thermal endurance of components and systems 
relating to the heat transfer chain. Electrotechnical 
modifications of this type include, e.g., the rewind-
ing of certain pump motors as well as the replace-
ment of supply cables and fan motors.
Temperatures exceeding the design basis of the 
components (+50°C) were detected in the tempera-
ture characterisations carried out inside the con-
tainments after the annual maintenances of 1997. 
It was also discovered that the general tempera-
ture of the steam generator rooms had increased 
significantly. To rectify the matter, fPH took the 
following measures to restore the temperatures 
back to an acceptable level:
•	 lowering the temperature of the cooling water 
for these rooms
•	 increasing the cooling capacity for these rooms 
and directing the cooling more accurately into 
hot areas
•	 increasing the number of temperature measure-
ments
•	 improving the thermal insulation.
As a result of these improvement measures, the 
general temperatures of the steam generator rooms 
have presently been successfully lowered by near-
ly ten degrees. Regardless of the measures taken, 
some hot spots have been detected in the steam gen-
erator rooms, for which fPH has designed cooling 
on a case-specific basis. In addition, the impact of 
the highest temperature on component ageing was 
studied by theoretical methods in the component 
type-specific report prepared in 1998. Due to bad 
availability of the original electrical and I&C cable 
types used inside the containment, new cable types 
from two manufacturers have been qualified.
The qualification of thermocouple sensors and 
plugs for the conditions prevailing in loss of cool-
ant accidents and main steam pipe breaks was 
assessed in connection with the modifications con-
cerning the coolant temperature measurements 
of the reactor upper section. Certain qualification 
measures relating to the above are still in progress. 
Sensors and plugs are part of the instrumentation 
that penetrates the reactor head, and the compart-
ment in question is not directly connected to the 
steam generator room.
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The qualification requirements pertaining to 
electrical and I&C components have been updated 
as a result of the analyses concerning leaks from 
the main steam pipe in 2002. The components 
needed in severe accidents have been qualified for 
the environmental conditions of severe accidents 
described in the safety analysis report. As part 
of the project for implementing provisions for se-
vere accidents, temperature sensors and magnetic 
switches, as well as new ignition plugs qualified for 
severe accident conditions, were installed in the 
containment.
The qualification of electrical and I&C compo-
nents outside containment was reviewed between 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The reviews re-
sulted in certain structural improvements relating 
to cabling and mechanical protection. In 1998 fPH 
decided to carry out additional reviews relating to 
the qualification of components outside contain-
ment, primarily concerning the management of 
accidents arising from postulated pipe breaks on 
the feedwater level of the control room building. 
Critical objects have been protected against jets 
caused by pipe breaks by moving them into a pro-
tected location or by protecting them. The quali-
fication is intended to be completed in connection 
with the automation renewal (LARA) by separat-
ing the mutually redundant components, functions 
and measurements required for performing critical 
functions.
The directive concerning electromagnetic com-
patibility (EmC) entered into force in 1996. Since 
the beginning of 1997 STUK has required that 
the environmental qualification of electrical and 
I&C components must also include the demonstra-
tion of electromagnetic compatibility. A survey of 
the electromagnetic conditions prevailing at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has been performed 
during the current operating licence period. As a 
result of the EmC survey, case-specific solutions 
will be implemented pertaining to conditions de-
viating from those of a normal industrial environ-
ment. Lightning protection has been improved 
after damages caused by lightning. The electro-
magnetic interferences caused by nature and hu-
man action have been considered in the design of 
new I&C buildings in accordance with the current 
requirements.
The original design of the plant did not include 
any special earthquake resistance requirements. 
However, according to the plant’s seismic risk 
analysis, the risks arising from earthquakes are 
relatively minor. The seismic classification in ac-
cordance with the Guide yvL 2.6, demonstrating 
that the plant’s earthquake resistance is not im-
paired, is to be applied in connection with major 
modifications being performed at the plant. The 
structures of new I&C buildings are to be dimen-
sioned in accordance with the earthquake resist-
ance requirements.
Service life management at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant is discussed in section 6.2.5 of the 
safety assessment. In particular, the remaining 
service life must be known for components quali-
fied to accident conditions. The remaining service 
life of cables is intended to be ensured by tests per-
formed on samples. As to the replaced components, 
the remaining qualification life is under control 
provided that the environmental conditions and 
functional requirements have remained within 
the original limits. As to the other components, the 
validity of the qualification usually cannot be as 
clearly verified, which requires continuous devel-
opment of the qualification methods.
Summary
In summary, it can be stated that the review of 
factors affecting the preservation of the qualifica-
tion status of systems, structures and components 
in accordance with the IAEA guide NS-G-2.10 was 
not presented in the reports submitted to STUK 
in connection with the submission of the operat-
ing licence application. STUK required fPH to 
develop their qualification procedure to make it 
more systematic, taking into account the trace-
ability of the qualification of the most safety-im-
portant systems, structures and components for 
the original qualification requirements and the 
possible changes in loads, as well as operational 
and environmental conditions occurring during 
the operation of the plant, updates to the safety 
analyses, and the changing of qualification re-
quirements due to the advancement of technol-
ogy. fPH has presented an action plan for im-
proving the maintenance of qualification. The 
revised qualification programme will utilise the 
existing practices of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant in the areas of maintenance, management 
of spare parts and plant modifications, monitoring 
of component status, environmental conditions 
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and malfunctions, operating experience feedback, 
and quality management. The qualification pro-
gramme presents written definitions for operat-
ing principles and connections between various 
organisations, and provides more systematic in-
structions for the qualification activities. The in-
formation systems of the plant will be expanded 
to enable more efficient management of the in-
formation needed for maintaining the qualifica-
tion of systems, structures and components. The 
qualification programme, revised in accordance 
with the plan, is to be initiated at the beginning of 
2008. STUK considers the presented action plan 
sufficient.
The qualification of components outside the con-
tainment of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has 
been investigated, and structural improvements 
relating to cabling and mechanical protection have 
been performed. measures required for pipe breaks 
occurring on the feedwater level are intended to 
be completed in connection with the automation 
renewal project.
The conclusion to the above is that the quali-
fication procedures at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant, together with the development measures 
presented, are sufficient for the renewal of the op-
erating licence.
44
STUK-B 81
6 Operation of the Nuclear Power Plant 
(Government Decision 359/1991)
6.1 Section 23: Technical Specifications 
and plant procedures
Technical and administrative requirements and 
restrictions for ensuring the safe operation of a 
nuclear	power	plant	shall	be	set	forth	in	the	plant’s	
Technical Specifications.
Appropriate procedures shall exist for the op-
eration, maintenance, in-service inspections and 
periodic tests as well as transient and accident con-
ditions of a nuclear power plant.
Taken together, the Technical Specifications and 
plant procedures define the limits and operating 
procedures for the safe operation of the nuclear 
power plant in different operational conditions.
The Technical Specifications for the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units set forth the 
restrictions and conditions, defined in accordance 
with the design basis, concerning the operation 
of the reactor and the plant, the requirements 
concerning periodic tests, and the essential admin-
istrative procedures. The Technical Specifications 
is a document reviewed and approved by STUK, 
which is continuously kept up to date. According to 
STUK’s view, the Technical Specifications for the 
Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units are up 
to date and sufficient. fPH submitted the latest 
updated revisions of the Technical Specifications 
for the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units to 
STUK for approval in November 2005, and STUK 
approved them according to the requirements set 
forth in the Guide yvL 1.1 in decisions A273/104, 
13 April 2006, and B273/29, 13 April 2006.
fPH has also made continuous efforts to de-
velop and improve the Technical Specifications in 
order to enhance their unambiguity and usability. 
In addition, efforts have been made to perform 
the assessment of modification needs on the basis 
of the completed modifications and the operating 
experience gained to the extent regarded as suf-
ficient, and these assessments have been appro-
priately included in the Technical Specifications. 
Similar care will also be required in the future 
because extensive modifications will be made to 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in the coming 
years (the automation renewal project LARA), 
the particular challenge at that point being the 
maintenance of Technical Specifications, training 
relating to the changes, and the correct timing of 
the deployment.
STUK has required fPH to assess the compre-
hensiveness and adequate balance of the Technical 
Specifications by the end of 2008 using probabilis-
tic analysis.
The most important instruction types included 
in the operation and maintenance manuals of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant are:
•	 the quality assurance manual and the adminis-
trative procedures included the administrative 
rules contained therein
•	 procedures for controlling the operating and 
maintenance routines of the plant
•	 emergency procedures
•	 operation and maintenance procedures to en-
sure the appropriate operation and mainte-
nance of systems and components
•	 procedures for periodic tests and in-service in-
spections to ensure the operability of systems 
and components
•	 procedures for restoring the normal state to 
ensure the correct state of systems and compo-
nents
•	 operating chemistry procedures for supervising 
chemical parameters and taking appropriate 
measures.
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The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant currently has in 
place an advanced and up to date system of plant 
procedures that is incorporated as part of the qual-
ity system of the plant. The requirements pertain-
ing to the comprehensiveness and up-to-dateness 
of, the responsibilities relating to, and compliance 
with the plant procedures and instructions are laid 
down in the quality assurance manual. The an-
nual assessment of the comprehensiveness and ef-
fectiveness of the quality assurance programme 
in accordance with the manual also includes the 
review of the plant procedure system. This review 
will highlight, among other things, the require-
ments, sufficiency and update needs of the plant 
procedures, as well as the fulfilment of the set 
requirements.
fPH has significantly developed its plant pro-
cedures with regard to, e.g., emergency and trou-
bleshooting procedures, severe accident manage-
ment procedures, instructions concerning the qual-
ity systems of the radiochemistry and operating 
chemistry laboratories, and the instructions and 
structure of procedures concerning the inspection 
organisation Loviisa yvL during the current op-
erating licence period. The project for presenting 
the emergency procedures in a flow chart format 
was initiated in 2000. The procedures were put 
into use after STUK’s approval on 1 march 2006. 
Procedures for severe accident management (SAm) 
were introduced in 2002. The procedures were 
updated in 2005, and the revised procedures were 
introduced in 2006.
According to STUK’s view, the plant procedures 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant adequately 
cover the safety-significant work processes and ac-
tions, such as the nuclear power plant’s operation, 
maintenance, in-service inspections and periodic 
tests, and transient and accident conditions. The 
project for developing new emergency procedures, 
as well as other instruction development efforts, 
reflects Loviisa’s aim to create as good a set of 
instructions for the needs of the organisation as 
possible. The maintenance and development of in-
structions is determined and controlled, targeting 
the requirements of the future with a sufficiently 
long reach. A longer-term development target at 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is to prepare com-
prehensive emergency procedures for shutdown 
states. A plan for the instruction development has 
been drawn up, and STUK has required the in-
structions to be completed by the end of 2014. one 
of the future challenges will result from the update 
needs arising from extensive modifications, such as 
the automation renewal project LARA.
The conclusion to the above is that the Technical 
Specifications and plant procedures of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant have been implemented in a 
manner referred to in section 23 of the Government 
Decision.
6.2 Section 24: Operation 
and maintenance
In all activities affecting the operation of a nuclear 
power plant and the availability of components, a 
systematic approach shall be applied for ensuring 
plant	operators’	continuous	awareness	of	 the	state	
of the plant and its components.
The reliable operation of systems and compo-
nents shall be ensured by adequate maintenance 
as well as by regular in-service inspections and 
periodic tests.
6.2.1 Plant operation
The responsibilities relating to plant operation and 
safety are defined in the administrative procedures 
of the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. 
The plant may only be operated from within the 
control room by an operator approved by STUK. 
All operational measures carried out at the plant 
relating to safety or operability are performed by 
operators or field operators and approved by the 
shift supervisor. The operation and condition moni-
toring of the plant is carried out in accordance with 
pre-determined and approved instructions.
The actions carried out when operating the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant are based on written 
plant procedures or written regulations. written 
regulations are prepared, for example, when chang-
ing the operating state or power level of the plant 
or for actions relating to reactor and nuclear fuel. 
Compliance with the Technical Specifications is al-
ways ensured by the shift supervisor in connection 
with planned changes to the plant state and work 
orders concerning components that are important 
to safety.
The state of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is 
primarily monitored using the data received from 
the process computer. The shift personnel monitor 
the main parameters of the plant, as well as other 
required process or status information as appli-
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cable, on the screen of the process computer. The 
plant state is also monitored on the basis of the 
gauges and alarms. The shift team also have pro-
cedures at their disposal for the purpose of check-
ing plant systems, components and states, and for 
reading status information on a regular basis. Any 
deviations observed by the shift team will be re-
sponded to in a manner required by the operating 
and emergency procedures.
The flow of information concerning the state 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is ensured by 
means of printed documents, information systems 
and meeting practices. The shifts maintain jour-
nals in which the main parameters describing the 
plant state, operational measures and all signifi-
cant faults and observations are recorded. written 
procedures have been prepared for change of shift, 
the purpose of which is to ensure that all relevant 
information is passed on to the next shift. Plant pa-
rameters are recorded in information systems in a 
manner that enables viewing them as history data 
and monitoring trend developments.
The plant has a periodic testing programme 
that defines the regularly performed tests used for 
ensuring the operability of components important 
to safety and availability, as well as the related ac-
ceptance criteria and testing frequencies. The test-
ing is performed in accordance with the separate 
testing instructions.
The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has in place a 
work order system that ensures the safe and time-
ly execution of repair, maintenance and preven-
tive maintenance work. The shift supervisor gives 
permission to start a certain task when inspecting 
the work plans prepared in accordance with the 
work order system, taking into account the oper-
ability requirements for systems and components 
laid down in the Technical Specifications.
Components and systems at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant are always tested for operability after 
fault repairs and maintenance work. Tests for 
ensuring the operability of the plant after mainte-
nance, modifications and repairs are performed be-
fore the start-up of the plant after annual mainte-
nance. The supervision and monitoring procedure 
for annual maintenance tests is instructed in the 
plant procedures.
The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has in place 
regulated procedures for reporting plant operation 
activities. These include regular and event-related 
reports. The plant also has daily meetings for shar-
ing plant condition information to the organisa-
tion.
In summary, it can be stated that systematic 
procedures are adhered to in the operation of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The reliable opera-
tion of systems and components has been ensured 
by regular in-service inspections and periodic tests. 
These procedures are used for ensuring that the 
plant systems and components are in the design 
basis state and that operators are constantly aware 
of the state of the plant and its components.
The conclusion to the above is that the opera-
tion of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has been 
implemented in a manner referred to in section 24 
of the Government Decision.
6.2.2 Maintenance
The maintenance operations at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant comprise preventive and corrective 
maintenance as well as the planning and imple-
mentation of modifications, spare parts mainte-
nance, outage operations, and quality control relat-
ing to all of the above-mentioned functions. The 
requirements concerning maintenance operations 
are specified in the guides yvL 1.8 and yvL 1.13. 
Detailed technical requirements and regulatory 
oversight are also described in several other yvL 
guides published by STUK.
According to the plant’s administrative rules 
and procedures, the maintenance unit operating 
under the authority of the plant manager assumes 
the main responsibility for maintenance operations 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. other organi-
sation units of the plant have also duties relating to 
the planning and implementation of maintenance. 
The planning of annual maintenance, as well as 
the quality control of maintenance, fall under the 
responsibility of the technology unit, while the con-
sideration of nuclear and radiation safety aspects 
in maintenance work planning are included in the 
duties of the safety unit. The duty of the operating 
unit is to arrange the process isolations and resto-
rations required by maintenance work as well as 
the related administrative supervision.
The requirements pertaining to maintenance 
operations are specified in the quality assurance 
manual. The documents pertaining to maintenance 
STUK-B 81
47
operations are in accordance with the set require-
ments and have been kept up to date during the 
operating licence period. The extensive plant modi-
fications currently underway impose considerable 
challenges for the update of instructions concern-
ing I&C technology in particular. The incorporation 
of maintenance instructions for revised systems as 
part of the plant procedure system is also perceived 
as a challenge.
A larger share of the maintenance operations 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant have been 
performed by subcontractors during the current 
operating licence period, in particular those car-
ried out during annual maintenances. Both the 
licensee and STUK have recently paid particular 
attention to the technical competence of the exter-
nal workforce and their familiarity with the plant 
and its procedures, as well as to the instruction 
and supervision carried out by the personnel of the 
licensee. According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the 
licensee is responsible for the safe use of nuclear 
energy and, consequently, also for the safety of 
maintenance work.
Plant modifications to improve safety, operabil-
ity and reliability have been carried out through-
out the operating history of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant. Examples of significant modifications 
carried out during the current operating licence 
period include:
•	 power increase by 11% at the beginning of 
operating licence period in 1998 (licensed in 
connection with the previous operating licence 
renewal)
•	 modifications relating to provisions made for 
severe accidents, the so-called SAm project (dis-
cussed in more detail in section 5.5 above)
•	 initiation of the plant automation renewal 
project LARA in 2004 (sections 5.1 and 5.10)
•	 renewal of the measurement system supporting 
the load monitoring of primary circuit struc-
tures (section 6.2.5)
•	 renewal of the condition monitoring system 
measuring the vibration levels of reactor cool-
ant pumps and turbines (section 6.2.5)
•	 enhancing the endurance of safety-classified ca-
bles located in the steam generator room against 
environmental conditions (section 6.2.5)
•	 reducing the reactivity risk during refuelling 
outages by removing unnecessary clean water 
lines (section 5.3 and 5.6)
•	 ensuring power supply by securing the power 
supply of the batteries of the 220 v and 24 v 
direct current systems (section 5.6)
•	 renewal of the fire alarm system, modifications 
to the fire fighting water system and fire extin-
guishing system, and the construction of a new 
fire station (section 5.8)
•	 securing the cooling of reactor coolant pump 
seals
•	 renewal of stationary radiation measuring sys-
tem and personal contamination monitors (sec-
tion 4.2)
•	 renewal of maintenance and laboratory infor-
mation systems
•	 modification of the protective sleeve of tempera-
ture sensors in the protective tubes of control 
rods
•	 ensuring the cold shutdown of the plant by 
securing the emergency residual heat removal 
system and the seawater systems serving as the 
ultimate heat sink (section 5.6)
•	 construction	of	a	 liquid	waste	solidification	 fa-
cility (section 10.1).
In addition to conventional condition monitoring 
measures, the preventive maintenance programme 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant comprises con-
tinuous-monitoring methods such as the vibration 
measurements of the reactor pressure vessel con-
trol rod drive mechanisms, reactor coolant pumps 
and the turbo-generator, monitoring of the primary 
circuit loads, and monitoring of leaks, water chem-
istry and loose parts. The operability of systems 
and components is ensured by tests performed at 
regular intervals. The tested systems and compo-
nents, as well as the testing schedule, are specified 
in the Technical Specifications. Periodic tests of at 
least similar scope are required after modifications 
and repairs, and after maintenance operations that 
required disassembly. The prior approval of STUK 
is required for the functional test programme exe-
cuted after considerable modifications. Inspections 
concerning the operability and condition of compo-
nents are also carried out as required on the basis 
of the accumulated operating experience and ad-
vancement of technological knowledge. The opera-
tors of vvER type plants have served as an impor-
tant source of operating experience in this regard.
The maintenance data of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant is assigned to operating locations 
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and components according to work numbers, from 
which they are entered into the maintenance infor-
mation system through work order and work as-
signment routines. The maintenance history feed-
back data obtained from the maintenance informa-
tion system is generated for the purpose of serving 
the plant operating organisation. The collection, 
recording and reporting of the maintenance and 
fault history is guided by procedures. The analysis 
and reporting of maintenance history has been 
recently developed on the basis of the accumulated 
experience.
The experience accumulated from maintenance 
operations is made use of when estimating the 
remaining service life of the components of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The applicable poli-
cies and procedures have been described in the 
procedure concerning the ageing management of 
components and structures. The history database 
is updated and the reporting is developed on 
the basis of the decisions made by the annually 
held ageing management and planning meeting. 
According to STUK’s view, the maintenance history 
currently serves effectively both the operation and 
maintenance activities and the PRAs concerning 
the reliability of technology.
In addition to day to day regulatory oversight, 
the effectiveness of the maintenance operations of 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has been moni-
tored during the current operating licence period 
using the indicator system developed by STUK. 
failure detection and anticipation have been con-
tinuously improved in maintenance operations at 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, and components 
have been replaced. As a result of these measures, 
the indicator concerning maintenance or the un-
derlying fault data do not show negative effects 
potentially associated with the ageing of the plant, 
which indicates effective service life management 
and successful maintenance of components.
The total number of the annual maintenance 
work at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant concern-
ing components subject to Technical Specifications, 
including both fault repairs and preventive main-
tenance, has been increasing towards the end of 
the current operating licence period. This is partly 
due to the new information system commissioned 
in 2006. In connection with the commissioning 
of the new system, the follow-up was also tar-
geted at those components subject to Technical 
Specifications that do not have any associated lim-
iting conditions for operation. Despite the changes 
to the work recording procedure, there was no 
marked change in the ratio of the number of pre-
ventive maintenance works to the number of fault 
repairs. Since the increase in the number of com-
ponents covered by the indicator has not affected 
the ratio of the number of preventive maintenance 
works to the number of fault repairs, maintenance 
operations can be considered to be in balance and 
consistently implemented on all plant components 
subject to Technical Specifications.
The average repair times of faults causing 
inoperability of components subject to Technical 
Specifications have remained relatively stable at 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant for several years, 
varying from one day (24 h) to over two days (more 
that 48 h). Production losses due to failures have 
been small at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, 
as is also indicated by the high load factors of the 
plant units.
maintenance operations are also discussed in 
sections 5.7 (avoiding human errors), 5.9 (safety 
classification), 5.10 (qualification of equipment and 
structures), 6.1 (Technical Specifications and plant 
procedures), 6.2.1 (plant operation), 6.2.3 (in-serv-
ice inspections), 6.2.5 (plant ageing management), 
and 6.3 (personnel).
The conclusion to the above is that the main-
tenance operations of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant fulfil the set requirements.
6.2.3 In-service inspections
The condition of the pressure-bearing compo-
nents of the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units is ensured by means of in-service inspec-
tions. Primary circuit components are subjected to 
in-service inspections performed during outages 
at regular intervals using non-destructive testing 
methods in accordance with the Guide yvL 3.8. 
The results of the in-service inspections are com-
pared with the results of earlier inspections and 
pre-service inspections performed prior to the com-
missioning.
The in-service inspection programmes are sub-
mitted to STUK for approval prior to each round of 
inspections. The programmes and the related in-
spection procedures are modified when necessary, 
taking into account the development of industry 
requirements and standards, the development of 
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inspection techniques, inspection experience, and 
operating experience from nuclear power plants in 
finland and elsewhere.
Attempts have been made to focus the inspec-
tions on areas where faults are most likely to 
emerge. These include, for example, items suscep-
tible to fatigue due to temperature variations. The 
selection of inspection items is under continuous 
development. A risk-informed in-service inspection 
programme is being developed to that end.
The frequency of the non-destructive examina-
tions performed at regular intervals is usually ten 
years. The inspection programmes have been sup-
plemented with additional inspections for reactor 
pressure vessel and primary circuit pipelines, and 
their frequency has been shortened to eight years. 
The inspection frequency for items susceptible to 
thermal fatigue is three years.
The Guide yvL 3.8 and the latest edition of the 
ASmE Code, Section xI are used as the accept-
ance criteria for in-service inspection programmes 
and procedures. A qualification system complying 
with European practice has been developed for in-
service inspections. STUK monitors the implemen-
tation of qualifications.
In addition to the aforementioned inspections, 
physical inspections that concern the condition 
and reliability of pressure vessels are performed at 
regular intervals in accordance with the finnish 
pressure equipment legislation. These inspections 
are the full inspection, internal inspection and 
operational inspection, and they include non-de-
structive testing as well as pressure and leak 
tests. Inspections concerning pipelines have been 
defined in the system-specific condition monitor-
ing programmes. These in-service inspections are 
discussed in the Guides yvL 3.0, yvL 3.3, yvL 
5.3, yvL 5.4 and yvL 5.7. The in-service inspec-
tion programmes fulfil the requirements specified 
in the yvL guides with regard to the number of 
inspections and inspection technique.
The reliability of the non-destructive exami-
nation methods for primary circuit pipelines and 
components has been essentially improved since 
the commissioning of the plant. The implementa-
tion of the qualification system for in-service in-
spections and the introduction of the risk-informed 
in-service inspection programme are significant 
development targets for operations.
The in-service inspection of electrical and I&C 
components, as well as the related procedures, 
are specified in the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
procedures. The in-service inspection of safety-im-
portant items, as well as the frequency of these in-
spections, is defined in the Technical Specifications. 
The scope of the in-service inspections is based on 
the required extent of condition monitoring, which 
is assessed in connection with the assessment of 
systems and their modifications. Requirements 
concerning the definition of testing scope are speci-
fied in the Guides yvL 5.2 and yvL 5.5.
The tasks to be performed on each item and the 
applicable procedures, acceptance criteria, measur-
ing equipment, safety aspects and protocols are 
defined in more detail in the maintenance instruc-
tions of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The 
instructions are updated every four years or when-
ever required. The equipment classification that 
has been under preparation at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant is intended to be used in the further 
improvement of the preventive maintenance and 
in-service inspection programmes.
The power increase implemented at the end 
of 1990s did not directly affect the scope of the 
in-service inspections of electrical and I&C com-
ponents. However, plant modifications, both those 
relating to the power increase and those performed 
later, such as the implementation of the severe 
accident management system and the renewal of 
radiation measuring systems, have changed the in-
spection items for the in-service inspection of elec-
trical and I&C systems. New platforms equipped 
with self-diagnostic and testing features will be 
introduced in connection with the automation re-
newal project (LARA). The I&C in-service inspec-
tion programmes will be so defined that the moni-
toring and in-service inspections performed by the 
systems themselves provide sufficient coverage.
A considerable part of the in-service inspections 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is performed in 
connection with annual maintenance outages, at 
which point STUK oversees the tests by inspect-
ing the testing protocols, the comprehensiveness 
of the tests and the appropriateness of the testing 
procedures. The state of the testing procedures is 
also assessed in connection with the operational 
in-service inspection programme. The remarks con-
cerning the comprehensiveness and correctness of 
the I&C in-service inspections have been accounted 
for in the procedure development, although there 
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remains room for improvement with regard to com-
prehensiveness.
The conclusion to the above is that the in-serv-
ice inspections of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
have been implemented in a manner referred to in 
section 24 of the Government Decision.
6.2.4 Currency of plant documentation
A large number of modifications are carried out at 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant each year. This re-
quires clear procedures being defined for the main-
tenance and assessment of plant documentation 
in order to ensure that the plant documentation 
corresponds with the actual plant and its current 
design basis after the modifications. The updated 
plant documentation of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant includes:
•	 the final Safety Analysis Report (fSAR)
•	 Technical Specifications
•	 the safety classification document
•	 emergency procedures
•	 operation and maintenance manuals
•	 flow diagrams, figures
•	 computer applications and files, the most im-
portant of which is the plant information sys-
tem LomAx containing, e.g., information about 
the storage facilities and modifications, fault 
repairs, maintenance activities and in-service 
inspections performed at the plant
•	 in-service inspection and periodic testing proce-
dures
•	 system line-up procedures
•	 operating chemistry procedures.
The procedures for modifications at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant have been completely revised 
during 2002–2005 and now contain sufficient and 
comprehensive maintenance routines for plant 
modification documentation. The procedures con-
cerning modifications and the maintenance of 
plant modification documentation are part of the 
plant quality assurance system that is updated at 
regular intervals and assessed annually.
STUK supervises the currency of the plant 
documentation in connection with document revi-
sions and inspections of the periodic inspection 
programme, as well as during annual mainte-
nances. As a significant share of the modifications 
are carried out during annual maintenance, one 
criteria for the start-up permit granted by STUK 
after the annual maintenance is that all safety-
significant modifications have been incorporated in 
those plant documents that may be needed when 
the plant is in power operation.
According to STUK’s view, the present proce-
dures for ensuring the currency of the documenta-
tion are sufficient and comprehensive. Currently, 
the plant documentation corresponds with the 
actual plant and its design basis. The present pro-
cedures, established at the end of the 1980s, have 
contributed to the elimination of potential discrep-
ancies between the plant and its documentations 
arising from the various modifications. further, 
no apparent problems have been observed in the 
operation and maintenance of the plant that had 
resulted from deficiencies or outdatedness of the 
plant documentation.
more timely incorporation of the modifications 
into the documentation presents a target for future 
development. future challenges are provided by 
the incorporation of the numerous modifications 
resulting from the Loviisa automation renewal 
(LARA) into the documentation and the concurrent 
future development of the emergency procedures.
The conclusion to the above is that the docu-
mentation of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is 
sufficiently up to date for the renewal of the oper-
ating licence.
6.2.5 Plant ageing management
According to the Guide yvL 1.1, a nuclear power 
plant shall have a comprehensive ageing man-
agement programme comprising the design and 
qualification of components and structures, their 
operation and operating experience, in-service in-
spections and periodic tests, and maintenance. The 
programme shall identify all significant ageing and 
wear mechanisms, and potential degradation ow-
ing to ageing. The periodic safety review shall as-
sess the experience of the facility ageing and age-
ing management.
Service life management programme
Service life management and the related technolog-
ical and financial planning have been implemented 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in the form of 
a proceduralised service life management process 
known as LoPLIm. The Power Plant Technology 
group is responsible for its coordination and super-
vision, and the system managers nominated within 
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the group take care of the implementation of the 
service life management of those systems, struc-
tures and components important to safety and op-
erability that fall under their responsibility, con-
sulting the experts of fortum Nuclear Service as 
applicable. for the purpose of proper definition of 
the content and extent of the measures taken, the 
systems, structures and components have been as-
signed to four classes: A) those limiting the service 
life of the plant, B) those critical in terms of their 
availability/financial impact, C) those important in 
terms of their availability/financial impact, D) oth-
ers. Class A systems, structures and components 
are further divided into subclasses, and the service 
life of 50 years is attempted to be ensured for each. 
The procedure applicable to Class B is similar, but 
the estimate of remaining service life based on the 
ageing mechanisms of each subclass is only made 
when required. for Class C, the ageing manage-
ment is based on operating experience, while for 
Class D the normal maintenance and operating 
activities are considered sufficient.
for the purpose of attaining the service life 
targets, the persons responsible for systems direct 
the activities of the organisation with several pro-
cedures relating to operation, maintenance, modifi-
cations and refurbishments, inspections, and R&D. 
Among other things, they prepare modification 
and project proposals, review the plant procedures 
and draw up amendment proposals, participate in 
planning, implementation and annual reviews, and 
maintain a long-term plan. These planning and 
directing efforts make use of the knowledge of the 
condition of the plant and plant trends accumulat-
ed through plant operation activities, maintenance 
and inspection programmes, research and devel-
opment programmes, operating experience from 
sister plants, and memberships of wANo (world 
Association of Nuclear operators) and NUmEx 
(Nuclear maintenance Experience Exchange). The 
persons responsible for systems enter the informa-
tion concerning the operability and the remaining 
service life of, as well as actions required for, the 
systems falling under their responsibility into the 
plant information system. other information rel-
evant to service life management is also collected 
in the information system, such as the details of 
inspections, vibrations, maintenance history, and 
the like. System-specific overall assessments are 
also maintained for service life management, and 
separate summary reports on the ageing of electri-
cal, I&C and mechanical components are annu-
ally prepared and submitted to STUK. follow-up 
and review meetings, with representatives from 
operation and maintenance and experts in ageing 
research as participants, are arranged on a regular 
basis for directing and developing the service life 
management. STUK has received more detailed in-
formation about the implementation of service life 
management in the periodic inspections conducted 
annually at the plant site.
According to STUK’s view, this organisational 
implementation meets the requirements specified 
in the Guide yvL 1.1. The LoPLIm process also 
sufficiently reflects the basic idea expressed in 
the IAEA guides of having service life manage-
ment serve as the umbrella programme directing 
operation and maintenance, while the link to long-
term planning creates preconditions for proactive 
operations that detect the investment needs in a 
timely manner. on the basis of the implemented 
refurbishments and modernisations, it can also be 
stated that the expertise and R&D activities relat-
ing to ageing management are on a good level at 
fPH: new technology solutions (e.g. the recovery 
heat treatment of the reactor pressure vessel, ex-
tensions of steam generator tube inspections and 
plugging of the tubes, primary head of the steam 
generator collector, secondary circuit water chem-
istry, and change of materials in the secondary 
circuit) have been deployed, and the electrical and 
I&C systems that are becoming technologically 
outdated are being extensively replaced with new 
ones.
Class A components and structures
The systems, structures and components assigned 
to Class A include the reactor pressure vessel 
(RPv), reactor coolant pump, steam generator, 
pressurizer,	containment	and	reactor	building.
on the basis of the decisions issued by STUK, 
the operation of the RPv may be continued until 
2012 at the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant and until 
2010 at the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant unit. The 
reason for this restriction is the embrittlement of 
the weld in the core area caused by neutron radia-
tion. In fPH’s view, the embrittlement of the RPv 
in both plant units can be managed with the cur-
rently available means until the end of the 50-year 
service life. Radiation embrittlement is discussed 
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in more detail in section 5.4. The leaks in the cor-
rosion	protection	sleeves	of	the	RPV	head	nozzles	
detected over the past few years, and the bulging 
obstructing the operation of control rods that po-
tentially arises from them, have been addressed 
by developing an ultrasonic inspection method and 
repair methods with which these damages are esti-
mated to be kept successfully under control during 
the entire planned service life. The condition of the 
coating on the RPv head seal is also under special 
supervision. The cumulative fatigue factors for 50 
operating years calculated in connection with the 
operating licence application for items subjected 
to the highest fatigue loads by extrapolating from 
the 1994–2004 transient statistics are low and do 
not impose limits on the service life. However, ac-
cording to STUK’s understanding, this assessment 
is based on the assumption of having the plant un-
dergo the most undisturbed operating years during 
its entire life cycle, which requires careful moni-
toring of loads and further specification of fatigue 
analysis if any load increases are detected during 
the next operating licence period.
During the current operating licence period, 
the operating experience of reactor coolant pumps 
has been dominated by mechanical and acousti-
cal vibrations in the primary circuit manifesting 
themselves in shutdown and start-up conditions 
at	a	high	 frequency	of	65	Hz,	which	 is	 independ-
ent of the operation of the pump. These vibrations 
caused damage to the suction structures serving 
as mounting platform for stator blades in several 
pumps, but the problem was rectified by structural 
changes to the stator blade seal ring and by repair 
grinding of the worn sections in the seal groove 
at the housing end. vibration monitoring has also 
been more effective during the current operating 
licence period. Through these experiences, the im-
portance of also maintaining the know-how relat-
ing to the original design basis is now better un-
derstood at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The 
50-year cumulative fatigue factors calculated in 
connection with the operating licence application 
for sections of the reactor coolant pump subjected 
to the highest fatigue loads are low with the excep-
tion of the labyrinth seal, which is being monitored 
by inspections, as are the stress corrosion risks 
caused by seal leaks and concentrated boron acid. 
In light of the investigations carried out, the ther-
mal embrittlement of the reactor coolant pump 
housing, manufactured of austenitic steel, and the 
90-degree pipe curve connected to it on the pres-
sure side, is not thought to impose limits on the 
service life. The reactor coolant pump motors have 
operated reliably over the past few years, and no 
ageing phenomena limiting their service life have 
been detected.
Corrosion phenomena occurring in the heat 
transfer tubes and collector structures have been 
considered factors potentially limiting the service 
life of the steam generators. Since it is not pos-
sible to reliably anticipate these phenomena, it is 
important to control them by means of in-service 
inspections, monitoring of feedwater impurities and 
removal of precipitation. faulty heat transfer tubes 
can be isolated from the cooling water circuit by 
plugging. By 2007 this solution had been used 55 
times at the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit, 
and 28 times at the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant 
unit. The figures are small in international compari-
son. The increased number of fault indications is 
partly due to the development of the inspection pro-
gramme. In the inspections of 2006 the indications 
were observed in the area of accumulated precipita-
tion. The stress corrosion resistance of the collector 
screw joints has been improved, and provisions have 
been made for a leak arising from the failure of the 
collector cover by refurbishment of the secondary 
circuit. The feedwater distribution pipes inside the 
steam generator have been replaced as a result 
of the erosion corrosion damage occurring. on the 
basis of the fatigue analyses updated in connection 
with the operating licence application to correspond 
with the 50-year service life, the fatigue will not 
limit the service life of the steam generator.
The	pressurizer,	operating	at	a	higher	tempera-
ture, functions as a pressure and volume controller 
for the primary circuit, which causes temperature 
transients	in	its	pipe	nozzles	during	start-up	and	
shutdown. The fatigue analyses, updated in con-
nection with the operating licence application to 
correspond with the 50-year service life, indicate 
that the cumulative fatigue factors allowed by the 
applicable standard are exceeded in a restricted 
area	of	the	bottom	nozzle,	which	will	require	inten-
sified in-service inspections of these areas. These 
impacts have been monitored at the Loviisa 1 nu-
clear power plant unit by an on-line load monitor-
ing system that was expanded during the current 
operating licence period.
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The condition and leaktightness of the contain-
ments is monitored annually by visual inspections, 
as well as by leak tests carried out, on average, 
every four years. A separate corrosion monitoring 
system has been set up for the containment steel 
liner anchor bolts, and the replacement of these 
bolts is possible. The condition of the containment 
liner plates is monitored by random-check-type 
inspections from accessible locations and through 
inspection holes drilled into the concrete structure. 
The introduction of water into these structures is 
avoided in order to prevent corrosion damage. The 
reactor building is not estimated to impose limits 
on operation during the planned 50-year service 
life.
Other mechanical components 
and structures
The fatigue loads on the reactor coolant pipes are 
minor, which is corroborated by the fatigue analy-
ses updated for 50 operating years. However, phe-
nomena of mixing and sedimentation of waters in 
different temperatures imposing stress on materi-
als occur in the pipes of the reactor auxiliary sys-
tem branching off from the reactor coolant pipes, 
in particular in the connection pipe leading to the 
pressurizer,	and	the	fatigue	arising	from	these	phe-
nomena is monitored by the load monitoring sys-
tem. The objects being monitored in the secondary 
circuit	in	this	system	include	the	feed	water	nozzle	
stressed by thermal loads and the steam generator 
blowdown pipes. STUK has been provided with a 
report on the erosion corrosion of the secondary 
circuit in connection with the operating licence 
application, according to which no significant thin-
ning of walls has been observed in the inspected 
items due to the relatively extensive renovation of 
the pipes. The thinning of the wall may be very lo-
cal in single-phase flow conditions, which is taken 
into account when selecting the inspection object 
and technique. The thinning trends and the impact 
of the power increase implemented in 1997–1998 
could not be determined on the basis of the thick-
ness measurement results. The clarification of the 
current vibration level of the reactor coolant pipes 
and the main steam pipes located in the steam 
generator room requested in connection with the 
operating licence application is still under prepa-
ration but expected to be completed in connection 
with the next annual maintenance outage.
Electrical and I&C systems and components
Detailed requirements concerning ageing monitor-
ing of electrical and I&C systems and components 
are specified in the Guides yvL 1.0, 2.0, 5.2 and 
5.5. The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant instructions 
concerning operating procedures, technology and 
maintenance cover the service life management 
processes for electrical and I&C systems and com-
ponents as well as external and internal reporting.
The ageing of electrical and I&C components 
inside and outside the containment of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant, as well as their cables and 
installations, will be monitored in connection with 
the regular inspections carried out during annual 
maintenance. The condition of components and in-
stallations located in the electrical and electronics 
rooms is also inspected at regular intervals. The 
ageing of electronic boards is monitored by compo-
nent type.
Ageing phenomena have been observed in the 
reactor protection system components, in particu-
lar in connection with the embrittlement of the 
plastic parts of the original relays, the resulting 
breakdowns having caused malfunctions. The ca-
pacitors of the electronics also dry up in a manner 
proportional to the temperature. A replacement 
spare part has been approved for protection system 
relays, of which approximately 10 items are needed 
each year. The protection system relays and the 
electronics have required repairs. The plant protec-
tion system is mainly implemented with the tech-
nology of the 1970s and 1980s. However, the need 
for spare part replacements is currently reasonable 
and not growing.
The plant automation systems at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant can be considered to include 
the I&C systems, control systems, and turbine 
control and protection systems. The plant I&C 
systems have been implemented using technology 
that dates back to the beginning of the 1970s. on 
the other hand, the single control, interlocking, au-
tomation and binary measurement cabinet boards 
included in the plant process control systems rep-
resent technology that dates back to the late 1960s 
(boards for stand-alone components). The fault 
frequency of plant automation components has 
remained within reasonable limits and has not 
increased, even though emerging embrittlement 
has been detected in the plastic parts of the board 
frames.
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The thermal ageing of cables occurring in the 
high-temperature compartments inside the con-
tainment is discussed in section 5.11 above. This 
may be regarded as the most important ageing 
phenomena concerning electrical and I&C sys-
tems.
According to the safety analysis report, the orig-
inal service life of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
was 30 years. A significant number of components 
required in postulated accidents were replaced 
or re-qualified in the 1980s, targeting a 40-year 
service life. In connection with the renewal of the 
protection systems, the intention is to replace the 
pressure and pressure differential transmitters of 
these systems by the end of the decade, targeting 
a 50-year service life. As to other I&C field compo-
nents, ageing monitoring by inspection measures 
has been presented, targeting a 50-year overall 
service life. STUK has noted (section 5.11) that 
the qualification procedure shall be made more 
systematic. In particular, the remaining service 
life must be known for components qualified for ac-
cident conditions, which is difficult to verify using 
the existing procedures.
Summary
The application submitted by fPH for extending 
the operating licence to exceed the 30-year service 
life that served as the original design basis by 20 
years is essentially based on the estimates made 
in the service life management programme. with 
regard to mechanical components and structures 
imposing limits for the plant service life, the age-
ing phenomena identified through operating expe-
rience, as well as the analysis of their future devel-
opment based on the international research results, 
have served as the starting point. The phenomena 
that have not yet occurred but can be expected to 
occur on the basis of the operating conditions have 
also been taken into account. The currently valid 
brittle fracture analyses indicate that the reactor 
pressure vessel can be safely operated until 2012 
in the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit and until 
2010 in the Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant unit. 
STUK is not currently aware of any obstacles of a 
principal nature for the continued operation of the 
reactor pressure vessels of Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units after 2012 and 2010. However, 
the continued operating life is subject to renewal 
of the analyses and possibly also the heat treat-
ment of reactor pressure vessels. fPH will esti-
mate the need for further heat treatments on the 
pressure vessels in connection with the prepara-
tion of a subsequent application concerning the use 
of pressure vessels. for fatigue analyses, updates 
comprising the entire licence period being applied 
for and acceptable with regard to their essential 
parts have been submitted in connection with the 
application. However, for corrosion phenomena, in 
particular those concerning the exposure of heat 
transfer tubes, it has not been possible to present 
a reliable estimate for this long a time span. The 
containment is not estimated to impose limits on 
operation during the planned 50-year service life.
A key element in the compensation of these 
uncertainty factors is the ability of the operating 
organisation and its technical support to resolve 
the potentially emerging problems, proof of which 
may be considered to have accumulated during 
the operating history to date. The determination 
of reactor pressure vessel fracture toughness has 
been an object of intense research at the Technical 
Research Centre of finland (vTT) for more than 
two decades. The internationally recognised mas-
ter curve approach created on the basis of this 
research has reduced the uncertainty of results by 
enabling the determination of fracture toughness 
directly from the irradiated material samples. A re-
covery heat treatment was performed on the reac-
tor pressure vessel of the Loviisa 1 nuclear power 
plant unit in 1996, as a result of which the mate-
rial characteristics of the critical weld were suc-
cessfully recovered nearly back to the level before 
irradiation. The mixing and sedimentation loads 
in the primary circuit, which were not included in 
the original design basis, have also been controlled 
using measurement systems developed and imple-
mented for this purpose by fPH. The service life 
management programme and the related know-
how have been actively and systematically devel-
oped at the plant since the early 1990s, which has 
served as the basis for the modernisations and the 
power increase carried out during 1997–1998.
In summary, it can be stated that the compo-
nents installed in the plant’s protection and I&C 
systems are old, mostly representing technology 
dating back to the 1960s and 1970s. fault frequen-
cies and the spare part situation have remained 
under control, but old relays in the reactor protec-
tion system, for example, have required repairs. 
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The implementation of the automation renewal by 
the mid-2010s, starting from the protection I&C 
systems, is necessary. for I&C field components, 
the spare part situations seems to be under control 
in view of the 50-year service life.
STUK has required that the ageing manage-
ment programmes for electrical and I&C systems 
and components be assessed on a regular basis 
and the annual reporting be improved. The pro-
grammes shall be comprehensive and effective, 
fulfilling the requirements specified in the Guides 
yvL 5.2 and yvL 5.5. The assessment of the re-
maining service life of I&C field components is 
expected to become easier when the procedures re-
lating to qualifications are made more systematic. 
STUK will monitor the subsequent developments 
in connection with its oversight process.
6.3 Section 25: Personnel
Nuclear power plant personnel shall be well suited 
for its duties, competent and well trained. Initial, 
complementary and refresher training programmes 
shall be established for the personnel.
For ensuring safety in all situations, competent 
personnel shall be available in a sufficient number.
The number of permanent personnel at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant decreased by approxi-
mately 20 people between the end of 1995 and the 
end of 2005 due to outsourcing of certain opera-
tions. The outsourcing concerns support functions 
such as personnel catering and maintenance of 
outdoor areas. However, the number of employees 
working in positions important in terms of power 
plant operation has in fact increased, and fPH is 
not planning to transfer these functions to service 
providers outside the plant organisation. Employee 
turnover has increased due to the retirement of the 
people of nearly the same age who were hired in 
the 1970s. As to licensed operators, all of the origi-
nal control room operators will be replaced within 
the next four years.
Both the anticipated changes in the long term 
and the requirements of the near future are consid-
ered in the human resource planning of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant. The readiness to react to 
changing resource needs exists even though the 
initiation or completion of some recruitment cam-
paigns has been delayed.
on the basis of the interviews carried out by 
fPH, it can be concluded that there is a strong 
and widely established view amongst the person-
nel that resources are insufficient in respect of the 
amount of work involved. The periodic inspection 
targeting personnel resources performed by STUK 
in November 2006 found the personnel resources 
were insufficient with regard to quality assurance, 
radiation monitoring, and work supervision of an-
nual maintenances. The Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant paid adequate attention to the strengthening 
of these functions during the spring of 2007.
The organisation of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant has in place the functions important to nu-
clear power plant safety in accordance with the 
Guide yvL 1.7 (functions important to nuclear 
power plant safety, and training and qualifica-
tion of personnel). The authority, responsibilities 
and lines of communication relating to functions 
important to safety have been clearly defined. An 
exception to the above is personnel development, 
for which the coordination responsibility is shared 
between several parties (training office, operating 
technology group and personnel administration). 
Expertise and resources for training and develop-
ment of the operations of the organisation have 
been available at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
during the current operating licence period.
The organisational structure, job descriptions, 
qualification requirements, authority and respon-
sibilities of the personnel and the lines of manage-
ment are described in the administrative rules 
and organisation manual of the plant. The person 
serving as the responsible manager of the plant is 
the Plant manager, who meets the requirements 
set for a responsible manager and in such position 
has sufficient authority and factual opportunity to 
effectively perform his duties.
Initial, refresher and complementary training 
programmes have been established for the person-
nel of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The compe-
tence requirements for duties important to safety 
have been described at the plant, and fPH has in 
place procedures for identifying training needs. 
Attention has also been paid to the assessment of 
the effectiveness of training. However, there are 
deficiencies with regard to the sufficient availabil-
ity of office and training facilities at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant.
The conclusion to the above is that the train-
ing and competence of the personnel of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant fulfils the regulations set 
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forth in section 25 of the Government Decision. 
The personnel of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
are well suited to their duties, as well as competent 
and trained. Initial, complementary and refresher 
training programmes have been established for the 
personnel. Procedures exist for ensuring the suf-
ficient number of available plant personnel, the ef-
fectiveness of which shall be paid attention during 
the next operating licence period.
6.4 Section 26: Monitoring releases 
of radioactive materials
Releases of radioactive materials from a nuclear 
power plant and their concentrations in the envi-
ronment shall be effectively monitored.
Detailed requirements relating to section 26 
of the Government Decision are set forth in the 
guides yvL 7.6 and yvL 7.7.
The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has in place 
technical systems for collecting and storing the 
majority of radioactive materials released into and 
residing in the plant’s process systems. only a mi-
nor part of the radioactive materials are released 
into the environment.
The radioactive releases occur in gaseous or par-
ticulate form through the vent stack into the atmos-
phere, as well as in the form of particles dissolved 
or mixed in water entering the seawater tunnel 
and further into the sea environment. The airborne 
and aquatic radioactive releases from the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant are monitored in all significant 
release pathways by on-line radiation monitors as 
well as by sampling and nuclide-specific radioac-
tivity measurements carried out at the laboratory. 
other potential release pathways are monitored by 
sampling and other methods. The on-line radiation 
monitors located in the release pathways and the 
sampling equipment have been replaced during the 
current operating licence period.
An extensive environmental radiation moni-
toring programme, approved by STUK, is being 
implemented in the vicinity of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant. According to this programme, the po-
tential migration of radioactive materials is being 
continuously monitored by analysing the radionu-
clide concentrations in foodstuffs produced in the 
area surrounding the plant and in other samples 
indicating the migration of releases. The results 
obtained from the monitoring of the environment 
corroborate the monitoring of radioactive releases 
carried out at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. 
The monitoring programme has been revised dur-
ing the current operating licence period.
The monitoring programme comprises approxi-
mately 335 samples per year. Types of samples 
include milk, meat, fish, crops and vegetables, as 
well as water and airborne aerosols. Samples are 
also taken from such indicator organisms that 
very effectively accumulate radioactive materials 
from their living environment. The nuclides that 
are most important in terms of human radiation 
exposure are analysed when studying the samples: 
gamma emitters such as 60Co, 131I and 137Cs, beta 
emitters ³H and 90Sr, and alpha emitters such as 
238Pu, 239Pu and 240Pu.
During the past few years the dose effects of the 
releases from the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant have 
remained below 1/1000 of the annual release limits. 
for airborne releases, the predominant releases, 
expressed in terms of activity, are those of noble 
gases, and for aquatic releases, those of tritium. The 
released nuclides observed in the environment have 
been activated corrosion products (e.g. 60Co) as well 
as certain other activation products and tritium. 
observations in ground environment samples have 
been rare, mostly those detected from high-capacity 
air collectors and fallout during annual mainte-
nance. Regular observations have been made of 
small amounts of radioactive materials originating 
from the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in the indi-
cator samples taken from the water environment. 
These are insignificant in terms of the surrounding 
population or nature. Radioactive materials origi-
nating from the Chernobyl accident have also been 
predominant in the environmental samples of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
The results of the environmental monitoring in-
dicate that the releases from Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant have been minor and insignificant in terms 
of their impact on the environment and people. 
Although the radioactivity concentrations in the 
environmental samples are small, the measure-
ment results for the air and fallout collectors and 
the Co-60 concentrations in kelp show a decreas-
ing trend, which is also apparent in the release 
measurements. The impact of the minor fallout 
condition in finland caused by the Chernobyl ac-
cident on the external radiation dose measured at 
the dosimeter station and on the Cs-137 concentra-
tion in milk is also clearly apparent in the results. 
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on the basis of the above, it can be stated that the 
methods employed are sufficiently sensitive for 
the purpose of environmental monitoring during 
normal operation and the changes in measurement 
result caused by abnormal conditions can also be 
clearly observed from them.
An automatic measuring system for the exter-
nal radiation in the environment is located in the 
area surrounding the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, 
the purpose of which is to rapidly provide informa-
tion about the possible changes in the environ-
ment occurring in a potential abnormal condition. 
A conceptual design plan concerning the renewal 
and complementation of the instrumentation of 
the weather measurement system located near the 
plant and used for assessing the spread of a radio-
active release in the atmosphere is currently being 
processed by STUK.
The conclusion on the above is that the releases 
of radioactive materials and their concentrations 
in the environment are effectively monitored at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in a manner referred 
to in section 26 of the Government Decision.
6.5 Section 27: Operating experience 
and safety research
Operating experience from nuclear power plants as 
well as results of safety research shall be systemati-
cally followed and assessed.
For further safety enhancement, actions shall be 
taken which can be regarded as justified consider-
ing operating experience and the results of safety 
research as well as the advancement of science and 
technology.
6.5.1 Operating experience from the 
previous operating licence period
The severity of operational events at nuclear fa-
cilities is described using the INES scale. The INES 
scale is a seven-level scale jointly developed by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the Nuclear Energy Agency of the organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (oECD/
NEA) used internationally to depict the severity of 
events at nuclear facilities. Events in classes 1–3 are 
incidents increasingly significant in terms of safety, 
and events in classes 4–7 are accidents. In addition 
to the above, class 0 is used for indicating that the 
event has no safety significance. No events exceed-
ing the severity class 2 have occurred at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant during its service life. four 
events have been classified as INES 2 events dur-
ing the service life of the plant, the latest of which 
occurred in 1993. The number of events warranting 
a special report during the current operating licence 
period was 32, of which 5 were classified as INES 1 
events and 26 as INES 0 events. one of the events 
remained below the INES classification limit. The 
number and severity of specially reported events is 
lower than previously, and the total number of op-
erational events has slightly decreased. The number 
of reactor scrams has also been low.
Due to an exceptionally high seawater level at 
the Gulf of finland, the emergency organisation 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant convened and 
emergency standby was declared at the plant on 
9 January 2005. The event did not endanger plant 
safety.
frequently occurring events during the current 
operating licence period include problems with ad-
justing the boron acid concentration in the primary 
circuit during shutdown and start-up of the plant 
units. The situation has been improved on the ba-
sis of the root cause analysis performed in 2002 to 
address the problem. one form of frequently occur-
ring events has also been the so-called cross fail-
ures. These refer to mutual dependencies between 
different components and systems, the joint effect 
of which must be identified to prevent inoperabili-
ties violating the Technical Specification from oc-
curring due to, for example, periodic maintenances. 
Since it has not been possible to eliminate the cross 
failures, they are regarded as issues requiring con-
stant monitoring.
The status of several factors affecting safety, op-
erability and quality of operations are monitored at 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant using indicators. 
The load factors of the plant units have been good 
in international comparison. from 1998 to 2005 
the load factor was 84.8-95.4 % for the Loviisa 1 
nuclear power plant unit and 82.2-95.7 % for the 
Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant unit. Reactor scrams 
have occurred rarely, the latest, in 2001, performed 
manually, and, in 2004, due to component failure, 
both at the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit.
on the basis of the indicators describing the 
inoperability of safety systems, the operation of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has been controlled 
and safe. Safety systems have not been inoperable 
to any significant extent due to faults, mainte-
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nance or other similar reasons. The indicators also 
provide follow-up data on occupational safety, fires 
and common cause failures, among other things.
In summary, it can be stated that none of the 
operational events at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant has essentially impaired plant safety or 
caused significant radioactive releases to the en-
vironment. The development has been positive 
during the current operating licence period, both in 
terms of the number of events and in terms of their 
safety significance.
6.5.2 Operating experience feedback
The monitoring of operational events at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant is part of the plant’s normal 
operation and maintenance activities. The depth of 
operational event analysis depends on the nature of 
the event and the severity of the consequences. A so-
called root cause analysis is prepared for events that 
are considered significant, in which the root causes of 
the event are investigated in addition to the actual 
causes. These usually relate to human activity and 
are thus principally of organisational origin.
The operating experience feedback activities 
are described in the plant procedures. The safety 
unit assumes the main responsibility for these 
activities. A responsible safety engineer has been 
appointed for the operating experience feedback 
activities. The operating experience feedback ac-
tivities have been appropriately organised and 
instructed. The assessment of operating experience 
feedback activities is carried out on a regular basis 
by quality control and plant management. The op-
erating experience feedback activities are reported 
to STUK annually.
A special operating experience feedback team 
has been assigned for the purpose of analysing 
operating experience from other nuclear power 
plants, with participants representing expertise 
from different fields of technology. The essential 
sources of information for the operating experience 
feedback team are the wANo (world Association 
of Nuclear operators), IAEA (International Atomic 
Energy Agency) and oECD/NEA (Nuclear Energy 
Agency). The operating experience data processing 
team reviews the reports received and investigates 
whether any of the events requires measures to 
be taken at the plant or in its procedures and in-
structions. The team provides recommendations 
for further processing and decisions to be made 
on possible further action. fPH annually reports 
the activities of the operating experience feedback 
team to STUK.
The success of the operating experience feed-
back activities can be assessed on the basis of the 
results attained. No significant frequently occurring 
events are evident in the plant’s operational events, 
and the number and severity of them are steadily 
decreasing. The operating experience feedback is 
a continuing process for which sufficient resources 
and opportunities to pursue the related activities 
must be continuously ensured. In particular, the 
identification of root causes of events and the timely 
execution of the respective corrective actions are of 
special importance. According to STUK’s view, needs 
for improvement in this area remain.
In summary, it can be stated that operating ex-
perience feedback activities of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant have been arranged in manner re-
ferred to in section 27 of the Government Decision.
6.5.3 Safety research
Due to the development history of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant, the fortum Generation 
unit has considerable know-how on vvER type 
plants in particular. for this reason, the follow-
up of and participation in nuclear technology re-
search is active. Nuclear power plant research has 
been organised into five research and development 
programmes within the fortum Generation unit: 
material research, nuclear waste research, opera-
tion and maintenance, fuel and reactor physics 
research, and thermal nuclear safety.
within these programmes, fortum Generation 
carries out its own research, coordinates research 
commissioned from other parties, and follows up 
and participates in international research pro-
grammes. The main focus of the research conduct-
ed by fortum Generation or commissioned from 
elsewhere is in resolving the detected needs that 
directly concern the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. 
The company receives more extensive information 
on the topical issues and recent results of research 
and development through national and interna-
tional research programmes.
In summary, it can be stated that the follow-
up of and participation in nuclear technology re-
search by the fortum Generation unit has been 
arranged in a manner referred to in section 27 of 
the Government Decision.
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7 Miscellaneous provisions 
(Government Decision 395/1991)
7.1 Section 28: Nuclear power 
plants in operation
For the part of such a nuclear power plant for 
which an operating licence was issued before the 
entry into force of this decision (an operating nu-
clear power plant) the limit for the dose referred to 
in Section 11 is 100 mSv, unless the application of 
the provisions contained in Section 11, as such, is 
justified, considering the provisions of Section 27, 
second paragraph.
The provisions of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of this 
decision are applied to an operating nuclear power 
plant to the extent justified based on the provisions 
of Section 27, second paragraph, and taking into 
account the technical solutions of the nuclear power 
plant in question.
Section 28 of the Government Decision provides 
certain exceptions to the provisions of sections 11, 
12, 17 and 18 of the resolution. The fulfilment of 
these provisions is assessed in sections 4.5, 4.6, 5.5 
and 5.6 above.
7.2 Section 29: Detailed regulations
Detailed regulations relating to the safety of a nu-
clear power plant are issued by the Finnish Centre 
for Radiation and Nuclear Safety.
STUK prepares and issues detailed regula-
tions concerning the safe use of nuclear energy 
by virtue of section 55, paragraph 2, point 3 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and section 29 of 
the Government Decision 395/1991 quoted above. 
STUK has chosen the issuance of yvL guides 
as its operating practice. These guides shall be 
complied with by the licensee or any other or-
ganisation concerned unless STUK has been pre-
sented with some other acceptable procedure or 
solution by which the safety level set forth in the 
yvL Guides is achieved. STUK has not wanted 
to make the yvL guides mandatory regulations 
because it would have had to confine to merely 
recording the attained level of technology and, 
further, reflecting in the guides the restrictions 
that the already implemented solutions impose 
on further modifications. one purpose of the yvL 
guides is to provide the users of nuclear energy 
with good design bases and operating procedures 
STUK considers acceptable.
STUK assesses the currency of the yvL guides 
on a regular basis and, when updating the guides, 
takes into account the advancement of nuclear and 
radiation safety technology and research as well as 
operating experience from finland and abroad in a 
manner referred to in section 27 of the Government 
Decision 395/1991. The structural reform of the 
yvL guide system was initiated on the basis of the 
prepared project plant in 2006. The views of the ex-
pert group assembled in 2005 with representatives 
from STUK and finnish nuclear power companies 
were taken into account when preparing the plan. 
The central objectives of the structural reform 
are the elimination of the observed overlaps and 
deficiencies, clarification of the set requirement 
level by removing the descriptive interpretation 
instructions, and reducing the number of detailed 
requirements. In connection with the reforms, the 
intention is to also introduce a system for marking 
individual requirements and a reference apparatus 
that utilises modern information technology. The 
number of instructions will be reduced to half of 
the present amount, and maintaining and using 
the guides will become easier. The objective is to 
have the new set of STUK-yvL guides completed 
by the end of 2011.
when preparing the yvL guides, one starting 
point is to attempt to continuously raise the level 
of safety. Consequently, when setting the safety 
targets specified in the guides, the highest level 
internationally achieved is considered the model 
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to be followed. In some regards, the targeted level 
is that which is considered achievable, at least in 
new nuclear power plants. for this reason, it is not 
possible, or even feasible, to consider the new yvL 
guides binding on nuclear power plants in opera-
tion in all respects.
for the purpose of clarifying the scope of ap-
plicability, a decision concerning nuclear facilities 
in operation or under construction is prepared 
for each new or revised yvL guide, defining the 
applicability of the guide with regard to nuclear 
facilities in operation or under construction. The 
measures to be taken by, for example, a utility 
company due to the guide are specified in imple-
mentation decisions. The guide does not change the 
decisions issued by STUK prior to the guide enter-
ing into force unless it is separately announced by 
STUK. on the other hand, STUK requires that the 
need and opportunities for increasing the safety 
level are re-assessed in light of new yvL guides. 
measures to increase safety may be required on 
the basis of the assessment when deemed justified. 
The systematic preparation of implementation de-
cisions for yvL guides was started in 2000.
The design bases concerning structures, sys-
tems and components of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant have been mostly laid down during the 
1970s. Although the plant has been considerably 
renovated since the commissioning and extensive 
modifications have been implemented in several 
systems to improve safety, the plant does not quite 
meet the requirements of the currently valid yvL 
guides in all respects. The deviations from the yvL 
guides are discussed under the respective sections 
of Government Decisions concerning the subject 
matter in question.
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8 Physical protection 
(Government Decision 396/1991)
Regulations and the requirements 
issued by virtue of it
The regulations for physical protection are defined 
in the Nuclear Energy Act, Nuclear Energy Decree, 
and the Government Decision 396/1991. Detailed 
application instructions for the requirements and 
the control procedures of STUK are described in 
the classified yvL Guides 6.11, “Physical protection 
at nuclear power plants”, and yvL 6.21, “Physical 
protection of nuclear fuel transports”. moreover, 
some yvL Guides, for example yvL 1.0, yvL 2.0, 
yvL 5.5 and yvL 5.6, contain requirements where 
the need to consider unlawful actions against the 
nuclear power plant shall be taken into account.
Relating to potential new plant projects and 
significant modification projects concerning the 
existing plants, it has been observed that re-
quirements concerning physical protection should 
be further specified in certain respects. These 
specifications have been presented to licensees in 
STUK’s classified decisions in 2002. The events of 
11 September 2001 were taken into account in the 
preparation of these decisions. New requirements 
concerning the specification decisions are mainly 
related to the so-called external threats. In this 
context, external threats refer to such intentional 
or negligent external actions against a nuclear 
power plant, which, without provisions against 
such actions, could endanger nuclear power plant 
safety. The requirements aim to take into account 
the long operating life of the plant units as well as 
the difficulties related to forecasting the future as 
regards, for example, various disorders and crises 
in society. However, actual military operations 
have not been taken into account in the design ba-
sis. International agreements concerning military 
operations prohibit attacks on targets containing 
large amounts of energy, such as power plants.
Responsibility and control
According to the law, the licensee is unambiguously 
responsible for the safety of the nuclear power 
plant. However, the licensee’s means and authori-
sations are not adequate as such in, for example, a 
situation caused by terrorism. Even then it must 
be possible to dimension the applicable counter-
measures, both as regards the extent and timing of 
the verified threat. In addition to the licensee, the 
police and other authorities providing executive 
assistance to the licensee also have legal obliga-
tions to secure safety in the event of various un-
lawful circumstances. Therefore, the significance of 
cooperation between the safety authorities and the 
various parties should be emphasised in cases re-
lating to threat situations and the provisions made 
for them at nuclear power plants. There have not 
been any actions aiming to damage nuclear power 
plants in finland.
STUK also acts as the regulatory authority for 
physical protection in cases relating to the use of 
nuclear energy. STUK has summoned a separate 
expert team to provide safety precautions against 
unlawful action, whose task is to regularly follow 
and assess threat scenarios and any changes to 
them, to develop operational preparedness and 
the flow of information, and to widen its members’ 
expertise. In addition to STUK and experts from 
the power companies, the team includes repre-
sentatives from the main finnish police and safety 
authorities. The member organisations of the team 
have an extensive international cooperation net-
work, through which information and opinions con-
cerning international developments are forwarded 
to the team.
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Physical protection arranged by 
the licensee and its control
The procedures for preventing unlawful action 
against the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units are described in the physical protection plan 
of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The plan cov-
ers the structural and technical protection of the 
plant as well as administrative procedures. The 
said plan and certain other documents concerning 
physical protection are handled as secret docu-
ments. This is due to the fact that their coming into 
the possession of those planning unlawful actions 
could compromise the achievement of the objective 
of the security arrangements (Act on the openness 
of Government Activities 621/1999, section 24, par-
agraph 7).
The physical protection plan has been regularly 
updated, and the latest version was approved by 
STUK in 2003. Detailed operating instructions for 
the physical protection organisation are specified 
in, among others, the guarding procedures that 
have been regularly submitted to STUK for infor-
mation.
STUK has assessed the currency and sufficien-
cy of the physical protection of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant on the basis of the requirements laid 
down in the Government Decision 396/1991 and 
Guides yvL 6.11 and yvL 6.21, as well as on the 
basis of the specification decision concerning the 
said guides, focusing on the changes in the na-
tional and international security situation during 
the past 10 years and the impact of these factors 
on physical protection at nuclear power plants. In 
connection with the operating licence application, 
fPH submitted a report that, among other things, 
provides a statement of position regarding the 
implementation of the design bases presented in 
the above-mentioned specification decision at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. A large number of 
improvement measures have been carried out dur-
ing the past few years. The improvement measures 
are still partly in progress but the majority of them 
will be completed by the end of 2007.
Concerning the licensee’s description of the ar-
rangements for physical protection, a statement 
from the Police Department of the ministry of the 
Interior, as well as a supplementary statement 
complementing it, has been requested and ob-
tained in accordance with section 37 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. According to the statement and the 
supplementary statement, the Police Department 
has not found anything objectionable in the de-
scription of the arrangements for physical protec-
tion relating to the operating licence application.
According to STUK’s view, the arrangements for 
physical protection of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant have been planned and implemented in a 
manner that makes it possible to prevent unlawful 
actions against the plant. on the basis of STUK’s 
assessment, there are no obstacles with regard to 
physical protection for the continuation of the op-
erating licence.
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9 Emergency response arrangements 
(Government Decision 397/1991)
Planning of emergency 
response arrangements and the 
emergency organisation
fPH has analysed accident and safety-impairing 
events as the basis for the planning of emergen-
cy response arrangements at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant (see section 3.4.1 above). Emergencies 
have been classified and described in the plant’s 
emergency plan and procedures. The notifications 
and alarms to plant personnel and authorities re-
quired by different classes of emergencies, as well 
as the scope of operations of the emergency or-
ganisation pertaining to the type of emergency, are 
described in the procedures.
fPH has analysed the radiation exposure of 
employees in different accidents during the current 
operating licence period, as well as the accessibil-
ity of items in terms of repairs and maintenance 
both inside the plant and on the plant site. The as-
sessment is still partly in progress. In preparation 
for potential emergencies, fPH has developed an 
information system for radiation experts (SaTu), 
which is an auxiliary system primarily used in 
severe accidents. The system can be used for as-
sessing the releases from the plant into the envi-
ronment and the radiation condition of the plant 
site during an accident.
The emergency response arrangements of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant have been coordi-
nated with the management of operation and the 
arrangements for physical protection. The emer-
gency procedures contain the required references 
to operation procedures, and the changes required 
by the emergency and severe accident manage-
ment procedures introduced in connection with the 
renewal of plant procedures have been updated 
into them. The changes resulting from the regional 
restructuring of rescue operations and the initia-
tion of emergency response centre operations have 
been updated into the emergency response plan 
and procedures.
A person responsible for emergency response 
arrangements and his deputy have been appointed 
for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The emergen-
cy organisation has been described in the emergen-
cy procedures, updated with regard to personnel 
changes and contact information approximately 
once a year. The narrower staffing of the emergen-
cy organisation required for emergency standby 
state is defined in the emergency procedures. The 
assignment and training of the users of the infor-
mation system for radiation experts is continuing 
for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
Operational preparedness
Provisions have been made at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant for performing the measures required 
in an emergency and for analysing its effects and 
assessing its development. The operation of the 
emergency organisation is guided by written pro-
cedures (see Appendix 2, Chapter 8 of the state-
ment). The premises of the emergency organisation 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power have the emergency 
procedures and a large amount of status informa-
tion readily available on the process computer, part 
of which is sent to the fortum Nuclear Services 
(fNS) support at Keilaniemi and to STUK’s emer-
gency response centre.
Preparations have been made at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant for assessing the radiation 
condition and dispersion of radioactive materials 
in accidents. The equipment at the plant site has 
been developed by replacing two external radiation 
dose rate meters in 2004 and the weather mast 
measuring system in 2002. The LENA calculating 
model can be used for assessing the dispersion of 
the	 release	 in	 the	 emergency	 planning	 zone.	The	
users of the calculating model, originating from 
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Sweden, are continuing their cooperation and ex-
change of information.
Premises have been allocated for the emergency 
organization	 of	 the	 Loviisa	 Nuclear	 Power	 Plant	
in the air raid shelter and for the fNS support in 
Keilaniemi. The premises contain the equipment 
and software required for analysing the plant and 
radiation condition and for maintaining an overall 
picture of the accident, as well as the required 
written procedures and background material. The 
power plant has the required protective equipment 
readily available for emergencies.
The communications and alarm systems of the 
plant have been developed during the past three 
operating licence periods by replacing the dedicat-
ed DigiPower dial connection with other redundant 
and secured phone connections and, at fPH, by de-
ploying the forHelp calling service for alerting the 
emergency organisation. This is also used for test-
ing the availability of the emergency organisation 
at regular intervals. In connection with the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant automation renewal project 
(LARA), it has been required that the impacts of 
the project on, e.g., data communications connec-
tion, be assessed.
written procedures have been planned and 
drawn up for informing the media and the public. 
These are performed in accordance with the crisis 
communications principles of the fortum Group 
and regularly tested in emergency exercises.
Maintenance of preparedness
Emergency preparedness training and exercises 
are annually arranged for the emergency organisa-
tion of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. fPH has 
submitted the annual plans for emergency pre-
paredness training to STUK, as well as reports on 
their implementation. further, STUK has also been 
provided with a longer-term plan for emergency 
preparedness training and exercises. The emergen-
cy preparedness training has comprised classroom 
and action group-specific practical training. In ad-
dition to severe accidents, the emergencies covered 
by the emergency preparedness exercises have var-
ied to also include conditions classified as emer-
gency standby. A combined fire and emergency ex-
ercise was organised in 2002 to test the operating 
procedures. The content and extent of the exercises 
are assessed in the periodic inspections conducted 
by STUK. The generation change currently under-
way at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant requires, 
in addition to recruitment, a substantial training 
investment concerning both the actual work duties 
and duties relating to the emergency organisation 
of the newly recruited experts.
In addition to the emergency organisation train-
ing, attention has also been paid to the emergency 
preparedness training of others working at the 
plant site. In addition to annual maintenances, dif-
ferent kinds of construction projects are underway 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, and the induc-
tion training for which an access permit is required 
includes instructions for emergencies.
The responsibilities for maintaining the fa-
cilities and equipment reserved for emergencies, as 
well as the related inspection intervals, have been 
described in the emergency instructions. Sections 
13.3 and 13.4 of the final Safety Analysis Report 
describing the emergency plan are updated when 
required, while the emergency instructions are up-
dated at least once a year.
Operation during emergencies
The control rooms of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant are in constant readiness to initiate emer-
gency operations. The shift supervisor serves 
as the emergency manager until the emergency 
manager appointed from within the emergency 
organisation assumes the responsibility for man-
aging the situation. The emergency plan contains 
a description of the emergency organisation in 
the initial stage of its operation, as well as of the 
actual emergency organisation along with the re-
lated job descriptions. The procedures concerning 
notifications and alarms to the authorities have 
been updated with regard to emergency response 
centre operations. means of communicating the 
overall picture on the situation have been devel-
oped during the past few years by introducing 
computer aided emergency record keeping and by 
providing instructions for forwarding the emer-
gency records and release data to STUK during 
the emergency situation.
The plant emergency manager’s command re-
sponsibilities in an emergency situation have been 
revised due to amendments implemented in rescue 
legislation, and the related updates have been 
made in the emergency plan and instructions. 
During the past few years attention has also been 
paid to the termination of emergency situations 
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and debriefing measures. This has been instructed 
in the emergency manager’s emergency instruc-
tions, and the activities concerning it have been 
tested in emergency exercises. The emergency situ-
ation has been terminated in the concluding stage 
of the exercise when the plant has been success-
fully brought into a safe state and the further 
measures required by the situation have been 
briefly assessed.
Measures relating to rescue operations
fPH has ensured the cooperation with the Eastern 
Uusimaa fire and Rescue Services in cases of 
emergencies by means of joint meetings and in 
connection with the updates to the rescue plan for 
a severe radiation accident at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power plant prepared by the regional fire and res-
cue services. The parties participating in the plan-
ning of the rescue operations exercise arranged 
in the autumn of 2006 included fPH and the rel-
evant authorities, and the appropriateness of the 
operations and instructions in terms of all parties 
concerned was assessed with regard to new rescue 
region arrangements. The exercise tested the func-
tionality of the instructions and the cooperation 
between the utility and the authorities in practice.
Emergency operating instructions have been 
distributed to the population of the emergency 
planning	zone,	while	iodine	tablets	were	distribut-
ed	to	the	population	of	the	protective	zone	in	2002.
Summary
According to STUK’s view, fPH has ensured the 
emergency response arrangements of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with the 
Government Decision 397/1991 and has further 
developed the preparedness for emergencies. In 
connection with the processing of the operating 
licence, the ministry of the Interior has provided 
STUK with a statement stating that the arrange-
ments are tested by means of emergency exer-
cises at regular intervals and no significant defects 
have been observed in them. In its statement, the 
ministry draws attention to the changes that have 
occurred in the rescue services and to the impor-
tance of continued close cooperation with the re-
gional rescue services when preparing and updat-
ing the emergency and rescue plans.
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10 Nuclear fuel management
The general design bases for nuclear fuel have 
been defined in the Guides yvL 1.0 and yvL 6.2. 
The design objective is that the probability of fuel 
failure is low during normal operational conditions 
and anticipated operational transients, and that 
during a postulated accident the rate of fuel fail-
ures remains low and the fuel remains in a cool-
able state. The measures for ensuring fuel integrity 
during the operation of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant are discussed in more detail in section 5.3.
Detailed requirements for the design, quality 
management and control, handling, storage and 
transport of fuel are specified in the Guides yvL 
6.2, yvL 6.3, yvL 6.4, yvL 6.5, yvL 6.7 and yvL 
6.8. The Russian company TvEL and the British 
company BNfL (westinghouse) have served as the 
fuel manufacturers for the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant. At the end of 2006 fPH decided to order fuel 
for both plant units exclusively from TvEL until 
the end of their service lives.
The stationary fuel assembly and the control 
rod fuel extension consist of an assembly formed 
by control rods that are surrounded by a hexagonal 
tube and equipped with tie plates in the ends. Each 
fuel assembly contains 126 fuel rods. The rod as-
sembly rests on the lower support plate and is held 
together by spacers. The fuel rod consists of ura-
nium oxide pellets located inside the cladding. End 
plugs have been welded gas-tight into the ends of 
the cladding. The degree of enrichment with regard 
to Uranium-235 has varied between 3.2 and 4.0 per 
cent. The control rod is a combination of absorber 
rod and fuel extension. The neutron-absorbing 
structure of the absorber section consists of a stack 
of hexagonal boron-steel sleeves standing freely 
inside the tube.
fPH, and the consultants possibly hired by 
fPH, control the fuel manufactured in the fuel 
factory. The purpose of STUK’s regulatory control 
is to ensure that the activities of the licensee are 
adequate. A receiving inspection is performed on 
each fuel batch arriving at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant in which the dimensions of the fuel 
assemblies and absorber sections are inspected 
and the quality of the surfaces is visually checked. 
The quality assurance operations concerning the 
procurement of nuclear fuel are also described in 
section 3.3.
The fresh fuel storage of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant is shared by both plant units. The stor-
age is dimensioned to provide room for the reload 
batches of three refuelling periods of the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. Provisions for 
ensuring subcriticality have been made in the 
structural design of the storage and in the geomet-
rical design of the fresh fuel storage and handling 
racks.
In summary, it can be stated that nuclear fuel 
management has been appropriately arranged at 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
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11 Nuclear waste management
According to Section 20, paragraph 1, point 2 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act, one prerequisite for granting 
a construction permit for a nuclear facility is that 
the methods available to the applicant for arrang-
ing nuclear waste management, including the final 
disposal of nuclear waste and the decommissioning 
of the facility, are sufficient and appropriate.
11.1 Handling, storage and disposal 
of reactor waste (Government 
Decisions 395/1991 and 398/1991)
The starting point of the management of reactor 
waste by fPH is that the waste is taken care of 
at the Loviisa plant site, including its final dis-
posal. No significant safety-related problems have 
emerged in the management of intermediate and 
low level waste generated during the operation of 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant during the cur-
rent operating licence period.
A new practice based on the LamDA system 
for accounting for the reactor waste of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant was introduced in 2006. It 
contains both computational and measured waste 
inventories concerning stored waste and disposed 
waste packages. The new system fulfils the require-
ments for the accounting of nuclear waste specified 
in the yvL guides.
At the end of 2006 the volume of intermediate 
and low level waste amounted to approximately 
2990 m³; the average annual accumulation thus 
amounting to 110 m³. The total activity, excluding 
the so-called activated metal waste, was approxi-
mately 18 TBq. The accumulated waste volumes 
and activities were below average on internation-
al comparison. The total accumulation of reactor 
waste by the end of the operating licence period 
being applied for is estimated to be approximately 
11,500 m³. The accumulation is calculated on the 
basis of the outer volume of disposed waste pack-
ages, assuming that liquid waste is solidified into a 
concrete matrix.
It is proposed in the licence application that the 
maximum waste volume of 3,000 m³ solid waste 
and 2,400 m³ liquid waste be recorded in the li-
cence conditions. These are the same as those in 
the current licence conditions and correspond with 
the existing storage capacity.
The most significant project relating to the 
management of intermediate and low level waste 
during the current operating licence period of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant has been the con-
struction of a liquid waste solidification facility and 
a repository for solidified waste. The commission-
ing of the facilities, as well as the related safety as-
sessments and document approvals, is planned to 
take place in 2007. The intention is to initially only 
solidify and dispose of evaporator bottoms, while 
the handling of ion-exchange resins is only to be 
started after sufficient experience of the operation 
of the solidification facility has been obtained.
The management of the solid waste of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is intended to be 
developed by employing centralised facilities for 
the handling, activity monitoring and temporary 
storage of maintenance waste. The plan concern-
ing the above has been completed and the project 
was initially scheduled to be implemented by 2009, 
but, according to the present schedule, will be com-
pleted in 2010.
maintenance waste has been disposed of since 
1998, and the second disposal tunnel in the re-
pository was approved for use in 2006. The dis-
posal facility, comprising the repositories for both 
maintenance waste and solidified waste, has been 
provided with an operating licence until 2055. 
According to the operating licence conditions, an 
extensive intermediate safety assessment of the 
final disposal shall be made by the end of 2013.
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following the initiation of the disposal of so-
lidified waste, long-term disposal at the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant is needed for shield elements 
removed from inside the reactor pressure vessel, 
core instruments, samples and vacuum cleaning 
residues, and highly radiating seal water filters, as 
well as some 200 m³ of non-combustible waste in 
the basement storage. Their disposal is intended 
to be taken care of in connection with the decom-
missioning of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant at 
the latest.
According to STUK’s view, the methods for 
managing reactor waste employed by fPH are, 
considering the plans for their future improve-
ment, appropriate and sufficient for managing the 
waste in a safe manner.
11.2 Handling, storage and disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel (Government 
Decisions 395/1991 and 478/1999)
The starting point of the management of spent 
nuclear fuel by fPH is that the interim storage of 
spent fuel is provided at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant site until it can be disposed of in the disposal 
facility constructed by Posiva oy. No significant 
safety-related problems have emerged in the stor-
age of spent fuel during the current operating li-
cence period.
At the end of 2006 there were 403 tU of spent 
nuclear fuel in the storage of Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant. In addition, 330 tU of spent nuclear 
fuel were exported to the mayak plant in Russia, 
as agreed at that time. By the end of the operat-
ing licence period being applied for the estimated 
accumulation of spent fuel will amount to ap-
proximately 1,100 tU. If the disposal operations 
are initiated in 2020 as planned, the intermediate 
storage will contain a maximum of 760 tU of spent 
nuclear fuel.
The storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel will 
be increased at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant so 
that it is sufficient until the initiation of disposal by 
employing more compact racks in the existing stor-
age pools. The first two compact racks have already 
been installed and additional compact racks will 
be commissioned two at a time every 2 to 3 years. 
STUK has approved the pre-inspection documents 
concerning the commissioning of compact racks. 
The changes to the licence conditions concerning 
the increase of storage capacity are intended to be 
taken care of in connection with the renewal of the 
operating licence for the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant in 2007.
It is proposed in the operating licence applica-
tion that the interim storage maximum capacity 
of 1100 tU be recorded in the licence conditions. 
According to STUK’s understanding, the storage of 
the said volume of spent fuel in the existing stor-
age facilities is possible both technically and in 
terms of safety. The cooling capacity of fuel pools 
needs to be increased, but this has been technically 
prepared for when designing the plant.
The spent nuclear fuel disposal plan for the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is based on the dis-
posal project of Posiva oy, for which the related 
Government decision-in-principle was ratified by 
Parliament in 2001. STUK performed a prelimi-
nary safety assessment of the disposal project in 
2000 based on Government Decision 478/1999. 
According to the present schedule, a construction 
licence is to be obtained for the encapsulation and 
disposal facility in 2012 and an operating licence in 
2018. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel could thus 
be commenced in 2020.
STUK oversees the spent nuclear fuel disposal 
project prepared by Posiva oy in accordance with 
the Nuclear Energy Act. The construction oversight 
of the underground research facility to be con-
structed in olkiluoto is based on the principles laid 
down in STUK’s letter y819/22, 26 october 2001. 
By virtue of the decision issued by the ministry of 
Trade and Industry in 2002, Posiva oy published 
an extensive report on the status of the disposal 
project and the related research, development and 
design work at the end of 2006. STUK has per-
formed an expert review of the report, which was 
also be submitted to the ministry of Trade and 
Industry for information at the end of June 2007.
According to STUK’s view, the methods for 
managing spent nuclear fuel employed by fPH, 
as well as the plans for their future improvement, 
are appropriate and sufficient for managing spent 
nuclear fuel in a safe manner.
11.3 Decommissioning of plant units
According to the decision issued by the ministry of 
Trade and Industry in 1991, the plan concerning 
the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant must 
be updated every five years. The decommissioning 
plan for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant was last 
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updated in 2003, and STUK reviewed the plan and 
provided a statement concerning it to the ministry 
of Trade and Industry in 2004 (dno A841/12, 12 
october 2004). on the basis of the statement, the 
ministry of Trade and Industry stated that in re-
spect of its implementation principles and level of 
detail, the plan meets the requirements imposed 
on it at this point. The decommissioning plan will 
next be updated in 2008.
The starting point of the decommissioning plan 
for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is the decom-
missioning of most of the plant approximately 14 
years after the termination of the plant operation. 
According to the plan, all structures and com-
ponents exceeding the limits for the removal of 
regulatory control will be disassembled from the 
plant and packed for disposal. The waste packages 
and certain large components will be disposed of 
in facilities constructed in the close vicinity of the 
disposal facility. The interim storage for spent fuel 
would only be disassembled when the disposal of 
spent fuel is implemented.
According to STUK’s view, the plans prepared 
by fPH for the decommissioning of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant are appropriate and at this 
point sufficient.
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12 Handling of nuclear materials
As regards the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant, fPH is 
obliged to comply with the nuclear material account-
ing and control manual approved by STUK and the 
applicable EU regulations. The nuclear safeguards 
are based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and the subsequent Safeguards Agreement signed 
by the IAEA, the EU Commission and the non-
nuclear weapon states of the EU (INfCIRC/193), 
in addition to the national Nuclear Energy Act 
and Decree. The EU Commission also has its own 
safeguards system that is based on the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Treaty. As 
regards safeguards arrangements, the relevant 
changes during the current operating licence pe-
riod include the EU regulation concerning the con-
trol of dual-use items (Council Regulation EC No 
1334/2000), the new Commission Regulation on the 
application of safeguards (302/2005), and the ad-
ditional protocol (INfCIRC/193a8) relating to the 
Safeguards Agreement signed by the non-nuclear 
weapon states of the EU, the Euratom and the 
IAEA. The reports relating to the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant required by the additional protocol 
have been submitted to the IAEA and partly to the 
EU Commission within the time limits specified in 
the agreement.
The practical safeguards procedures and ar-
rangements of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
are presented in the plant’s nuclear material ac-
counting and control manual. The manual was 
last revised in 2006 on the basis of the experi-
ence gained, modifications performed at the plant 
and changes to international treaties. The most 
important changes in the plant’s nuclear mate-
rial safeguards relate to changes in international 
treaties and regulations (Commission Regulation 
No 302/2005) or entry into force of new treaties 
and regulation (the model Protocol Additional). 
STUK approved the manual on 31 January 2007. 
Another manual relevant for nuclear safeguards is 
the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant manual for inter-
national transfer, which was approved by STUK on 
11 August 2005.
STUK has overseen the operations of fPH 
at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant concerning 
nuclear materials, and no deficiencies have been 
observed in the inspections. No deficiencies have 
been observed in the inspections performed by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the Commission (Euratom).
In summary, it can be stated that the necessary 
controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons have been appropriately arranged at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
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13 Other requirements
In addition to the safety requirements specified 
in the Government Decisions, a few other require-
ments relating to the safety of a nuclear facility are 
laid down in the Nuclear Energy Act. This chapter 
discusses the applicant’s financial and other pre-
requisites to engage in operations safely and in ac-
cordance with finland’s international contractual 
obligations (section 20, paragraph 1, point 4 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act) to the extent falling within 
STUK’s mandate. In addition, the compliance with 
the terms of the current operating licence of the 
Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units is also 
assessed.
13.1 The applicant’s financial 
prerequisites to engage in operations
The licence to operate a nuclear facility may be 
granted if the applicant is otherwise considered to 
have the financial and other prerequisites to en-
gage in operations safely… (section 20, paragraph 
1, point 4 of the Nuclear Energy Act).
The financial preconditions are primarily as-
sessed by authorities other than STUK (mainly the 
ministry of Trade and Industry). The licensee has 
financial obligations to, e.g., make provisions for 
the costs of nuclear waste management (for the re-
lated technical aspects, see section 11 above) and to 
cover the nuclear liability (see section 13.2 below). 
The financial position and business environment 
of the licensee also affects the safety of the plants, 
and STUK is therefore keeping track of the trends 
in investments made in finnish nuclear power 
plants to improve safety, as well as organisational 
reforms and the number and competence of the 
personnel.
As the finnish electricity market was deregu-
lated some 10 years ago, there is relatively long 
practical experience of the operations of nuclear 
power companies in the deregulated market in 
finland. fPH has adhered to a policy whereby the 
financial performance of operations is ensured by 
maintaining a high utilisation rate at the plant, 
meaning that even minor disturbances are to be 
avoided, which, in turn, requires that the plant 
units be kept in good condition. This requires in-
vestments that, for their part, contribute to the 
improvement of safety; proactive prevention of 
disturbances is always the primary goal in safety 
planning as well.
In the reports submitted to STUK in connection 
with the operating licence application, fPH un-
dertakes to continuously improve the safety of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in the future.
13.2 International treaties
The international concerning nuclear material 
safeguards and matters pertaining to nuclear li-
ability, nuclear safety and nuclear waste fall within 
STUK’s mandate. In addition, finland is bound 
by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) as well as by the 
obligations of the regulations and directives issued 
by virtue of it. These treaties have been incorpo-
rated into the national legislation.
Nuclear liability – that is, the liabilities and 
obligations arising from nuclear damage – is pre-
scribed by the Nuclear Liability Act (484/1972). 
The Nuclear Liability Act takes into account the 
international treaties concerning finland, which 
mainly set the minimum limits on the liabilities for 
nuclear damage. Raised liabilities can be enacted 
nationally, as is done in some countries.
The Nuclear Liability Act was last amended 
by an Act (493/2005) in which the amendments 
concerning, e.g., the amount of liability of the 
operator of a nuclear facility, provided in sec-
tion 18, required by the Protocol amending the 
Paris Convention and the Protocol supplement-
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ing the Brussels Supplementary Convention were 
incorporated into the Nuclear Liability Act. In the 
amendment, the licensee’s amount of liability to 
be covered by insurance is substantially increased 
to EUR 700 million (the present requirement is 
EUR 175 million Special Drawing Rights, which 
translates to approximately EUR 200 million). In 
addition, the revised agreements provide EUR 500 
million from the host country and EUR 300 million 
from the States participating in an international 
Convention to be used for compensation, which 
amounts to EUR 1,500 million being available 
for compensating the consequences of an accident 
in the new contractual arrangement. finland’s 
amended Nuclear Liability Act also imposes un-
limited liability on the licensee to compensate 
for damage arising from an accident occurring in 
finland.
The Nuclear Liability Act amended by Act 
493/2005 will enter into force by virtue of a 
Government Decree to be issued later. The entry 
into force of the new Nuclear Liability Act and the 
ratification of international conventions is intend-
ed to be executed simultaneously in all member 
States.
The liability insurances taken out by fPH 
cover the separate plant units located on the plant 
site – that is, the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units and the reactor waste repository. The 
amounts insured currently fulfil the requirements 
laid down in section 18 of the Nuclear Liability 
Act. The Insurance Supervision Authority has as-
sessed the liability insurances taken out by fPH 
and stated, by virtue of decision 23/499/2003, 15 
January 2004, that they are acceptable. According 
to section 20, paragraph 2 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the operation of a nuclear facility is subject to 
the licensee of the nuclear facility having arranged 
indemnification regarding liability in the case of 
nuclear damage as prescribed.
STUK assesses the liability insurances relating 
transports in connection with each transport. The 
insurances have been appropriately arranged. In 
the case of fPH, the insurance cover has been pro-
vided by fPH taking out the required insurances 
with the Nordic Nuclear Insurance Pool.
The International Nuclear Safety Convention, 
SopS 74/1996 (INfCIRC/449), a collection of top-
level nuclear safety principles legally binding the 
States that have joined the convention, was signed 
in 1994. finland joined the convention right from 
the beginning, and it has been effective as of 1996.
Conversely, the International Nuclear waste 
Convention, SopS 36/2001 (INfCIRC/546), a collec-
tion of top-level nuclear waste management prin-
ciples legally binding the States that have joined 
the convention, was signed in 1997. finland joined 
the convention right from the beginning, and it has 
been effective as of 2001.
The matters regulated by the International 
Nuclear Safety Convention and the International 
Nuclear waste Convention are covered by the 
finnish legislation, Government Decisions and 
regulations. The implementation of the conven-
tions is reviewed at the meetings organised by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) every 
three years, for the purpose of which each member 
country must submit a report on its actions. The 
previous international review meeting in which 
the implementation of the International Nuclear 
Safety Convention was assessed was held in April 
2005.
International treaties relating to nuclear ma-
terial safeguards were discussed in section 12 
above.
13.3 Compliance with the conditions 
of the current operating 
licence of the plant
The Government granted Imatran voima oy an op-
erating licence concerning a nuclear installation by 
virtue of resolution 1/812/97 on 2 April 1998. The 
operating licence for the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units and related buildings required 
for nuclear fuel and nuclear waste management 
is valid until 31 December 2007. The trade name 
of Imatran voima oy registered with the Trade 
Register was changed to fortum Power and Heat 
oy on 1 march 1999. The following licence condi-
tions are presented in the operating licence.
By virtue of the licence issued with this decision, 
the licensee is allowed to possess, fabricate, handle, 
use and store nuclear waste and nuclear material 
as well as other nuclear substances at the plant site 
as follows:
•	 spent nuclear fuel produced in connection with 
the operation of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
in plant unit Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 and in the 
spent fuel storages a total of 610 tons of ura-
nium,
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•	 fresh nuclear fuel needed for the operation of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant and nuclear mate-
rial already existing at the plant site, as well as 
other substances, components and equipment 
in the import of which the regulations provided 
by the Nuclear Energy Act and Nuclear Energy 
Decree have been complied with,
•	 3000 m³ of solid reactor waste produced in con-
nection with the operation of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant in the storage and on the plant site, 
as well as 2400 m³ of liquid reactor waste in the 
liquid waste storage and in the solidification 
plant.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority shall 
approve the extension of the spent fuel storage and 
the continuation plans for the liquid reactor waste 
solidification facility, as well as their construction 
and commissioning.
only the spent fuel produced in connection with 
the operation of the plant itself is being possessed, 
handled, used and stored at the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant. All spent fuel produced at the plant 
during the operating licence period is possessed at 
the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units or 
stored in spent fuel storage facilities. The amount 
of spent fuel at the plant site has remained below 
610 tonnes of uranium throughout the entire op-
erating licence period: on 31 December 2005 the 
amount was 379 tonnes, and upon termination of 
the operating licence period on 31 December 2007 
the amount is estimated to be 428 tonnes.
only the fresh fuel needed for the operation 
of the plant itself is possessed, handled, used and 
stored at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The 
regulations laid down in the Nuclear Energy Act 
and Decree have been complied with in the import 
of all nuclear materials, components and equip-
ment present on the plant site.
Similarly, only the solid and liquid reactor 
waste produced in connection with the operation 
of the plant itself is possessed, handled, used and 
stored at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant. The 
amount of solid reactor waste in the storage fa-
cilities and on the plant site has remained below 
3,000 m³ throughout the entire operating licence 
period: on 31 December 2005 the amount was 332 
m³, and at the end of the operating licence period 
on 31 December 2007 the amount is estimated to 
be 729 m³. Part of the solid waste produced at the 
plant is disposed of in the reactor waste reposi-
tory, at which point it falls within the operating 
licence conditions of the repository. The operat-
ing licence for the repository is valid until 31 
December 2055.
The liquid waste has been stored in the liquid 
waste storage on the plant site. Since the commis-
sioning of the solidification facility in 2007, only 
small amounts of liquid reactor waste are being 
stored pending solidification. Small amounts of 
solidified waste are stored at the solidification fa-
cility before the waste containers are transported 
into the reactor waste repository. The amount of 
liquid reactor waste has remained below 2,400 m³ 
throughout the entire operating licence period: 
on 31 December 2005 the amount was 1,160 m³, 
and at the end of the operating licence period on 
31 December 2007 the amount is estimated to be 
1,240 m³.
The spent fuel storage of the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant was expanded during the current 
operating licence period by constructing four addi-
tional pools. STUK approved the plan for expand-
ing the storage, supervised the construction during 
1997–2000 and approved the commissioning in 
may 2000 according to the respective operating 
licence condition. fPH has initiated a new project 
for increasing the capacity of the storage by pro-
curing more compact fuel storage racks for the 
existing storage. The first compact storage racks 
were procured in 2007. STUK approved the plans 
relating to the project in 2006 and will oversee the 
commissioning of the new racks.
A solidification facility for liquid reactor waste 
has been constructed at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant during the current operating licence period. 
STUK approved the plans for the solidification 
facility, supervised the construction during 2004–
2006, and is expecting to approve its commission-
ing in 2007 according to the respective operating 
licence condition.
In summary, it can be stated that the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant has fulfilled the licence condi-
tions defined in the current operating licence.
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14 Summary
Sections 5 to 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) 
contain the following provisions on the safe use of 
nuclear energy:
Section 5, The use of nuclear energy, taking into 
account its various effects, shall be in line with the 
overall good of society;
Section 6, The use of nuclear energy must be 
safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or damage 
to the environment or property;
Section 6a, Nuclear waste generated in connec-
tion with or as a result of use of nuclear energy in 
Finland shall be handled, stored and permanently 
disposed of in Finland […]; and
Section 7, Sufficient physical protection and 
emergency planning as well as other arrangements 
for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting 
nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be a 
prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.
A licence is required for the use of nuclear ener-
gy (section 8 of the Nuclear Energy Act). According 
to section 20 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the licence 
to operate a nuclear facility may be granted if:
1. the operation of the nuclear facility has been 
arranged so that the protection of workers, the 
population’s	 safety	 and	 environmental	 protec-
tion have been taken into account appropriately 
(sections 4 and 4.6 of the safety assessment);
2. the methods available to the applicant for ar-
ranging nuclear waste management, including 
the final disposal of nuclear waste and the de-
commissioning of the facility, are sufficient and 
appropriate (section 10);
3. the applicant has sufficient expertise available 
and, in particular, the competence of the operat-
ing staff and the operating organisation of the 
nuclear facility are appropriate (section 6.3.2);
4. the applicant is otherwise considered to have 
the financial and other prerequisites to engage 
in operations safely and in accordance with 
Finland’s	 international	 contractual	 obligations	
(sections 12 and 13); and
5. the nuclear facility and its operation otherwise 
fulfil the principles laid down in sections 5–7.
Operation of the nuclear facility shall not be started 
on the basis of a licence granted:
1. until the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Author-
ity (STUK) has ascertained that the nuclear fa-
cility meets the safety requirements set, that the 
physical protection and emergency planning are 
sufficient, that the necessary control to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been 
arranged appropriately, and that the licensee of 
the nuclear facility has, as provided, arranged 
indemnification regarding liability in case of 
nuclear damage (sections 3–13); and
2. until the Ministry of Trade and Industry has 
ascertained that provision for the cost of nuclear 
waste management has been arranged in ac-
cordance with the provisions of chapter 7.
In this safety assessment, STUK has evaluated 
the realisation of those points that fall within its 
mandate.
with regard to section 20, paragraph 1, points 
1–3 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the arrangements 
for the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units, 
and the related buildings and storage facilities 
required for nuclear fuel and nuclear waste man-
agement are sufficient and adequate in respect of 
safety for granting the operating licence.
with regard to section 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK states that the finnish electricity mar-
ket has already been open to competition for 10 
years with no adverse effects in respect of the 
investments relating to the safety of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant having been observed. The 
finnish legislation and the practices of the licen-
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see concerning it are, to the extent falling within 
STUK’s mandate, in accordance with international 
treaties.
No such factors on the basis of which the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant could be deemed not 
to comply with the principles laid down in sections 
5 to 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act have arisen in 
the course of supervisory activities carried out by 
STUK.
Relating to section 20, paragraph 2, point 1 
of the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK states that the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant meets the set safe-
ty requirements, with the reservations presented 
below. further, STUK has ascertained that the 
physical protection and emergency planning at the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant are sufficient, that 
the necessary control to prevent the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons has been appropriately ar-
ranged, and that the licensee of the nuclear facility 
has, as provided, arranged indemnification regard-
ing liability in case of nuclear damage.
The design bases concerning the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant were mostly laid down dur-
ing the 1970s. The objective during the operation of 
the plant has been to continuously improve plant 
safety. Substantial modernisations have been car-
ried out at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant since 
its commissioning, and extensive modifications 
have been implemented in several systems in order 
to improve safety.
Risk factors have been systematically identified 
and eliminated using probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA) during the current operating licence period. 
Examples of such plant modifications include en-
suring the cooling of reactor coolant pump seals 
as well as improvements to the plant residu-
al heat removal and emergency cooling systems. 
Improvements to the containment systems for 
managing severe accidents were also implement-
ed during the current operating licence period. 
However, the estimated risk of major release (the 
frequency of a release exceeding the severe acci-
dent limit set forth in section 12 of the Government 
Decision 395/1991) has not been significantly re-
duced because new accident sequences have been 
identified that are not included in the present 
severe accident management strategy. According 
to the latest updated analyses, the Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant meets the target value for core damage 
frequency set for old plants by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but fails to meet 
the numerical design objectives set for new power 
plants by STUK in Guide yvL 2.8.
for nuclear power plants in operation, STUK 
has set a target to attain a safety level as high as 
reasonably achievable. It will be necessary to fur-
ther continue the safety improvement measures 
during the future operating licence period. fPH 
has presented a long-term plan for reducing the ac-
cident and release risk, and for supplementing the 
existing PRA. STUK will monitor and supervise 
the implementation of the programme.
The application submitted by fPH for extending 
the operating licence to exceed the 30-year service 
life that served as the original design basis by 20 
years is essentially based on the estimates made in 
the service life management programme. The serv-
ice life management programme and the related 
know-how have been actively and systematically 
developed at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant since 
the beginning of the 1990s. with regard to mechan-
ical components and structures imposing limits on 
the plant service life, the ageing phenomena iden-
tified through operating experience and research, 
as well as the analysis of their future development 
based on the international research results, have 
served as the starting point. The fatigue analysis 
of primary circuit components has been updated to 
correspond with the 50-year service life.
A number of improvements have been made at 
both nuclear power plant units to reduce the risk 
of brittle fracture in the reactor pressure vessel. 
The recovery heat treatment carried out at the 
Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit in 1996 recov-
ered the fracture toughness characteristics of the 
most embrittled weld nearly back to the original 
level. According to the justification presented by 
fPH, the risk of brittle fracture can be sufficiently 
controlled until the end of the 50-year service life. 
on the basis of the currently valid safety analyses, 
the reactor pressure vessel has been approved for 
operation in the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit 
until 2012 and in Loviisa 2 nuclear power plant 
unit until 2010. STUK is not currently aware of 
any obstacles of a principal nature for the contin-
ued operation of the reactor pressure vessels after 
2012 and 2010. However, the continued operation 
life is subject to renewal of the analyses. fPH 
will estimate the need for further recovery heat 
treatments on the pressure vessels in connection 
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with the preparation of a subsequent application 
concerning the use of pressure vessels. STUK will 
issue a decision on the further use after processing 
the applications received from fPH.
The ageing of electrical and I&C components 
inside and outside the containment of the Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant, as well as their cables and 
installations, will be monitored in connection 
with the regular inspections carried out during 
annual maintenances. STUK has required that 
the ageing management programmes for electri-
cal and I&C systems and components be assessed 
on a regular basis and the annual reporting be 
improved in order to meet the requirements pre-
scribed in the yvL guides. STUK will monitor the 
subsequent developments in connection with its 
oversight process.
The components installed in the protection and 
I&C systems of the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
are old, mostly representing technology dating 
back to the 1960s and 1970s. The changes relating 
to the automation renewal project LARA have been 
commenced during 2006 as preparations for the first 
control room changes. The purpose of the project is to 
gradually renew the protection I&C systems, opera-
tional I&C systems and control room of the plant by 
the end of 2014. The new I&C systems are primarily 
based on programmable technology, which makes 
it possible to obtain more accurate information on 
the status of the monitored and controlled processes 
and I&C systems. The I&C functions will primarily 
remain unchanged. most of the control functions 
will become screen-based. old reactor and plant 
protection systems will be integrated into a single 
new reactor protection system. Two independent 
backup protection systems will be implemented for 
fault conditions in the reactor protection system: 
an automatic programmed and a manual hard-
wired protection system. The automatic system 
covers the actuation of safety functions urgently 
required in cases of accidents, while the manual 
system covers the remaining functions. These two 
securing systems will make it possible to bring the 
plant into hot shutdown even in the event of com-
plete loss of the actual reactor protection system. 
The approval of the automation renewal by STUK 
is progressing in stages. STUK has approved the 
conceptual design plan as the starting point for the 
automation renewal, as well as the conceptual de-
sign plans concerning functional changes.
The significance of a safety culture as an im-
portant factor affecting safety was widely acknowl-
edged at nuclear power plants in the 1990s. The 
development of a safety culture is a continuous 
learning process. According to STUK’s view, fPH 
aims at maintaining an advanced safety culture in 
accordance with requirements. However, the safety 
culture could be advanced in a more systematic 
manner with the help of experts in organisational 
research. In future, fPH must pay more attention 
in the monitoring and further improvement of the 
state of safety culture. STUK will monitor the sub-
sequent developments of safety culture in connec-
tion with its oversight process.
The personnel of the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant are well suited to their duties, as well as com-
petent and trained. Both the anticipated changes 
in the long term and the requirements of the near 
future are considered in the human resource plan-
ning of the power plant. The readiness to react to 
changing resource needs exists even though the 
initiation or completion of some recruitment cam-
paigns has been delayed. Special attention shall be 
paid to ensuring a sufficient number of available 
plant personnel during the future operating licence 
period.
The operating experience feedback at nuclear 
power plants is a continuing process for which 
sufficient resources and opportunities to pursue 
the related activities must be ensured. In particu-
lar, the identification of root causes of events and 
the timely execution of the respective corrective 
actions are of special importance. According to 
STUK’s view, there remain needs for improvement 
in this area for fPH.
In the spring of 2006 the ministry of Trade and 
Industry initiated a project for revising the nuclear 
energy legislation in cooperation with STUK. In 
connection with the project, a Government pro-
posal to amend the Nuclear Energy Act, as well as 
the Government decrees on the amendment of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and on general regulations 
for the safety of a nuclear power plant, physical 
protection concerning the use of nuclear energy, 
emergency preparedness arrangements at nuclear 
power plants and the safety of the disposal of nu-
clear waste, will be prepared. According to prelimi-
nary estimates, the changes concerning nuclear 
energy legislation are planned to enter into force at 
the beginning of 2008. The assessment concerning 
STUK-B 81
77
the renewal of the operating licence for the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units shall be carried 
out based on the currently effective legislation. 
However, the impact of the planned changes on the 
assessment has been considered below by assum-
ing that the changes were already in effect.
The main emphasis in the changes planned 
to the Act is on transferring the basic require-
ments of Government Decisions and the Nuclear 
Energy Decree to the level of the Act, as well as 
those identified from the content of decree drafts 
issued as Government Decrees according to the 
new constitution. Since the majority of the basic 
requirements to be transferred are included in the 
Government Decisions and the Nuclear Energy 
Act currently in force, the planned changes to the 
legislation do not, according to the view of the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, affect 
the assessment concerning the renewal of the 
operating licence for the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units.
The planned amendments to the Nuclear 
Energy Decree concern the transfer of regulation-
level requirements to the Nuclear Energy Act with 
no changes to their content in accordance with the 
new constitution, as well as the revision of export 
and import regulations. Thus the planned amend-
ments to the Nuclear Energy Decree would not 
change the assessment of the renewal of the oper-
ating licence for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant.
The objective of the renewal efforts targeted at 
the Government Decision level is to update the 10- 
to 16-year-old regulations so that the Government 
Decrees to be issued are up to date with regard to 
nuclear safety. The most important amendments to 
Government Decision 395/1991 currently in force 
would relate to severe accidents and handling of 
aircraft crashes, as well as organisational and safe-
ty culture issues in respect of which both technol-
ogy and the level of requirements have advanced. 
Planned amendments to Government Decision 
396/1991 on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Power Plants relate directly to the regulations 
that are to be included in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
Government Decision 397/1991 on the Emergency 
Preparedness of Nuclear Power Plants will be up-
dated to reflect the amendments to the rescue leg-
islation and operations concerning, in particular, 
the regional renewal of rescue operations and the 
initiation of emergency response centre operations. 
In addition, a few principal requirements from the 
guide level are also proposed to be transferred to 
the decree.
The planned amendments to the general regu-
lations will revise the general requirements con-
cerning nuclear safety in such a way that the cur-
rently operating nuclear power plants in Loviisa 
and olkiluoto will no longer fulfil the requirements 
in all respects when the decrees enter into force. 
Therefore, a provision concerning tolerances with 
regard to the application of certain regulations 
to nuclear power plants in operation will be in-
cluded in the Government Decree on the General 
Regulations on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants. 
Similar provisions concerning tolerances with re-
gard to nuclear power plants in operation are 
included in the current Government Decisions. It 
should be noted in this connection that a tolerance 
provision concerning the limit for the dose to an 
individual in the population arising as the result of 
postulated accidents is not intended to be included 
in the revised Government Decree on the Safety 
of Nuclear Power Plants. The current Government 
Decision 395/1991 does contain such tolerance pro-
vision. In connection with submitting the operat-
ing licence application, fPH has also submitted a 
clarification to STUK in which it is demonstrated 
that the 5 mSv dose limit for postulated accidents 
prescribed in section 11 of Government Decision 
395/1991 is not exceeded. The status of all nuclear 
power plants either currently in operation or under 
construction in respect of the amended decree-
level requirements will be assessed as a whole in 
connection with the preparation of the decrees in 
order to estimate the need for tolerance prescrip-
tions, as well as at a later stage when the decrees 
have entered into force. for the plant units in 
operation at olkiluoto, this will take place in con-
nection with the periodic safety review to be car-
ried out by the end of 2008, and for the plant units 
at Loviisa in connection with the separate review 
required to be carried by fPH by the end of 2008. 
for the olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit, the 
assessment will be carried out in connection with 
the processing of the operating licence application.
fPH has applied for an operating licence for 
the Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant unit until 31 
December 2027, and for the Loviisa 2 nuclear pow-
er plant unit, as well as the related buildings and 
storage facilities required for nuclear fuel and nu-
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clear waste management, until 31 December 2030. 
According to section 24 of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
the operating licence shall be granted fixed-term, 
and particular attention shall be paid to ensuring 
safety and to the estimated duration of operations. 
The nuclear energy legislation provides STUK 
with means to intervene in the use of nuclear en-
ergy if safety so requires. In this statement, STUK 
considers the operation referred to by the licence 
applicant to be safe and meets the requirements 
prescribed by legislation. The validity periods of 
the licences presented in the application by the ap-
plicant are the same as the estimated duration of 
operations. The operating licence periods applied 
for in respect of the plant units are in line with the 
decommissioning plan concerning the plant.
The spent fuel storage, liquid waste storage 
and solidification facility located in the area of the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant are all dependent on 
the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units in 
terms of both administration and process technol-
ogy. when the operation of the plant units is termi-
nated, this will require that the operation of these 
facilities is made independent. The stage when the 
facilities are made independent will involve a need 
for a quite extensive safety review.
In conclusion, STUK’s overall evaluation is that, 
with regard to matters falling within it’s mandate, 
the prerequisites of sections 5 to 7 and section 20, 
paragraph 1, of the Nuclear Energy Act for grant-
ing an operating licence for the Loviisa 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units and the related build-
ings and storage facilities required for nuclear fuel 
and nuclear waste management have been met. In 
connection with the preparation of this statement, 
STUK has noted that the matters and arrange-
ments referred to in section 20, paragraph 2, of the 
Nuclear Energy Act are in order.
If the operating licence is granted for the period 
indicated in the application, STUK proposes that 
the licensee be required to carry out two periodic 
safety reviews for the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant 
during the licence period as referred to in Guide 
yvL 1.1; the first safety review shall be submitted 
to STUK for approval by the end of 2015, and the 
second safety review by the end of 2023. STUK 
considers it important that the first overall safety 
assessment be conducted soon after the completion 
of the extensive plant modifications and safety 
improvement measures to be carried out at the 
beginning of the upcoming licence period. further, 
for the purposes of effective operation of STUK, 
it would be beneficial if the extensive safety as-
sessments of the Loviisa and olkiluoto nuclear 
power plants were not processed simultaneously. 
The operating licence for the olkiluoto Nuclear 
Power Plant is valid until 31 December 2018. The 
continuation of the operation of the reactor pres-
sure vessels will be assessed in connection with the 
periodic safety reviews. The execution of periodic 
safety reviews should be included as one of the 
licence conditions.
